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ABSTRACT 
Organizational Resources, Industry Membership, and Firm Performance: The Role of 
Capability Formation and Use in Value Creation for IPO-Stage New Ventures.  
(August 2007) 
Timothy R. Holcomb, B.B.A., University of Louisiana at Monroe; 
 
M.B.A., University of Louisiana at Monroe 
 
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee: Dr. Michael A. Hitt 
  Dr. R. Duane Ireland 
 
 
 
A widely held belief is that resource constraints and industry conditions pose 
severe threats to the performance of entrepreneurial firms. While previous research links 
resources controlled by these firms to different performance outcomes, extant research 
on organizational performance often assumes away contextual differences in the 
allocation of scarce resources by firms to develop and leverage different organizational 
capabilities. Further, no research has explored the performance implications of resource 
use, especially for new ventures.  
The purpose of this study is to bring capabilities to the foreground in the 
examination of organizational performance for new ventures following an initial public 
offering (IPO). Building from resource-based theory and contingency theory, I examine 
the indirect (through capability formation and use) effects that occur within the ‘black 
box’ between resources and performance for a sample of entrepreneurial firms 
undertaking an IPO. New theory is offered to explain the formation and performance 
outcomes of two configurations of organizational capabilities: market-managing 
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capabilities and market-creating capabilities. Human capital is considered, bringing 
agency into theory explaining capability formation and use. Further, I consider how 
underlying routines allow resources to be managed for greater value across different 
industries—conditions that make resources valuable in some contexts and not in others.  
I find that resource endowments at IPO affect the formation and use of 
organizational capabilities and that this relationship varies across different industry 
contexts. Further, I find support for the indirect effect of resources on performance 
outcomes through capability formation and use. More specifically, I find that 
adjustments to the configuration of organizational capabilities affect performance 
prospects over time. Results confirm that capability configurations compete for scarce 
resources, necessitating tradeoffs in allocation decisions between them. I also find that 
industry conditions moderate this relationship.  
By employing an integrative, multidisciplinary approach, this dissertation 
extends research on the performance effects of resource endowments and capability 
formation and use for entrepreneurial firms. Further, it contributes to growing research 
on IPO firms in strategic management and entrepreneurship, especially theoretical and 
empirical research examining the different firm and industry conditions that affect 
organizational performance during the period following a firm’s transition into the 
public arena.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
New ventures face significant challenges in their efforts to foster growth and 
improve performance, while enduring resource constraints and environmental pressures 
threatening their success. Management scholars offer different behavioral, structural, and 
environmental explanations of factors inducing or compelling their growth and 
performance under various conditions. Previous research, for example, has examined 
differences in behavioral and cognitive attributes (e.g., Baum & Locke, 2004; Baum, 
Lock, & Smith, 2001; Begley & Boyd, 1987; Katz & Shepherd, 2003), ecological and 
evolutionary conditions (e.g., Agarwal, Sarkar, & Echamebadi, 2002; Boone, Carroll, & 
van Witteloostuijn, 2002; Carroll & Hannan, 1989; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990; 
Robinson & McDougall, 2001), network ties and interorganizational relations (e.g., 
Gulati & Higgins, 2003; Florin, Lubatkin, & Schulze, 2003; Schoonhoven, Eisenhardt, 
& Lyman, 1990; Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999), and strategic orientation (e.g., 
Bamford, Dean, & McDougall, 2000; Echols & Tsai, 2005) as potential explanations for 
new venture success.  
Recently, scholars have presented resource-based perspectives of new venture 
performance that augment behavioral, structural, and environmental explanations and 
sharpen the focus on new ventures’ relative advantages (e.g., Baker & Nelson, 2005; 
George, 2005; Katila & Shane, 2005; Lichtenstein & Brush, 2001). According to this 
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style of the Academy of Management Journal. 
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perspective, firms differ in their resource positions, providing a source of performance 
heterogeneity across firms (Peteraf, 1993). This growing body of work, which is based 
on the original work of Penrose (1959) and uses Barney’s (1991) more recent translation 
of the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm, emphasizes the importance of resources 
in guiding firm activity and the management of a firm’s capabilities as central to 
competitive advantage.1  
When applying resource-based theory to explain why new ventures perform 
differently, however, results are mixed. Some scholars suggest that new ventures are 
undercapitalized (Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, & Rosen, 1994a, 1994b) and face a ‘liability of 
newness’ that constrains efforts to accumulate resources necessary for survival and 
growth (Brush, Green, & Hart, 2001; Certo, 2003; Choi & Shepherd, 2005). These 
conditions make it difficult to compete, especially against established firms, stifle 
growth and performance, and result in higher mortality rates for young firms. On the 
other hand, scholars have also argued that new ventures often ‘make do’ and even 
flourish by applying different combinations of resources to exploit opportunities despite 
enduring considerable resource constraints (Baker & Nelson, 2005; Garud & Karnoe, 
2003). These firms embrace and even pursue challenging growth strategies despite their 
inability to attract resources these actions demand (MacMillan & McGrath, 1997; 
                                                 
1
 Resources, broadly defined, have often been used in the literature in a generic sense to also include 
capabilities (e.g., Barney, 1991). Other scholars claim that capabilities represent how firms manage 
resources (e.g., Dutta, Narasimhan, & Rajiv, 2005; Helfat & Peteraf, 2003) or that capabilities represent a 
unique combination of resources that enable firms to pursue specific actions that create value (Sirmon, 
Hitt, & Ireland, 2007). For purposes of this dissertation, I use ‘resources’ to represent tangible or 
intangible assets (Barney, 1991; Grant, 1991) that new ventures’ own, control, or are provided access to on 
a semi-permanent basis, and that allow them to implement their strategies (Helfat & Peteraf, 2003). By 
contrast, ‘capabilities’ represent organizational routines that allow firms to effectively integrate and use 
resources to implement their strategies (Lavie, 2006; Winter, 2003). Capabilities serve as the intermediate 
transformation between allocations of resources by new ventures and the outcomes such resources are 
intended to achieve (Dosi, Nelson, & Winter, 2002; Lavie, 2006; Winter, 2000).  
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Mahoney & Michael, 2005) by making more efficient use of their resources 
(Mosakowski, 1998). Still, surprisingly little is known about how new ventures exploit 
their resources to achieve market and financial success (Katila & Shane, 2005; Zahra, 
1996). This gap is puzzling because poor resource allocation choices by new ventures, 
facing resource constraints, not only can undermine their performance, but also can 
affect their survival. Furthermore, while the RBV integrates context-specificity by 
requiring resources be ‘valuable’ (Barney, 1991), only a few attempts have been made to 
unpack the contingent effects that make resources more effective in some contexts and 
not in others.  
In response, this dissertation brings capabilities to the foreground in the 
examination of new venture performance. Further, building on earlier recommendations 
by scholars to consider the context in which resources are used (e.g., Barney, 2001; 
Priem & Butler, 2001a, 2001b; Sirmon, Hitt, & Ireland, 2007), this dissertation proposes 
an approach to examine the influence of environmental uncertainty on relationships 
between venture resources and performance. Stated differently, because resource-based 
theory is ‘context insensitive’ (Brush & Artz, 1999: 223), it is instructive to understand 
that certain conditions make the same resources and capabilities valuable in some 
contexts and not in others. Furthermore, resource-based arguments imply that 
organizational capabilities partially mediate the resource-performance link (Amit & 
Schoemaker, 1993; Black & Boal, 1994; Galunic & Rodan, 1998; Peteraf & Bergen, 
2003; however, no theory has substantiated this relationship and it stands untested. 
Indeed, the majority of resource-based research examines performance effects broadly, 
focusing on the distal relationship between resource attributes (e.g., the so-called VRIN 
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characteristics) and different performance outcomes. Accordingly, to understand the 
relationship between venture resources and performance, I examine relationships that 
occur within the ‘black box’ between resources and performance by identifying 
capabilities and measuring the underlying routines that allow resources to be managed 
for greater value.  
This dissertation views resources as inputs to productive activity that also act as 
inducements to experiment, take risks, and make discretionary strategic choices (George, 
2005; Mishina, Pollock, & Porac, 2004). They vary in type (e.g., financial capital and 
human capital) and they are used by new ventures to exploit existing product-market 
positions and to develop new product-market positions or substantially alter the process 
by which goods and services are produced. Neither owning nor controlling resources, 
nor having semi-permanent access to them, ensures performance (e.g., Black & Boal, 
1994; Maritan & Brush, 2003; Peteraf & Bergen, 2003; Priem & Butler, 2001a). Instead, 
resources must be used effectively (Morrow, Sirmon, Hitt, & Holcomb, 2007; Sirmon et 
al., 2007). In turn, capabilities ‘transform’ venture resources to achieve outcomes that 
are either operational or strategic in scope (Dutta, Narasimhan, & Rajiv, 2005; Winter, 
2000). Accordingly, how firms configure and ultimately use capabilities affect resource 
value and confer upon management decision options for performance in the short-term 
and for value creation and growth over time.  
Building on two enduring theoretical perspectives, the resource-based view of the 
firm (e.g., Barney, 1991; Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984) and contingency-based 
theory (e.g., Donaldson, 2001; Burns & Stalker, 1961; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1968; Zajac, 
Kraatz, & Bresser, 2000), I develop a theoretical model that examines the indirect 
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(through capability formation and use) effects of resources on firm performance for new 
ventures following an IPO. Herein, a capability configuration represents a distinctive 
combination of organizational capabilities consisting of routines, the attributes of those 
routines, and interdependencies formed across different configurations that allow firms 
to establish, maintain, and extend a competitive advantage (Lavie, 2006; Winter, 2003). 
New theory is offered to explain the formation and use together with the performance 
effects of two configuration types: market-managing capabilities and market-creating 
capabilities. Market-managing capabilities consist of operating routines that permit 
firms to exploit existing product market positions (March, 1991) and to more efficiently 
manage related productive and administrative activity. These capabilities are considered 
value-enabling because they exploit existing positions and bring stability and greater 
efficiencies to existing business activity. Examples include manufacturing, distribution 
and logistics management, procurement and inventory management, finance and 
financial reporting, labor relations and human resource management, and service 
management and customer support.  
By contrast, market-creating capabilities consist of dynamic routines (Teece, 
Pisano, & Shuen, 1997) that extend or substantially augment existing product-market 
positions, create new ones, or alter the process(es) by which future goods and services 
are produced and thus provide an important source of organizational flexibility and 
change. Accordingly, market-creating capabilities are value-enhancing, rather than 
value-enabling, because they permit ventures to achieve growth by altering current 
organizational scale and scope and thus enable competitive advantages to be sustained. 
Examples include research and development, engineering design, brand management 
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and advertising, new product introduction, alliance formation and management, mergers 
and acquisitions, and divestitures. 
In sum, this dissertation suggests that resources exert an indirect influence on 
performance of new ventures through the capabilities these firms configure and 
maintain. This conjecture is based on resource-based and contingency-based logics, 
which suggest that resource value is contingent on the context of their use. Accordingly, 
this work attempts to reach beyond the question of resource heterogeneity as an 
explanation for performance differences to deepen our understanding of contingencies 
influencing both the formation of different capability configurations, and the 
performance outcomes such capabilities are leveraged to achieve. 
Research Questions 
This research builds on previous studies of large firms and privately-held 
businesses in strategic management and entrepreneurship. It explores factors influencing 
the configuration of organizational capabilities by new ventures and the effect such 
configurations have on performance outcomes for these firms. Specifically, I propose 
and empirically test the influence of different venture resource combinations at IPO on 
the formation and use of organizational capabilities, given different industry conditions, 
as well as the indirect effects of venture resources on performance outcomes through 
different configurations of organizational capabilities. 
Young, entrepreneurial firms, specifically IPO-stage new ventures, provide an 
important context to consider our questions. These firms confront many obstacles in 
their formation and growth—limits in resources, knowledge, and legitimacy—and poor 
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choices about resource use not only undermine their performance, but also their survival. 
For purposes of this dissertation, new ventures are defined as firms that are six years old 
or less (Brush, 1995; Robinson & McDougall, 2001; Zahra, Ireland, & Hitt, 2000) at the 
time of their IPO (Florin et al., 2003). As previously discussed, this study examines how 
different resource endowments and environmental conditions at IPO affect the 
configuration of capabilities for new ventures, and how different capability 
configurations given prevailing environmental conditions explain performance outcomes 
among these firms. In doing so, this dissertation draws on and extends resource-based 
theory and contingency theory in the study of new venture performance.  
I examine three research questions: 
1. To what extent do resource endowments (e.g., financial capital and human 
capital) controlled by a new venture explain its performance following an 
IPO?  
2. To what extent do venture resources and environmental conditions at IPO 
account for the formation and use of market-managing and market-creating 
capabilities by new ventures following the IPO? Is the relationship between 
venture resources at IPO and the formation and use of these two 
configurations contingent on different environmental conditions at IPO? If 
so, to what extent? 
3. To what extent is the configuration of organizational capabilities likely to 
influence performance among new ventures? And importantly, does 
capability formation and use partially mediate the relationship between 
venture resources at IPO and performance? 
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Figure 1 summarizes the conceptual model for this dissertation. This model 
depicts conditions for new venture performance driven by assumptions about a venture’s 
resource endowment at IPO, and the contingent effects of the environment at IPO on the 
relationship between venture resources and the configuration of organizational 
capabilities by new ventures. Resource-based arguments imply a partial mediation effect 
of the use or allocation of resources through capabilities on firm performance (e.g., Dosi, 
Nelson, & Winter, 2002; Kogut & Kulatilaka, 2001). Nevertheless, the majority of 
resource-based research examines the use of resources broadly, focusing on the distal 
relationship between the value, rarity, inimitability, and nonsubstitutability (i.e., so-
called VRIN attributes) characteristics of firms’ resource endowments and different 
performance outcomes. As a result, scholars have largely overlooked the mediating 
effect that resource use exhibit on performance. In light of these deficiencies, this model 
asserts that the formation and use of different capability configurations partially 
mediates the effects of venture resources at IPO on the performance of these firms. 
Further, this model also asserts that the industry context moderates this relationship, 
such that the extent to which certain capability configurations explain different venture 
outcomes is contingent on environmental conditions at IPO. 
Contributions 
Although the elusive link between firms’ resource endowments and different 
performance outcomes has frustrated strategic management scholars for decades, 
resources and the resource-based view continues to receive widespread attention from 
scholars. By employing an integrative, multidisciplinary approach, this dissertation 
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makes three important contributions to the growing research on new venture 
performance. 
First, this research proposes and measures new constructs representing how firms 
configure capabilities. In doing so, the study builds new theory that extends the RBV to 
explain the indirect influence of resources on performance through capability formation 
and use. These constructs increase the theory’s predictive validity and enhance our 
understanding of the performance efficacy of resources. Resource-based logic suggests 
that resource endowments exhibit both direct and indirect effects on new venture 
performance. Thus, embedded within this argument is the implicit assumption that 
capabilities serve an important role in the relationship between venture resources and the 
performance outcomes such resources achieve (Dosi et al., 2002; Lavie, 2006; Winter, 
2000). Nevertheless, the majority of resource-based research overlooks possible 
intervening effects and focuses almost exclusively on direct resource-performance or 
capability-performance relationships (e.g., Denrell, Fang, & Winter, 2003; Peteraf & 
Bergen, 2003) or, more recently, on measurements of capability effectiveness (e.g., 
Dutta et al., 2005; Lieberman & Dhawan, 2005).  
On the surface, the resource-performance relationship might appear to be a fair 
proxy of value creation via the development of competitive advantage (Ireland, Hitt, & 
Sirmon, 2003). However, considerable research suggests that performance outcomes are 
not simply a function of the value and rarity of resources, but also depend on the way in 
which those resources are deployed and used by a firm (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Amit 
& Schoemaker, 1993; Penrose, 1959). Given the noise in firm-level performance 
outcomes and measures (Brush, Bromiley, & Hendrickx, 1999) and the relatively 
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equivocal nature of the resource-performance relationship in prior research (Priem & 
Butler, 2001a), this work asserts that examining the influence of resources on firm 
performance through the configuration of a venture’s capabilities will enhance our 
understanding of the efficacy of different resource endowments in achieving valuable 
performance outcomes.  
Second, in examining relationships across different industry contexts, this study 
provides a contingent view of the resource-performance link that to-date has been 
unexplored. Thus, it extends research examining the influence of industry membership 
on the value of resources (e.g., Agarwal et al., 2002; Bamford et al., 2000; Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven, 1990), answering calls to further integrate contingency theory logic into 
our understanding of the RBV (Aragon-Correa & Sharma, 2003; Sirmon et al., 2007). 
Further, by employing a multilevel framework to examine cross-level relationships, this 
study contributes to the growing literature examining the relative importance of firm- 
and industry-level factors on firm performance (e.g., Hawawani, Subramanian, & 
Verdin, 2003; Hough, 2006; Misangyi, Elms, Greckhamer, & Lepine, 2006). 
Relying on resource-based theory and contingency theory perspectives, this 
dissertation provides a theoretical framework explaining how characteristics of the 
environment influence the allocation of resources to different capability configurations 
and its impact on new venture performance. This is important because while prior work 
has established that patterns of capabilities vary with different environmental 
contingencies (e.g., Brush & Artz, 1999; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000), the contingent 
resource-based approach as yet has not generated sufficient empirical research to explain 
performance variations between different environmental contexts. In integrating these 
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two perspectives, this research accepts the view that environmental conditions influence 
firm performance, but does not mechanistically determine it, thus avoiding previous 
criticisms of contingency theory as being too deterministic (Dess, Lumpkin, & Covin, 
1997; Schoonhoven, 1981). Accordingly, this dissertation contributes to the literature by 
offering a systemic examination of contingency theory, and it reinforces previous studies 
addressing the influence of environmental and competitive conditions on resource 
allocations and the performance outcomes venture resources are intended to achieve.  
Finally, this study advances our understanding of firms recently completing the 
transition to the public arena. Specifically, it contributes to a growing body of research 
on IPO-stage firms, especially theoretical and empirical research examining conditions 
that affect performance following an IPO. Over the past several years, IPOs have 
received a significant amount of attention in the finance (e.g., Jain & Kini, 1994), 
strategic management (e.g., Certo, Covin, Daily, & Dalton, 2001; Certo, Daily, Cannella, 
& Dalton, 2003; Certo, 2003), and organizational (e.g., Fischer & Pollock, 2004; 
Welbourne & Andrews, 1996) literatures. The primary focus of much of this research 
has been on discovering factors affecting the initial pricing of IPO stocks and their 
market returns over various periods. Although IPOs offer a number of benefits to firms 
that successfully navigate the transition, the transformation from private to public 
ownership often necessitates a change in strategies (Fisher & Pollock, 2004) as firms 
determine how to deploy new financial resources made available by the public offering. 
Although IPO firms vary in the intensity with which they pursue different activities, all 
generally face the difficult task of adapting their administrative systems enough to incur 
some reexposure with liabilities of newness (Certo, 2003; Fisher & Pollock, 2004). 
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Because capabilities form the basis for the ability of firms to perform critical activities, 
resource considerations are likely to constrain the range of capabilities available to these 
ventures. Accordingly, this dissertation contributes to the growing research on IPO firms 
in strategic management and entrepreneurship, especially theoretical and empirical 
research examining the different conditions that may affect a new venture’s performance 
during the period following its transition into the public arena. 
In sum, I conjecture that given the critical role of resource endowments to firm 
success, the configuration and use of different resource combinations (i.e., capabilities) 
and their impact on new venture growth and performance carries substantive 
implications for scholarship in strategic management and entrepreneurship research and 
for the practice of management. Furthermore, the conceptual and theoretical framework 
developed in this dissertation may have important implications beyond the current focus 
on new ventures to privately-held firms and to larger publicly traded firms in strategic 
management. 
Organization of Dissertation  
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter II presents a review of the 
extant literature on theories used to explain new venture performance. In Chapter III, I 
describe why and how new ventures combine their resources to form different capability 
configurations and elaborate on the direct and indirect performance implications of these 
actions on the performance of new ventures. I also consider how the environment 
moderates these relationships. Additionally in Chapter III, I present the hypotheses and 
theoretical model relating different resource types, environmental conditions, and their 
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interaction with the configuration of organizational capabilities and new venture 
performance. I also demonstrate how the formation and use of capability configurations 
partially mediate the relationship between venture resources at IPO and new venture 
success. In Chapter IV, I describe the research methodology employed to test the 
hypothesized relationships. More specifically, I describe the sample, operationalizations 
of the dependent, intervening, independent, moderator, and control variables, and the 
model specification approach with the analytical procedures applied to test the 
hypotheses. Chapter V reports the results of the analyses. Finally, Chapter VI discusses 
the contributions of this study as well as possible directions for future research. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
Investigation of new venture success remains a principal area of research in 
multiple disciplines. Scholars have employed a variety of theoretical approaches to 
explain various behavioral, structural, and environmental factors as causes of new 
venture growth and performance. However, previous research has generally applied less 
sophisticated theoretical models, often choosing to examine these factors in isolation in 
order to answer questions about different venture outcomes (Baum & Locke, 2004). 
Authors of more recent studies, however, combine different dimensions to provide a 
more comprehensive prediction of venture growth and performance (e.g., Baum, & 
Locke, 2004; Baum et al., 2001; Chrisman, Bauerschmidt, & Hofer, 1998; Covin & 
Slevin, 1990; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990). These studies reflect similar attempts 
in strategic management research to explain the contingent effects of different 
organizational attributes and environmental conditions on firm performance (e.g., Zajac 
et al., 2000). However, despite calls for increasingly more robust theoretical frameworks 
to untangle the multifaceted process by which new ventures and established firms 
perform (Aldrich & Martinez, 2001; Dess et al., 1997; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000), 
there is room for substantial theoretical and methodological improvements using models 
that are more sophisticated.  
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This chapter summarizes literature pertaining to new venture performance. This 
review consists of two sections. The first section of this chapter provides a descriptive 
overview of dominant theoretical perspectives previously used to explain different 
performance outcomes. This section also summarizes the extensive empirical literature 
investigating the relationships between behavioral, structural, and environmental factors 
and the different performance outcomes. Limitations of the extant literature on new 
venture performance are discussed to motivate further investigation of the relationship 
between venture resources and new venture performance. 
Dominant Approaches to New Venture Growth and Performance 
A number of dominant perspectives, including those associated with strategic 
management, organization theory, economics, sociology, and psychology, prescribe 
conditions for increased new venture growth and performance (Ireland, Webb, & 
Coombs, 2005). Theories from strategic management, for example, offer insights for 
how new ventures develop and sustain competitive advantages and why some firms 
succeed while others fail. By contrast, organization theory informs our understanding 
about environmental conditions affecting the founding, growth and performance, and 
mortality of new and established firms and populations of firms. Economics provides 
theoretical frameworks used by scholars to examine the efficiency and effectiveness of 
new ventures. Sociology provides insights into how different groups collectively 
function within organizations, and psychological perspectives permit examination of the 
effects of different personality traits, behaviors, cognitions, and other attributes on the 
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TABLE 1  
Theories Relevant to New Venture Growth and Performance 
 
  
Behavioral Theory Organizational Ecology Institutional Theory Network Theory Organizational Strategy  
Resource-based 
Theory2 
Disciplinary Origins Psychology & Sociology Organization Theory & 
Sociology 
Organization Theory & 
Sociology 
Organization Theory & 
Sociology 
Strategic Management Strategic Management 
Theoretical 
Approaches and  
Related Research 
Streams 
Behavioral Traits Theory 
Cognitive Theory  
Intentionality 
- Theory of Planned 
Behavior 
- Entrepreneurial Event 
Model 
Density Dependence 
Theory  
Liability of Adolescence  
Liability of Newness  
Liability of Smallness  
Niche-Width Theory 
Resource-Partitioning 
Theory  
Institutional Theory 
New Institutional 
Theory 
Social Capital Theory  
Structural Hole Theory  
Strategy Formulation/ 
Formation 
Strategic Orientation 
Entrepreneurial 
Orientation  
Contingent Resource-
based Theory  
Dynamic Capabilities  
Entrepreneurial 
Bricolage 
Knowledge-based View  
Resource-based View 
Resource Allocation 
Key Contributors Ajzen (1991) 
Bandura (1997) 
Baum & Locke (2004) 
Baum, Locke, & Smith 
(2001) 
Begley & Boyd (1987) 
Bird (1988) 
Brockhaus (1980) 
Gatewood, Shaver, & 
Gartner (1995) 
Gist & Mitchell (1992) 
Katz & Shepherd (2003) 
Krueger (2003) 
Krueger, Reilly, & 
Carsrud (2000) 
Locke & Latham (1990) 
McClelland (1965) 
Mitchell, Smith, 
Seawright, & Morse 
(2000) 
Sexton & Bowman 
(1986) 
Shapero (1975, 1982) 
Boone, Carroll, & van 
Witteloostuijn (2002) 
Brush, Green, & Hart 
(2001) 
Brüdel & Schüssler 
(1990) 
Carroll (1984, 1985) 
Carroll, Dobrev, & 
Swaminathan (2002 
Carroll & Hannan (1989) 
Choi & Shepherd (2005) 
Dobrev, Kim, & Hannan 
(2001) 
Freeman, Carroll, & 
Hannan (1983) 
Freeman & Hannan 
(1983) 
Hannan & Freeman 
(1977, 1984) 
Pfeffer & Salancik 
(1978) 
Stinchcombe (1965) 
Swaminathan (2001) 
Baum & Oliver (1991, 
1996) 
DiMaggio & Powell 
(1983) 
Greenwood & Hinings 
(1996) 
Meyer & Rowan (1977) 
Selznick (1996) 
Scott (1987, 1995) 
Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels 
(1999) 
Zucker (1987) 
Burt (1992) 
Coleman (1988) 
Granovetter (1973) 
Gulati & Higgins (2003) 
Florin, Lubatkin, & 
Schulze (2003) 
Nahapiet & Ghoshal 
(1998) 
Covin & Slevin (1989) 
Lumpkin & Dess (1996) 
McDougall, Robinson, & 
DeNisi (1992) 
Miller (1983) 
Miles & Snow (1978) 
Sandberg (1986) 
Sandberg & Hofer (1987) 
Vesper (1980) 
Baker & Nelson (2005)  
Barney (1991) 
Bower & Gilbert (2006) 
Brush & Artz (1999) 
Dosi, Nelson, & Winter 
(2002) 
Dutta, Narasimhan, & 
Rajiv (2005) 
Garud & Karnoe (2003) 
Grant (1996) 
Helfat & Peteraf (2003) 
Lavie (2006) 
Morrow, Sirmon, Hitt, & 
Holcomb (2007) 
Mosakowski (2002) 
Penrose (1959) 
Peteraf (1993) 
Sirmon, Hitt, & Ireland 
(2007) 
Teece, Pisano, & Shuen 
(1997) 
Wernerfelt (1984) 
Winter (2000, 2003) 
 
                                                 
2
 Previous theoretical and empirical research investigating the relationships posited by resource-based theory is provided in Chapter III. 
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TABLE 1 (cont.) 
 
  Behavioral Theory Organizational Ecology Institutional Theory Network Theory Organizational Strategy  Resource-based Theory 
Underlying 
Theoretical 
Assumptions 
Venture growth and 
performance is a function 
of personality traits, 
cognitions, and other 
important individual 
attributes (i.e., education, 
experience, tenure, etc.) 
that differentiate 
entrepreneurial and 
managerial tendencies 
across individuals 
Venture growth and 
performance is a 
function of the age and 
size of the venture, the 
organizational form 
(structure), the 
distribution of resources, 
and the density of 
population of firms. 
Venture performance is 
a function of the degree 
to which features of a 
venture conform to 
cognitive, normative, 
and regulative structures 
that provide stability 
and meaning to social 
behavior, i.e. rules, 
norms, expectations, 
and values of society. 
Venture growth and 
performance is 
explained by virtue of 
the relationships 
ventures maintain with 
actors (i.e., other firms, 
government institutions, 
etc.) in the environment. 
Venture growth and 
performance is a 
function of the degree to 
which a venture's 
strategic orientation 
matches the competitive 
market and whether it 
possess the necessary 
attributes to identify, 
evaluate, and exploit new 
opportunities. 
Venture growth and 
performance is 
explained by the value, 
inimitability, rarity, and 
non-substitutability of a 
ventures resource 
endowment and the 
manner in which those 
resources are employed 
through capabilities for 
productive purposes. 
Resource and 
Capability Conditions 
Conceptualizations of 
resources and capabilities 
are generally confined to 
attributes of an individual 
(the entrepreneur, 
founder, manager). 
Treats resources as an 
exogenous condition. 
Accounts for adaptive 
organizational change by 
focusing on the 
distribution of resources 
in the environment and 
the terms on which they 
are available. 
New ventures conform 
to institutional rules in 
order to gain access to 
resources that enhance 
their ability to compete. 
Structural, relational, 
and cognitive linkages 
between firms and 
within networks 
facilitate information 
and resource flows 
between firms. Social 
capital refers to the sum 
of resources that accrue 
to a firm through 
relationships formed 
between firms and itself 
is considered a resource. 
Resources affect 
strategic actions to the 
extent ventures' 
management consider 
resources owned and 
controlled, or available 
via the market in 
formulating strategy. 
Resources guide venture 
activity and management 
of capabilities is central 
to value creation. When 
resources and 
capabilities are valuable, 
rare, and inimitable, they 
convey a potential for 
competitive advantage. 
Rent generation then is a 
function of ex ante 
resource-selection and 
ex post capability-
building. 
Variables of Interest Personality traits (Need 
for achievement, self-
esteem, self-efficacy, 
locus of control, risk-
taking propensity, 
tolerance for 
ambiguity) 
Cognitions (knowledge, 
heuristics, biases, 
decision  routines) 
Other demographics 
(age, gender, education, 
experience, etc.) 
Bargaining power 
Firm age 
Firm size 
Legitimacy 
Number of organizations 
Population density 
Population concentration 
Resource partitioning 
TMT and Board 
composition 
Performance 
heterogeneity 
Resource composition 
Tie number 
Tie strength 
Network centrality 
Board interlocks 
Relationship prestige 
Strategy type 
Entrepreneurial 
characteristics 
Financial capital  
(cash, assets, debt, 
equity) 
Human capital 
(knowledge, expertise, 
experience) 
Social capital 
(relationship ties, 
board interlocks, 
underwriter prestige) 
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behavior and performance outcomes of new ventures. Table 1 provides a summary of 
dominant perspectives explaining different performance outcomes for new ventures: 
behavioral theory, organizational ecology, institutional theory, network theory, and new 
venture strategy. This dissertation briefly examines each of these perspectives in the 
following sections. 
Behavioral Theory 
Generally, psychological research into new venture performance has 
concentrated on the relationship between psychological traits (e.g., Brockhaus, 1980), 
intentionality (e.g., Krueger, Reilly, & Carsrud, 2000), and cognitions (e.g., Krueger, 
2003; Katz & Shepherd, 2003), respectively, and different venture outcomes.  
Traits 
Personality traits are dispositions that are relatively stable across time and setting 
(Epstein & O’Brien, 1985). According to this perspective, individuals possess 
personality traits that are assumed to correlate with entrepreneurial or managerial 
behaviors, and thus directly influence venture outcomes. Personality traits often 
associated in the literature with new venture success include need for achievement (e.g., 
Lee & Tsang, 2001; McClelland, 1965), self-esteem (e.g., Baum et al., 2001; Locke & 
Latham, 1990), self-efficacy (e.g., Bandura, 1997; Gatewood et al., 1995; Gist & 
Mitchell, 1992; Poon, Ainuddin, & Junit, 2006; Zhao, Seibert, & Hills, 2005), locus of 
control (e.g., Lee & Tsang, 2001; Sexton & Bowman, 1986), risk-taking propensity (e.g., 
Brockhaus, 1980; Teoh & Foo, 1997), tolerance of ambiguity (e.g., Teoh & Foo, 1997), 
and tenacity (e.g., Baum & Locke, 2004; Baum et al., 2001), among others.  
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Although venture capitalists and entrepreneurs themselves commonly point to 
entrepreneurs’ personal characteristics as dominant reasons for success (Sexton, 2001), 
research examining the utility of using personality trait measures in the prediction of 
new venture creation, in addition to new venture growth and performance, has produced 
equivocal results (Aldrich & Wiedenmayer, 1993; Begley & Boyd, 1987; Brockhaus & 
Horwitz, 1986; Low & MacMillan, 1988). For example, Johnson’s (1990) meta-analysis 
results concluded that while achievement motivation is a distinguishing characteristic of 
entrepreneurs, personality traits more generally are not meaningful predictors of new 
venture performance, finding that their effects accounted for less than 7% of the 
explained variance.  
Recent attempts to show the relevance of risk-taking and tolerance of ambiguity 
in the role-conflict to firm performance relationship also produced weak results (e.g., 
Teoh & Foo, 1997). Based on their review of the literature, Carsrud and Krueger (1995) 
found need for achievement (McClelland, 1965), risk-taking propensity (Brockhaus, 
1980), and locus of control (Sexton & Bowman, 1986) were not meaningfully related to 
new venture performance. Baum and Locke (2004) concluded passion for work, defined 
as one’s enthusiasm or zeal for challenge and task uncertainty (Locke, 2000), and 
tenacity, or perseverance (Gatewood et al., 1995), traits failed to significantly account 
for variance in new venture growth. These results led some researchers to conclude the 
use of personality traits to explain new venture outcomes was a ‘dead-end strategy’ 
(Gartner, 1990). 
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Intentionality 
In contrast to the representation of personality traits as stable dispositions, 
intentions, in their simplest form, capture motivational factors believed to influence 
behaviors (Ajzen, 1991; Krueger et al., 2000). More specifically, intentions indicate the 
degree to which people commit to a course of action and the level of effort they are 
willing to exert. Thus, intentions motivate people to act and guide goal-setting, 
communication, and commitment (Bird, 1988). Generally, the greater the intention to 
engage in a behavior, the more likely should be its performance. These motivations refer 
to the different mechanisms governing the direction, intensity, and persistence of actions 
not due solely to differences in ability or to environmental conditions that coerce or 
force certain actions (Bolles, 1975; Vroom, 1964). In fact, evidence suggests that 
intentionality may be the single best predictor of planned behavior (e.g., Krueger et al., 
2000). Because individual behaviors have consequential effects on venture behaviors 
(Busenitz & Barney, 1997), scholars therefore believe intentions play an important role 
in the growth and performance of new ventures.  
Entrepreneurial intentions are derived from perceptions of desirability (i.e., the 
personal attractiveness of new opportunities or a specified venture outcome) and 
feasibility (the degree to which an individual feels personally capable) and from an 
individual’s propensity to act volitionally (Shapero, 1975, 1982). Accordingly, 
intentional routines are central to voluntary behavior because they govern 
entrepreneurial choice among alternative courses of action (Vroom, 1964), and then 
orient behaviors that guide actions (Ajzen, 1991; Bandura, 1986; Bird, 1988; Krueger, 
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2003; Weiner, 1985). In other words, only when the features of an opportunity align with 
an individual’s intentions will s/he act. As such, intentionality directs attention, 
experience, and action toward search and discovery routines aimed at the exploitation of 
new opportunities. Accordingly, the stronger the intention to engage in a behavior, the 
more likely should be its performance.  
Social psychologists have found success in using parsimonious models of 
behavioral intentions to explain individual behaviors (Krueger, 2003; Krueger et al., 
2000). As a result, two of the more robust theory-driven models of intentions found their 
way into new venture research: the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991) and 
Shapero’s (1975, 1982) model of entrepreneurial events. The theory of planned behavior 
is an extension of the theory of reasoned action (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 1975). This theory offers a dispositional prediction of human behavior that 
emphasizes factors affecting the motivation to perform a given behavior, such as 
attitudes toward the behavior (perceptions and beliefs about personal impacts of the 
resulting outcomes), perceived social norms, and perceived behavioral control (ability; 
e.g., availability of time, money, skills, etc.). By contrast, Shapero’s (1982) 
entrepreneurial event model is implicitly an intention model, specific to the domain of 
entrepreneurship, whereby intentions to start a new venture derive from perceptions of 
desirability and feasibility and from a propensity to act on recognized emergent 
opportunities. 
Both models have produced considerable empirical support. For example, 
research has verified the significance of perceptions of desirability and perceptions of 
feasibility and, for example, the intent to start a new venture (e.g., Krueger et al., 2000; 
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Shook, Priem, & McGee, 2003) or to be self-employed (e.g., Kolvereid, 1996). 
However, there appears to be no substantive research examining specific venture 
outcomes beyond the creation of new ventures. 
Cognitions 
Understanding of the uncertainty of traits and intentions in explaining new 
venture outcomes led researchers to study variations in cognitions and decision 
processes to explain new venture creation and outcomes such as growth, performance, 
and survival. Theories of social cognition play a vital role in explaining the venture 
creation decision, and suggest that perceptions and judgments, rather than objective 
reality, may explain venture success (Simon, Houghton, & Aquino, 1999). Cognitive 
theory explains behavior as it is shaped by the person-environment interaction. 
According to this perspective, decision making occurs within a specific context or 
situation described by two pairs of factors: (1) cognition and motivation, and (2) the 
person and the situation (Fiske & Taylor, 1984: 4-5). Accordingly, models used to 
explain individual behavior attempt to approximate reality as perceived when an 
individual processes information about these two factor pairs. In this manner, social 
cognition scholars associate individual information processing, judgment, and choice 
with individual decision-making conditions that occur as a result of different situational 
contexts (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978). 
Sociologists often apply cognitive theory to examine the interaction between 
individuals and their environment, arguing that social context plays a major role in 
shaping cognitive structures and, consequently, entrepreneurial behaviors (Zahra, Korri, 
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& Yu, 2005). For example, Day and Lord (1992) concluded that, compared to novices, 
individuals with significant experience founding and managing new ventures (i.e., 
experts) were more schema-driven, which they attribute to different heuristics formed by 
experts through experience. In other words, social cognition theory suggests that 
experience conditions individuals in such a way as to explain how such individuals 
gather and analyze certain types of information differently than individuals without 
experience (Ucbasaran, Wright, Westhead, & Busenitz, 2003). Accordingly, researchers 
have relied on measures of entrepreneurial experience to explain variation in differential 
propensities among individual entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial firms to recognize and 
consequently choose to exploit opportunities in the market. 
Some research suggests that cognitive constructs relating to biases and heuristics 
differentiate behaviors of entrepreneurs from those of non-entrepreneurs in explaining 
the discovery and exploitation of opportunities (Baron, 1998; Busenitz & Barney, 1997; 
Simon et al., 1999). Accordingly, entrepreneurial cognition can importantly lead to the 
opportunity recognition and success with new venture creation (Mitchell, Busenitz, Lant, 
McDougall, Morse, & Smith, 2004; Zahra et al., 2005). As one of the few studies linking 
social cognitions with new venture creation, growth, and profitability, Mitchell et al. 
(2000) demonstrated a link between entrepreneurial cognitions and new venture creation. 
Using a sample of business professionals from seven countries, Mitchell and his 
colleagues found that certain knowledge structures (cognitive scripts) are associated with 
the venture creation decision and the effects are consistent across different national and 
cultural contexts.  
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Although research linking different entrepreneurial cognitions with new venture 
growth and performance is limited, research in strategic management has established 
empirical linkages between venture behavior and performance outcomes and 
characteristics of different cognitive structures and knowledge routines among individual 
members of the executive team (e.g., Reger & Palmer, 1996) and at the group-level, 
among, for example, members of the top management team (e.g., Hambrick & Mason, 
1984; McNamara, Luce, & Thompson, 2002; Porac & Thomas, 1990). Examining new 
venture top management teams, Ensley and Pearce (2001) concluded that cognition as a 
group-level construct figured importantly in predicting new venture performance.  
Organizational Ecology 
In contrast to psychological-based theories that posit direct and indirect effects 
between attributes of individuals and new venture success, organizational ecology 
accounts for adaptive change by focusing on the distribution of environmental resources 
and the terms on which these resources are available. Inspired by the question “Why are 
there so many kinds of organizations?” (Hannan & Freeman, 1977: 936), ecologists seek 
to explain the relative abundance and diversity of firms and to account for their changing 
composition by examining the effects of social, economic, and political conditions over 
time (Baum, 1996; Singh & Lumsden, 1990).  
Environments contain firms vying for similar resources; the need for similar 
resources provides the basis for competition between firms. Because individual 
‘populations’ maintain finite capacities for given resources (Hannan & Freeman, 1989), 
market forces are thought to differentially select or selectively eliminate ventures on the 
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basis of different organizational attributes (e.g., organizational structure, strategies, and 
routines), competitive pressures, and the logic of institutionalized norms. Accordingly, 
organizational scholars contend that new venture creation, different performance 
outcomes, and mortality emerge as a function of variation, selection, retention, and 
competition processes at work in an environment (Aldrich, 1979; McKelvey & Aldrich, 
1983). According to this perspective, firms face constraints in their ability to adapt to 
environmental demands. Nevertheless, firms vary their strategy, structure, resource 
endowments, competences, and so forth to meet evolving market conditions for resource 
acquisition.  
Variations may be intentional or blind (Aldrich, 1979; McKelvey & Aldrich, 
1983). More specifically, variations may occur as a purposeful response to changing 
market conditions (e.g., intentional variation; Baum, 1996) or they may occur 
independently of selection pressures by accident or chance (e.g., blind variation; March, 
1981). Accordingly, when successful variations are known, other firms imitate them 
creating normative pressures for conformity, retention, and diffusion that make resulting 
growth and performance advantages temporary (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Nelson & 
Winter, 1982). By contrast, complex variations often create causal ambiguity making it 
difficult for rivals to imitate. As a result, variations that are both valuable and difficult-
to-imitate provide a source of sustainable competitive advantage leading to favorable 
venture growth and performance. 
Organizational theorists apply a range of ecological theories to explain different 
outcomes. This dissertation briefly reviews six theoretical frameworks: liability of 
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newness, liability of adolescence, liability of smallness, density dependence theory, 
niche-width theory, and resource-partitioning theory.  
Liability of Newness 
Directing attention to an age-dependent decline in mortality rates, Stinchcombe 
(1965) argued that young firms have a high propensity to fail. He noted that new 
ventures are likely to fail because members of these young organizations cannot adjust 
quickly enough to new roles and working relationships and because these organizations 
lack a “track record” with customers and suppliers. Underlying the failure of new 
ventures is their limited resources. Limited resources make young firms especially 
vulnerable to even slight operational inefficiencies, production delays, and 
environmental dynamism (Van de Ven, Hudson, & Schroeder, 1984) and limit their 
ability to shift to circumstances that are more favorable. 
Stinchcombe labeled these problems ‘liabilities of newness.’ According to this 
perspective, new ventures are set on a course at founding that may be difficult or costly 
to change (Boeker, 1989; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990). Structures and routines 
develop quickly (Gersick, 1989), and members of these ventures come to see them as the 
only acceptable way to accomplish tasks (Zucker, 1989). In other words, structures and 
routines in new ventures become viewed as part of an integrated whole in which it is 
difficult to enact change in one element of the organization without adversely affecting 
the whole. Finally, young firms often make investments in people, technology, and 
assets using limited financial capital that they may not be able to change because they 
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are too resource-poor. Accordingly, new ventures face a number of challenges that make 
growth and survival in the new domain prohibitive.  
Because selection processes favor older, more reliable organizations, failure rates 
are expected to decline monotonically with age (Freeman et al., 1983; Hannan & 
Freeman, 1984). Stated differently, as time passes, organizational structures stabilize and 
ties with other actors become more resilient, and young firms come to have their actions 
sanctioned by powerful collective actors. This results in older more established firms 
developing advantages over newer ventures in part because of the ease these firms have 
in continuing existing routines compared with the difficulties new ventures face in either 
creating new routines or borrowing old ones (Henderson, 1999; Nelson & Winter, 1982).  
A complementary treatment of the liability of newness comes from Hannan and 
Freeman (1984). These scholars argue that environmental selection processes favor firms 
exhibiting high levels of reliability and accountability in their routines, structure, and 
performance. More specifically, selection processes favor organizations with high 
reliability, i.e., a low variance in quality, and high accountability, i.e., the ability of an 
organization to account rationally for its actions. Reliability and accountability, in turn, 
require that organizational structures be highly reproducible (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). 
Because reliability and accountability tend to increase with age, failure rates decrease, as 
firms grow older. Due both to processes of internal learning, coordination, and 
socialization within an organization and because of the legitimacy that results from 
relationships formed between organizations over time, reproducibility increases with age 
(Singh & Lumdsen, 1990). Accordingly, highly reproducible structures generate stronger 
inertial pressures on the organization over time, making the organizations with high 
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structural inertia more favored by selection processes. However, organizational changes 
alter established structures and patterns of communication and disrupt the stability of the 
organizational routines (Nelson & Winter, 1982), resetting the liability-of-newness 
clock, and creating the same conditions that make young firms more likely to fail. 
Organizations that continually change structures to respond to new environmental 
pressures are said to recreate a liability of newness (new organizations are more 
vulnerable to selection processes than older ones). Consequently, as predicted, failure 
rates vary directly with the frequency of reorganizations.  
Stinchcombe (1965) emphasized the importance of two sets of contextual factors. 
One is organizational. New ventures lack resources and often have key organizational 
members in unfamiliar roles with underdeveloped work relationships. Moreover, these 
firms maintain underdeveloped routines, which adversely affect the efficiency of their 
task environments because routines not only define what an organization can do, they 
also define what the organization knows (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Levitt & March, 
1988). The second set is environmental. Young firms face performance constraints and 
mortality risks in part because they lack legitimacy and power and also because they 
often maintain few relationships with different owners of valuable resource stocks 
(Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990). 
Researchers within and outside of organizational ecology have elaborated on 
these factors and provide support for liability of newness arguments involving different 
new venture outcomes (e.g., Carroll, 1983; Carroll & Delacroix, 1982; Freeman et al., 
1983). Freeman et al. (1983), for example, found support for the liability of newness and 
its continuous decline interpretation in survival data of different U.S. ventures, including 
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semiconductor manufacturers, newspaper organizations, and labor unions. Singh, House, 
and Tucker (1986), in a study of the processes underlying the liability of newness, 
examined the impact of internal organizational changes on mortality rates of voluntary 
social service organizations and found that the lack of external legitimacy was one main 
reason for the high mortality of young organizations. In a companion study, Singh et al. 
(1986) tested competing theoretical perspectives on the impact of organizational change 
on mortality rates. Subsequent studies, however, when controlling for the time-varying 
function of size, has found much less pronounced liability of newness effect (Singh & 
Lumsden, 1990). 
Research in finance and strategic management examining the valuation of firms 
undertaking the transition from privately held ventures to publicly traded firms have 
applied liability of newness arguments to explain, for example, IPO performance (e.g., 
Higgins & Gulati, 2006; Ritter, 1984). Institutional investors face tremendous 
uncertainty associated with the quality of young firms undertaking an IPO. This 
uncertainty is reflected in the research on equity values of IPOs, which has been marked 
by considerable debate regarding how to value IPO deals (e.g., Ritter, 1984). Certo 
(2003) describes this general problem of determining firm quality at time of IPO a 
‘liability of market newness’ and offers that firms undertaking IPOs strive to overcome 
this liability by providing signals of legitimacy to investors. Higgins and Gulati (2003) 
similarly suggested that young firms gain organizational legitimacy by offering symbols 
of quality that redress specific concerns regarding product viability, competitive 
efficacy, and marketing efficacy. In another empirical study, Stuart et al. (1999) 
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examined how two forms of uncertainty—firm age and pre-IPO financing—moderate 
the effects of prestigious affiliations on IPO performance.  
Throughout these and other theoretical and empirical studies of IPO firms, the 
general proposition remains that, given uncertainty at the time of IPO, young firms must 
convince external parties of the firm’s quality and often do so by providing information 
that signals the firm’s legitimacy. Following arguments posed by Barney (1986), such 
uncertainty can also obscure the value of resource endowments owned or controlled by 
IPO firms, a situation that will be explored further in Chapter III. Indeed, this logic 
echoes the seminal work of Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), who suggested that an 
organization’s most critical activity is gaining the support of social entities that can 
ensure the firm’s survival (see also, March and Simon, 1958)—entities, such as 
investors, who are the ultimate stakeholders. 
Research in strategic management has also begun to recognize the conditioning 
effects of age on new venture performance and survival. Findings suggest the new 
ventures suffer significantly high levels of mortality owing to liabilities of newness once 
markets reach maturity (e.g., Agarwal & Gort, 2002; Suarez & Utterback, 1995). Using 
evolutionary theory to extend ecological perspectives on resource constraints and 
mortality among new ventures, Agarwal et al. (2002) found an elevated survival 
advantage for new ventures founded during the growth stage related to a more favorable 
knowledge regime and less formidable scale and resource barriers that exists in these 
market contexts. 
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Liability of Adolescence 
In contrast to the linear decline in mortality suggested by proponents of the 
liability of newness, some scholars argue that new ventures suffer from a liability of 
adolescence, evidenced by failure rates having a non-linear (inverted U-shaped) 
relationship with age (e.g., Levinthal & Fichman, 1988; Fichman & Levinthal, 1991). 
These studies suggest that young firms survive for a period with little risk of failure by 
drawing on initial resource endowments typically acquired at founding (e.g., venture 
capital funding, bank loans, initial public offering proceeds). Accordingly, new ventures 
face their highest mortality rate several years after their founding as initial endowments 
are expended and as these firms become increasingly more reliant on their ability to 
sustain resource needs from naturally evolving business operations.  
Empirical research lends support to this argument. In a large study of German 
firms, Brüderl and Schüssler (1990), for example, challenged the liability of newness 
argument theoretically and empirically with the ‘liability of adolescence’ perspective. 
They found that the length of time between new venture creation and the time when this 
class of firms experience peak mortality rates was resource-dependent. Young firms with 
larger initial financial resource endowments enjoyed lower peak failure rates and were 
able to postpone the time when peak failure rates occurred. This viewpoint distinguished 
between two periods of an organizational life cycle. In the first phase, the adolescence 
phase, death risks are low, following a nonmonotonic risk function, in part, because 
powerful actors in the population were monitoring performance and postponing 
judgment about success or failure and because new organizations typically possessed a 
 33 
 
 
 
stock of slack resources. The higher the initial endowments, the longer the duration of 
adolescence. In the later phase, the post-adolescence phase, monitoring ends, 
endowments return to equilibrium, and new ventures are subject to usual risks of failure. 
Other empirical studies also provide support for an initial ‘honeymoon period’ (e.g., 
Henderson, 1999; Mitchell, 1991; Singh et al., 1986). 
Liability of Smallness 
Common to both the liability of newness and the adolescence perspectives is that 
the initial period following new venture creation is the most hazardous, and failure rates 
eventually decline with age. These two perspectives differ only about whether failure 
rates peak at founding or several years later. In contrast, other scholars have advanced a 
very different perspective. They have observed that most of the initial work examining 
these two perspectives neglected to account for age-varying effects of size (e.g., Barron, 
West, & Hannan, 1994; Baum, 1989; Henderson, 1999; Ranger-Moore, 1997). Thus, 
closely related to the liability of newness and liability of adolescence is the so-called 
‘liability of smallness,’ which predicts failure rates decline monotonically with size.  
Larger organizations are assumed to be less likely to fail for a variety of reasons. 
First, since large size increases inertial tendencies (i.e., reproducibility), and since 
selection pressures favor structurally inert organizations for their reliability, large 
organizations are proposed to be less vulnerable to the risk of failure (Barnett & 
Amburgey, 1990; Hannan & Freeman, 1984). Second, the propensity of small ventures 
to fail is often the consequence of resource constraints facing organizations that fail to 
raise adequate financial capital, recruit and train a quality workforce, meet higher 
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interest payments, or handle the administrative burden of governmental compliance 
(Aldrich & Auster, 1986). Finally, large size also tends to legitimate organizations, to the 
extent that large size signals dependability and success to current and future 
stakeholders.  
Since new ventures tend to be small organizations at founding, if small 
organizations have higher failure rates as the liability of smallness predicts, then 
evidence suggests that negative relationships between age and failure were probably due 
to differences in size rather than the causal effects of age. In other words, what appears 
as negative age dependence in empirical studies examining liabilities of newness and 
adolescence perspectives may actually be a confounding of unmeasured size (Barnett & 
Amburgey, 1990; Baum & Oliver, 1991; Levinthal, 1991). Although previous empirical 
studies find consistent support for the liability of newness hypothesis (e.g., Carroll, 
1983; Carroll & Delacroix, 1982; Freeman et al., 1983), more recent studies find failure 
rates do not decline with age after controlling for contemporaneous size (e.g., Barron et 
al., 1994; Brüderl & Schüssler, 1990; Fichman & Levinthal, 1991). Instead, the 
relationship between age and failure rates is actually positive in studies where size has 
been included as a time-varying control (e.g., Barron, West, & Hannan, 1994; Baum & 
Oliver, 1991; Ranger-Moore, 1997).  
Barron and his colleagues (1994) also found that new venture growth rates are 
negatively related to age, further evidence that age worsens performance outcomes. As a 
result, some ecologists have concluded that firms suffer not from liabilities of newness 
or adolescence, but from a liability of obsolescence, because older firms face the time-
varying effects of inertia such that they become more inefficient and unresponsive to 
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changes in the external environment. Consequently, failure rates are expected to increase 
with age, and growth rates are expected to decline. As a result, a growing number of 
organizational theorists recommend a more contingent approach (e.g., Baum, 1996; 
Ranger-Moore, 1997; Singh, 2006). 
Density Dependence Theory 
One of the most studied arguments in the population ecology domain is density 
dependence theory (Carroll & Hannan; 1989; Hannan, Carroll, Dundon, & Torres, 1995; 
Hannan & Freeman, 1989). According to this perspective, changes in population density 
predict venture founding and failure rates as a consequence of processes of legitimation 
and competition (Hannan & Carroll, 1992). More specifically, initial foundings signal a 
developing niche to entrepreneurs, encouraging the creation of additional new ventures. 
As a result, founding rates rise and mortality rates fall as the legitimation of a population 
increases. However, as competition within and among population’s intensifies, 
significant increases in density reduce founding rates and increase mortality rates. 
Because legitimacy exerts less of a positive influence on founding and less of a negative 
influence on mortality, further increases in density beyond an inflection point induce 
competition, driving founding rates down and increasing mortality rates among newer 
ventures (Carroll & Hannan, 1989). This results in an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between density and founding, and a U-shaped relationship between density and failure 
rates.  
Evidence indicates conditions at founding shape the resource opportunities that 
fund new venture growth and survival, and thus figure prominently in the success of new 
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ventures (e.g., Agarwal & Bayus, 2004; Agarwal et al., 2002; Bamford et al., 2000; 
Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990). For example, examining a population of new 
ventures in the semiconductor sector, Eisenhardt and Schoonhovem (1990) found that 
environmental conditions at founding play a significant and meaningful role in the 
resource opportunities that shape the performance outcomes for new ventures. 
Specifically, founding in growth-stage markets, defined as markets providing significant 
resource opportunities with growing consumer demand, is associated with higher growth 
rates among new firms than is founding in either an emergent (e.g., new markets 
characterized by low demand and high uncertainty; Anderson & Zeithaml, 1984) or 
mature (e.g., large markets with stable or slowly growing demand; Tushman & 
Anderson, 1986) market. In addition, empirical results suggest that characteristics of the 
market at founding also affect the profitability of new ventures. Carroll (1984), for 
example, found that while new ventures founded in mature markets were unlikely to 
become very large, they tended to become more profitable than other firms founded in 
emergent or growth markets did.  
According to the density model, at the firm-level, competition among firms 
depends implicitly on the likelihood that two or more firms will attempt to exploit the 
resources from the same factor markets (Swaminathan, 1996). Not addressed is the 
intensity of competition for resources that is generated by these firms. Research suggests 
that competitive intensity is likely to have both contemporaneous and persistent effects 
related to conditions that exist at the time of a new venture’s founding (Barnett & 
Amburgey, 1990). In other words, new ventures founded in periods of high competitive 
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intensity likely face resource constraints that are similar to those encountered by new 
ventures founded in high-density environments (Barnett, 1997).  
Moreover, there is considerable debate about whether or not legitimacy is the 
true causal mechanism for the first half of the density curves (e.g., Baum, 1996; Baum & 
Powell, 1995; Singh, 1990; Zucker, 1989). Baum (1996), in particular, argues that 
institutional processes and linkages, political turmoil, government regulations, and 
technology may also underlie the observed relationship between density and founding. 
That is, an organizational form is legitimate to the extent that relevant actors regard it as 
the ‘natural’ way to organize (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). From this perspective, rarity of a 
form poses serious problems of legitimacy for new ventures. For example, Baum and 
Oliver (1992) found that controlling for institutional embeddedness eliminated 
legitimacy as an explanation for the front half of the density dependence curve. This 
finding suggests the importance of establishing institutional linkages to the success of 
new ventures (Baum & Oliver, 1991; Oliver, 1997). Moreover, density dependence 
arguments also fall short of explaining variations in the effect between organizations. 
Specifically, this perspective implies each venture in a population has an equivalent 
impact on the mortality rates and performance of member-firms (Singh & Lumsden, 
1990). Accordingly, the covariates needed for more robust description of the competitive 
heterogeneity between firms and the density dependence of a population are not fully 
understood. Nevertheless, the model’s basic predictions concerning the shape of the 
curves themselves have generally received empirical
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Niche-Width Theory 
Evidence suggests that resource opportunities available to new ventures also 
depend on the competition for those opportunities within their founding environment 
(Carroll & Hannan, 1989; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990). Ecologists refer to a 
market niche as the resource ‘space’ within which firms operate, expressing ways in 
which population and venture growth rates depend on the availability of resources and 
the competitive actions within and between populations (Dobrev et al., 2001; Freeman & 
Hannan, 1983). The existence of established competitors occupying large shares of a 
market’s resource space makes it particularly difficult for new ventures to grow. One 
reason is that established firms with large market shares are difficult to dislodge from a 
market, given their size, legitimacy, and first-mover advantages (Aaker & Day, 1986). 
Niche-width therefore represents a market’s ability to sustain the growth of member 
firms and its tolerance for changing levels of resources. According to this perspective, 
new ventures depend on the availability of distinct combinations of resources—called 
niches—and on the level of competition for those resources for their survival and 
growth. By determining the combination of resources available to member-firms, niches 
therefore act as a ‘fitness function’ (Hannan & Freeman, 1989), influencing the 
composition of firms, the nature of competition among those firms, and the conditions 
for growth and performance for new ventures and established firms alike. Stated 
differently, the nature of the competitive interdependence that results from the pursuit of 
similar resources jointly affects firm outcomes (Aldrich, 1999).  
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Niche width then refers to an organization’s variance in resource utilization 
(Hannan & Freeman, 1989). This representation proves useful for classifying firms in 
terms of generalist (wide niche) and specialist (narrow niche) strategies. Firms 
competing across a limited range of product and geographic markets (niches) are called 
specialists. Because specialists compete in fewer markets, they require fewer resources 
to deal with environmental contingencies, and thus appear leaner than generalists (i.e., 
less resource slack). By contrast, generalists compete in a wider variety of product and 
geographic markets simultaneously generating economies of scale and scope by 
diversifying into new markets. However, by competing in a diversity of markets, 
generalists face complex demands requiring greater resource slack and excess capacity 
to exploit opportunities. Freeman and Hannan (1983) elaborated and refined the theory, 
focusing on two features of environmental variation that determine niches—levels of 
environmental variability and grain. Whereas variability refers to the variance in 
magnitude of environmental fluctuations about their mean, grain refers to the rate at 
which these environmental fluctuations occur (i.e., the frequency and duration of each 
change), with many small periodic fluctuations representing fine-grained change and a 
smaller number of large, episodic variations representing coarse-grained change. 
Accordingly, niche-width theories are formulated to explain how environmental 
conditions, specifically variations in resources, affect the mortality and performance 
outcomes of specialists and generalists. 
Niche width theories have been empirically tested across a variety of different 
markets, including the restaurant (e.g., Freeman & Hannan, 1983), newspapers (e.g., 
Delacroix & Carroll, 1983; Carroll, 1985), and automobile (Dobrev et al., 2002) 
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industries. In relatively stable environments where the pattern of variation is fine-
grained, specialist strategies are favored because of specialists can concentrate on 
particular market conditions of a narrower niche (Carroll, 1984). Specialist strategies are 
also favored for coarse-grained fluctuations when the level of environmental variation is 
low, because generalism offers no particular advantage against uncertainty. However, in 
uncertain environments where the level of variability is high, the broad market reach of 
generalists give them a selection advantage over specialists regardless of the frequency 
and duration of changes (i.e., the grain), because diversified organizations can more 
effectively allocate risks across the different markets served.  
Resource-Partitioning Theory 
Niche-width perspectives assume that environmental resources and conditions 
are disjointed and highly dissimilar (Carroll et al., 2002; Péli, 1997). As a result, 
generalist organizations that straddle different ‘niches’ (i.e., resource markets) suffer 
diseconomies resulting from inefficient administrative overhead or excess capacity (i.e., 
resource slack). By contrast, resource-partitioning theory assumes that different resource 
markets are not substantially dissimilar. Accordingly, generalists may actually benefit 
from diversification, especially when participation in additional markets provides scale 
economies (Carroll et al., 2002).3 In other words, resource-partitioning theory uses 
insights about economies of scale to make different predictions about niche-width theory 
based on environmental states across markets supporting different resource levels, which 
                                                 
3
 For example, General Motors participates in a variety of different ‘resource markets,’ ranging from gas, 
diesel, alternative fuel vehicles in both the consumer and commercial (trucks and buses) vehicle markets, 
to gas and diesel turbine engines for other vehicles. Accordingly, these markets share resource similarities 
that enable General Motors to leverage its resource endowments and capabilities across different market 
segments. 
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yield scale economies to larger, more established firms operating in two or more 
markets. Moreover, evidence suggests that resulting scale and scope economies may 
outweigh administrative overhead costs that would otherwise make generalists 
organizations inefficient (Carroll et al., 2002). 
Broadly speaking, this theoretical perspective assumes markets consisting of 
finite sets of heterogeneous resources and explains the simultaneous occurrence of 
different organizational forms as a function of resource distributions within each market 
and a firm’s centrality to those resources (Boone et al., 2002). Owing to scale 
competition, established generalist firms come to dominate the market center, which 
represents place at which most resources accumulate.4 Owing to entrepreneurial 
discovery, ‘empty spots’ in the resource space defining the market become populated by 
new ventures (Swaminathan, 1996), implying a stronger linkage between environmental 
resources and new venture creation than previously thought. Moreover, because higher 
production activities by generalists generally leads to greater scale efficiencies, which 
can be passed on to customers in the form of lower prices or better goods or services, 
competition in the market center among large established generalists often trigger scale-
driven competition for scarce resources (Boone et al., 2002). As a result, resource-
partitioning perspectives are used to explain differential growth rates and performance 
variations among new ventures within and between different environmental contexts. 
                                                 
4
 The original niche width theory (e.g., Hannan & Freeman, 1977) assumes firms face a single, 
homogenous resource condition at any point in time. Over time, resources are assumed to be disjointed or 
highly dissimilar (Péli, 1997). According to this perspective, firms face highly dissimilar environmental 
resource states that alternate over time. Because of the dissimilarity in resource states, generalists 
occupying two or more markets pay a price in terms of overhead and excess capacity. By contrast, 
according to resource-partitioning theory, firms confront multiple resource conditions at any point in time 
and these resource markets are not assumed to be dissimilar.  
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Empirical results lend support to these theoretical arguments. Examining 
automobile industries in France, Germany, and the U.K., Dobrev et al. (2002: 1333), 
found that firms often seek viable positions outside of a market center when faced with 
‘competitive crowding’ by diversifying into new or different product or geographic 
segments. Moreover, their results suggest that drivers of density dependence (i.e., 
competitive crowding) explain the diversification actions firms take and may explain 
variations in mortality rates that occur when firms explore less competitive market 
segments. More recently, in strategic management research, scholars have become 
increasingly interested in the influence of different environmental contexts on firms’ 
diversification decisions, especially the criticality of different resource contexts. Wan 
and Hoskisson (2003), for example, found that in less munificent environments, 
increases to product diversification positively affect firm performance.  
Institutional Theory 
Complementing organizational ecology’s examination of different resource 
contexts, institutional theory stresses the influence of systems surrounding new and 
established firms that shape social and organizational behavior (Scott, 1995). The role of 
institutions in a market is to “establish the fundamental political, social, and legal ground 
rules that [shape] the basis for production, exchange, and distribution” (North: 1981: 6). 
Thus, institutions set the rules of the game (North, 1990) and may “reduce both 
transaction and information costs through reducing uncertainty and establishing a stable 
structure that facilitates interactions” (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & Wright, 2000: 252-253). 
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Institutional theory declares that firms’ behaviors are the product of norms, 
values, and taken-for-granted assumptions that originate in the institutional context 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1987). Economic choices are constrained not only by 
resource constraints, but also by socially constructed limits framing norms, habits, and 
customs. According to this perspective, conformity to social expectations determines 
venture performance and survival (Baum & Oliver, 1991; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
Oliver, 1991). As Scott (1987: 498) observes, “organizations … conform because they 
are rewarded for doing so through increased legitimacy, resources, and survival 
capabilities.” Unlike theoretical frameworks from economics and strategic management, 
which examine the extent to which firm behavior is rational and economically justified, 
institutional theorists emphasize the extent to which firm behavior “is compliant, 
habitual, reflective, and socially-defined” (Oliver, 1997: 699).  
Institutional theorists are especially interested in how organizational structures 
and routines become institutionalized over time (Scott, 1987; Zucker, 1987). Meyer and 
Rowan (1977: 341) explains, “Institutionalization involves the process by which social 
processes, obligations, or actualities come to take on a rule-like status in social thought 
and action.” In other words, organizations are driven to adapt their formal structures to 
become isomorphic with domains of rationalized activity that are defined by prevailing 
institutional norms, expectations, and values as the source of pressures on organizations 
to conform (Scott, 1995). These pressures have important implications for new ventures 
because these firms face the prospect of having to direct comparatively greater levels of 
resources to institutionalized activities aimed at achieving conformity than established 
rivals do. 
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Institutional activities are the result of interrelated processes occurring at 
different levels of analysis: individual, organizational, and interorganizational or 
industry. At the individual-level, managers’ norms, habits, and conformity to traditions 
account for institutionalized activities (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). At the firm-level, 
corporate culture organizing principles, and political processes perpetuate 
institutionalized structures and behaviors (Tolbert & Zucker, 1996). At the 
interorganizational-level, pressures emerging from industry relationships, societal 
expectations, and government policies define socially-acceptable firm conduct, and those 
social pressures common to all firms in the same sector cause these firms to exhibit 
similar behaviors (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Haveman, 1993; Scott, 1995).  
Because institutional environments are not uniform, individual markets are 
composed of institutions that may differ significantly from one another (Scott, 2005). 
Further, institutional change is complex and institutions often persist over long periods 
of time (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Tolbert & Zucker, 1996). At any given time, it is 
likely that institutions may be changing at different rates and may be at different stages 
of development. Resource endowments take on added importance as a source of superior 
performance when environments are in a state of flux (Grant, 1991; Makhija, 2003). 
Resources determine the extent to which new ventures can formulate and implement 
strategies that take advantage of opportunities in the market (Grant, 1991; Amit & 
Schoemaker, 1993). Moreover, resources are context-sensitive and, depending on the 
characteristics of that context, certain resources can create strategic inflexibility and core 
rigidities that may lead to negative performance returns (Leonard-Barton, 1992). New 
ventures therefore must direct attention to the institutional context of their resources to 
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create value and sustain the advantage over time, especially when institutions change. 
Managing these processes requires sophisticated routines and processes to determine, 
develop, and deploy the resources and capabilities required by young firms (cf. Lei, Hitt, 
& Bettis, 1996; Teece et al., 1997). 
Research finds that adoption of prevailing structures and routines also increases 
organizational legitimacy (Staw & Epstein, 2000). This is especially important for new 
ventures because legitimacy assists these firms in resource acquisition and in survival 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Deephouse (1999: 152) states, “a 
firm which is similar to other firms avoids legitimacy challenges that hinder resource 
acquisition.” Singh et al. (1986) cite the lack of institutional support experienced by 
young firms as one prominent reason underlying the higher mortality rates among these 
firms (i.e., liability of newness). Furthermore, firms with higher level of institutional 
support are able to acquire resources that are more valuable at more favorable terms than 
firms facing legitimacy constraints (Deephouse, 1996). Because legitimate firms are less 
likely to fail, suppliers of financial capital may accept lower risk premiums (Miller & 
Bromiley, 1990), which provides needed capital for growth and lower interest charges 
increases operating margins and returns. According, institutional theory may not only 
explain the behavior and actions of new ventures, but also provides insight into how 
different actors interpret the signals firm behaviors relate. 
Network Theory 
Where institutional theory argues for conformity to norms as the basis for 
organizational legitimacy and the acquisition of resources from the environment, 
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network theory adopts a relational approach (Gulati, Nohria, & Zaheer, 2000) examining 
firm outcomes and survival in a world in which new and established firms are embedded 
in networks of social and professional relationships with other firms (Granovetter, 1985; 
Gulati, 1999). Both liability of newness and smallness arguments assume that embryonic 
routines (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990), uncertainty about the quality of new 
ventures’ goods and services (Hannan & Freeman, 1984), and a lack of social 
acceptance, stability, and sufficient resources (Boeker, 1989) typify young firms and that 
these shortcomings raise their risk of failure. New ventures are truncated in their 
resource endowment and thus these firms depend critically on their environment for 
success.  
Mobilizing resources to establish and grow a new venture is an undertaking laden 
with uncertainty and unforeseeable complexities (Aldrich & Auster, 1986). This process 
is also inherently social, because young firms depend on outside firms for resources 
beneficial to but not possessed by these firms (Gulati, 1995; Stuart et al., 1999). Aiken 
and Hage (1968: 914-915) noted that new ventures, in particular, face such dependence, 
“because of their need for resources—not only money, but also resources such as 
specialized skills, access to particular kinds of markets, and the like.” Ahuja (2000) 
stressed the importance of network configuration in establishing interfirm linkages that 
allow firms to access network resources and legitimacy and to combine these resources 
with existing stocks to create value. Network theory therefore helps explain the benefits 
made available to firms from their relationship ties with other actors. Accordingly, 
significant effort has since been made to identify crucial contingencies likely to lead to 
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such dependence that in turn explains relationship ties and network formation (for a 
review, see Oliver, 1990). 
Network resources are distinct from the resources residing securely within firms’ 
boundaries (Gulati, 1999). They can be considered to be “strengths that firms can use to 
conceive of and implement their strategies” (Barney, 1991: 101). While resource-based 
perspectives highlight the importance of social factors and also the role of unique firm 
histories, only recently has attention been given to network resources that emerge from 
firms’ participation in interfirm networks (Barney, 1991). For resource-constrained new 
ventures, relationship ties formed with venture capitalists, business angels, investment 
bankers, underwriters, and other financial institutions provide a valuable source of both 
financial capital and knowledge (Shane & Stuart, 2002; Steier & Greenwood, 2000). 
Their ability to mobilize extramural resources, attract new customers, and identify 
entrepreneurial opportunities is conditioned on external networks (Lee, Lee, & Pennings, 
2001), since social relations often mediate economic transactions and convey 
organizational legitimacy (Granovetter, 1985). Accordingly, network theory holds that 
new ventures should pursue strategies focusing on the development of valuable networks 
with external resource holders in order to succeed. However, while such relationships 
constitute an important, possibly more efficient channel of resources, considerable 
investments are required to establish and maintain networks given norms of reciprocity 
(Adler & Kwon, 2002).  
Although scholars generally agree that network positioning and relationship ties 
figure prominently in the performance outcomes of new ventures, explaining network 
formation is an important point of contention. According to Bourdieu (1986) and 
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Coleman (1988), patterns of relationships emerge due to the value to individuals and 
firms in establishing and preserving social capital. Social capital represents the network 
itself and the sums of resources embedded within the durable network of social 
relationships firms possess (Bourdieu, 1986; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). According to 
this perspective, a dense network with strong ties is associated with trust and fine-
grained information exchanges between network members (Larson, 1992; Rowley, 
Behrens, & Krackhardt, 2000; Uzzi, 1997). On the other hand, weak ties increase 
information diversity and lead to novel information (Granovetter, 1973).  
By contrast, Burt (1992) suggests that firms embedded in sparsely connected 
networks enjoy greater efficiencies and brokerage advantages based on the ability to 
arbitrage nonredundant information exchanges between otherwise disconnected 
members of the network. Burt explains new venture creation as a function of structural 
holes that emerge between dense pockets of network relationships. In other words, 
network positions associated with greater value creation opportunities lie between not 
within dense regions of relationships. These structural holes, in turn present 
opportunities for brokering information and resource flows between otherwise 
disconnected firms. These two perspectives are briefly reviewed in the following 
sections. 
Social Capital Theory 
Social capital theory (e.g., Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman, 1988; Granovetter, 1973) 
relies on closed networks where dense relationships connect members with each other. 
In closed networks, social capital facilitates the development of norms of acceptable 
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behavior by diffusing information about normative behaviors within a network. As a 
result, a network provides value to members by providing access to information and 
resources that are embedded within the network.  
Social capital is represented by the relational resources available to a firm 
through its partners or through its network of social relationships (Baker, 1990). Adler 
and Kwon (2002) define social capital as goodwill engendered through social relations 
that can be mobilized to facilitate action.5 It is available to individuals or groups whose 
source lies within the structure and content of the actor's (e.g. the individual, group or 
firm) social relations. The effects of social capital on firms flow from the information, 
influence, and solidarity it makes available to them.  
For new ventures, social capital is especially important. In particular, researchers 
argue that social capital facilitates resource exchanges and product innovation between 
firms (e.g., Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998); influences the creation of knowledge capital (e.g., 
Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998) and the effectiveness of cross-functional teams (e.g., 
Rosenthal, 1996); facilitates entrepreneurship (e.g., Chung & Gibbons, 1997) and the 
formation of start-up companies (e.g., Walker et al., 1997); and strengthens inter-firm 
learning and culture (e.g., Kraatz, 1998). Thus, social capital is a powerful construct for 
understanding the emergence, viability, and strength of relationships between new 
ventures and other actors and for explaining performance variations that occur between 
new and established firms.  
Fewer cultural differences between two firms, for example, facilitate 
communication between them. Communication provides an avenue to avoid conflicts 
                                                 
5
 Goodwill is defined as “sympathy, trust and forgiveness offered … by friends and acquaintances” (Adler 
& Kwon, 2002: 18). 
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and spurs a process resulting in trustworthiness. Thus, relational capital is 
interchangeable with social capital and reflects each unique boundary-spanning linkage 
between a firm and its partners (Luo, 2002). In addition, Dyer and Singh (1998) argue 
that absorptive capacity in knowledge sharing between the firm and its partners is 
enhanced as individuals within each organization become more familiar with each other, 
and as the cultural distance is narrowed during the socialization process.6 A closer 
proximity reinforces trust, strengthens relational linkages and bonds, and encourages 
organizations to cooperate with each other to achieve common goals (Tsai & Ghoshal, 
1998; Koka & Prescott, 2002; Luo, 2002).  
The conceptualization of social capital as a resource for action is one way of 
introducing social structure into the rational action paradigm. Coleman (1988) 
introduced the concept “social capital” which parallels the concepts of human capital, 
financial capital, and physical capital. Social capital “is defined by its function. It is not a 
single entity but a variety of different entities, with two elements in common: they all 
consist of some aspect of social structures, and they facilitate certain actions of actors—
whether persons or corporate actors—within the structure” (Coleman, 1988). Like other 
forms of capital, social capital is productive, making possible the achievement of certain 
ends that in its absence would not be possible. Similarly, Walker et al. (1997) refer to 
social capital as a means of enforcing norms of behavior among individual or corporate 
actors and thus act as a constraint as well as a resource.  
                                                 
6
 Absorptive capacity is the ability of a firm to recognize the value of new, external information, assimilate 
it, and disseminate it to achieve “commercial ends” where prior related knowledge confers an ability to 
more effectively embrace new information (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). 
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Relying on Granovetter’s (1992) distinction between structural and relational 
embeddedness, the structural dimension of social capital relies on the property of the 
network (i.e., position in the network) and emphasizes the social interaction. The 
location of an actor’s contacts in a social structure of interactions provides certain 
advantages for the actor. The relational dimension of social capital in contrast refers to 
assets rooted in these relationships such as trust and trustworthiness (Granovetter, 1992). 
Capturing the essence of what Coleman (1988) described as “the public good aspect of 
social capital”, the cognitive dimension is embodied in attributes like a shared code or a 
shared paradigm that facilitates a common understanding of collective goals and proper 
ways of acting in a social system (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998).  
Prior research in strategic management, organization theory, and finance suggests 
that relational ties affect startup innovation (Walker et al., 1994) and the growth and 
performance (e.g., Carter & Manaster, 1990; Baum, 1996) among new ventures. For 
example, relational ties with prestigious underwriters signal lower risk offerings 
resulting in higher returns for new ventures undertaking an IPO (Carter & Manaster, 
1990). Further, organizational scholars argue that ties to prominent organizations 
mitigate uncertainty by signaling a new venture’s legitimacy and quality to external 
resource holders, which in turn affects the growth and market performance of these firms 
(Stuart et al., 1999). Specifically, Stuart and his colleagues (1999) found that ties with 
well-regarded affiliates increased sales growth rates among U.S. semiconductor startups, 
and resulted in faster IPOs—at higher valuations—among U.S. biotechnology startups. 
One benefit to new ventures in developing relational ties with established firms is access 
to valuable information, resources, and capabilities that can enable these firms to 
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overcome the liabilities of newness and/or smallness (Baum & Silverman, 1999; Rao, 
1994). Accordingly, social capital gained through relational ties not only influence new 
ventures’ resources and capabilities, but also others’ perceptions of these firms’ 
resources and capabilities (Baum, Calabrese, & Silverman, 2000). 
Structural Hole Theory 
By contrast, structural hole theory (e.g., Burt, 1992, 1997) emphasizes the 
importance of open rather than closed networks whereby the positions within the 
network that are associated with the highest returns lie between not within regions of 
relationships (Walker et al., 1997). Structural holes are gaps between network members 
indirectly linked to one another through a common third party, but that otherwise remain 
disconnected (Ahuja, 2000). Structural autonomy therefore strengthens firms’ positions 
in a network. When a firm fills structural holes by linking other network members that 
are otherwise disconnected and eliminates its own structural holes, the firm is 
structurally autonomous (Burt, 1992). Structural autonomy allows the firm to extract 
value from the network by brokering and controlling the exchange of information and 
the flow of resources between the disconnected network members (Burt, 1997). 
Accordingly, firms build relationships with multiple disconnected clusters and use these 
connections to obtain resource and information control advantages over others.  
According to this perspective, network positions associated with the highest 
economic return lie between, not within, dense regions of relationships called structural 
holes, which present opportunities for brokering information flow among firms (Burt, 
1992). These opportunities have greater economic payoffs because the brokers’ 
 53 
 
 
 
information advantage creates the potential for arbitrage in markets for goods and 
services. Resources embedded in networks are a function of (1) the information and 
control advantages that emerge from the position one holds in the network and (2) the 
individual actor’s ability to act as a broker in relations between other partners. Thus, 
social capital is derived from the ability to broker the flow of information and resources 
between otherwise disconnected parties across a network, which reinforces the 
importance of structural autonomy leading to lower network constraint and greater social 
capital. 
Reductions in independence, however, offset the benefits of increasing social 
constraint from establishing relationships in closed regions of the network. Thus, 
network structure determines the redundancy of its information benefits to young and 
established firms alike. Burt introduced two indicators of network redundancy. The first 
is cohesion. Cohesive contacts—contacts strongly connected to one another—are likely 
to have similar information and therefore provide redundant information benefits. The 
second indication is structural equivalence. Equivalent contacts—contacts that link an 
actor to the same third parties—have the same sources of information and therefore 
provide redundant information flow. In contrast, structural holes are the gaps between 
non-redundant contacts that can offer additive, rather than redundant, information 
advantages.  
There is a growing body of research in strategic management coming to terms 
with the performance consequences of networks for new ventures. For example, research 
suggests that network location (i.e., centrality) shapes the nature of competition with 
ventures more centrally located having more timely access to information about 
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promising opportunities, which in turn affects rates of growth for these firms (Powell, 
Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996). Uzzi (1997: 49) found that structural embeddedness 
promotes allocative resource efficiencies and “economies of time (the ability to 
capitalize quickly on market opportunities)” yielding higher survival rates for networked 
firms. Evidence also suggests that diversity levels are lower at higher levels of structural 
integration and further increases in redundancy reduces a venture’s ability to adapt, 
diminishing performance and survival chances (Uzzi, 1996, 1997). Similarly, Baum and 
his colleagues (2000) also found that highly redundant network ties reduced the diversity 
of information flow creating inefficient partner configurations and capabilities while 
incurring greater costs.  
More recently, scholars have begun to examine the contingent effects of 
environmental conditions on value derived from these networks. Powell et al. (1996), for 
example, demonstrated the importance of collaboration to innovation among ventures 
operating in ‘high-velocity’ environments, such as those conditions found in 
biotechnology. Afuah’s (2000) examination of alliances among computer workstation 
manufacturers concluded that firms operating in complex and highly dynamic markets 
should not invest limited resources in strong ties among a small set of network members. 
Dramatic shifts in environmental conditions dramatically impede competitive advantage, 
because of an overcommitment to network positions established through its network of 
strong ties. Instead, firms should allocate resources to maintaining weak ties with 
alternative partners, who represent options for dealing with environmental shocks in the 
‘local’ market. Finally, studying the effects of tie density and network sparsity among 
ventures in the semiconductor steel industries, Rowley et al. (2000) concluded that 
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stronger ties were more credible for firms when dealing with lower environmental 
uncertainty and a competitive environment demanding higher degrees of exploration.  
New Venture Strategy  
Scholars also devote considerable attention to understanding the relationship 
between new venture strategy and different performance outcomes (e.g., Carter, Stearns, 
Reynolds, & Miller, 1990; Covin & Slevin, 1990; McDougall & Robinson, 1990; 
Sandberg, 1986; Sandberg & Hofer, 1987; Vesper, 1980). A central argument in the new 
venture strategy literature draws from contentions in strategic management research that 
young firms must fit with their environment to survive and achieve success. According 
to this perspective, new ventures’ managers are responsible for developing strategies that 
maintain “satisfactory alignments of environmental opportunities and risk on the one 
hand, and organizational capabilities and resources on the other” (Miles, 1982: 14). 
Accordingly, strategic management is understood as a process that deals with 
formulating and implementing strategy that enables firms to maintain alignment with the 
external environment (Hofer & Schendel, 1978; Vesper, 1980; Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven, 1990) and, more broadly for new ventures, with actions aimed at 
opportunity exploitation, organizational renewal, and growth (Dess, Ireland, Zahra, 
Floyd, Janney, & Lane, 2003). According to this perspective, strategies address two 
questions: “What business(es) should we be in?” and “How should we compete within a 
given business?”  
Attempts to specify appropriate strategies for new ventures have yielded a 
number of different typologies and insightful perspectives. Much of the early research 
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about new venture strategies dealt with the debate over whether these firms should 
pursue ‘niche’ strategies wherein they would avoid direct competition with large, more 
established firms (e.g., Broom & Longenecker, 1971) or risk an aggressive campaign 
against established firms on a broad front aimed at rapidly building share (e.g., Hanan, 
1976; Vesper, 1980). Supporters of the underlying niche perspective argued that startups 
possess a liability of newness (Stinchcombe, 1965) in which limits in both resources and 
learning constrain chances for growth and survival (Broom & Longenecker, 1971; Cohn 
& Lindberg, 1974). These scholars urge new ventures to concentrate on specialized 
products, localized business operations, and higher levels of quality and craftsmanship 
and market segments where high levels of customer service create unique (to new 
ventures) advantages or opportunities too small to be of interest to larger firms (Cohn & 
Lindberg, 1974). By contrast, other scholars contend that new ventures should consider a 
broader range of strategic alternatives, including direct competition with market leaders 
(Biggadike, 1979; Cooper, Willard, & Woo, 1986; Miller & Camp, 1985). Biggadike 
(1976), for example, argued that unless new ventures enter markets with aggressive 
share objectives, and invested and marketed with a focus on rapid share growth, they 
penalize themselves by lacking the broad appeal of established competitors. 
Accordingly, being more aggressive and broader than incumbents’ results in superior 
financial and market performance.  
Subsequent empirical studies examining new venture strategy have also 
considered the contingent effects of different organizational (e.g., Henderson, 1999), 
competitive (e.g., Chaganti, Chaganti, & Mahajan, 1989; Zahra & Bogner, 2000), 
industry (e.g., McDougall et al., 1992; Sandberg & Hofer, 1987), and national (e.g., 
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Shane & Kolvereid, 1995; Zahra et al., 2000) contexts on strategy formulation and new 
venture success. For example, Carter et al. (1992) found evidence that new venture 
strategies vary across different stages in the evolutionary lifecycle of industry supply 
chains. Empirical findings also suggest the effects of strategy on new venture 
performance and profitability may be greater when analyses also considered the industry 
structure (e.g., McDougall et al., 1992; Sandberg & Hofer, 1987). Chaganti, Chaganti, 
and Mahajan (1989) found that in price competitive environments a cost leadership 
strategy negatively correlates with new venture profitability. By contrast, other research 
suggests that in highly competitive environments ‘high performance’ new ventures tend 
to offer higher quality goods and services for a premium price relative to competitors 
(e.g., Covin & Slevin, 1990).  
These efforts borrow from broader strategic management literature where a 
limited number of strategic models are presumed to capture the essence of most 
competitive postures. Two especially influential schemes are the approaches developed 
by Porter (1980) and Miles and Snow (1978). Porter (1980: 35) emphasized three 
generic strategies by which firms develop defensible positions: cost leadership, product 
or service differentiation, or focus. Firms adopting cost leadership pursue investments in 
scale and scope economies, tight cost and administrative controls, and productivity 
enhancements aimed at minimizing value chain costs. Low cost positions yield cost 
savings allowing these firms to undercut competitors by passing savings on to customers 
in the form of lower prices. Firms pursuing approaches to differentiation emphasize the 
quality of goods and services. Successful differentiation strategies yield higher margins 
and provide defensible positions against competitors owing to brand loyalty by 
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customers and resulting lower price sensitivities of targeted customer groups. Finally, a 
focused approach involves seeking out a particular customer group, product or service 
line, or geographic markets that ventures serve using cost leadership or differentiation.  
Miles and Snow (1978) distinguished generic strategies according to how firms 
respond to different environmental conditions and characterized firms by how they align 
strategy, structure, and process variables under these various environmental conditions. 
Their work placed the concept of congruence in the domain of strategic management 
research. ‘Prospectors’ possess flexible structures that are used to search the 
environment for different product/service/market opportunities. These firms tend to be 
the first-to market innovators to which industry competitors must respond. ‘Defenders” 
attempt to seal off a segment of the market by exploiting efficiencies across their value 
chain, thereby improving operational stability and reducing vulnerability to the 
environment. ‘Analyzers’ operate in two or more competitive domains simultaneously. 
By paying close attention to the actions of key competitors in each market, they 
selectively pursue production efficiencies to exploit stable domains or product 
innovations to success in more dynamic domains when appropriate. Finally, ‘Reactors’ 
have no clearly articulated strategy. These firms respond inconsistently to different 
market conditions and are therefore at the mercy of environmental variations.  
Summary 
As demonstrated in the previous sections, multiple and varied theoretical 
explanations from strategic management, organization theory, economics, sociology, and 
psychology, prescribe conditions for different performance outcomes among new 
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ventures. Additionally, the vast empirical evidence presented in the preceding sections 
illustrates the empirical inconsistencies as well as the lack of explanatory power in the 
literature on new venture performance. Furthermore, as noted in this chapter, previous 
studies often examine factors in isolation and thus fail to provide a more robust 
prediction of new venture performance. For example, many of the behavioral theories 
concentrate on the relationship between different psychological traits (e.g., Gatewood et 
al., 1995; Lee & Tsang, 2001; Locke & Latham, 1990; Zhao et al., 2005), motivational 
factors such as intentionality (e.g., Ajzen, 1991; Bird, 1988; Krueger et al., 2000), or the 
application of cognitive theory to explain different entrepreneurial behaviors (e.g., 
Busenitz & Barney, 1997; Mitchell et al., 2004; Simon et al., 1999; Zahra et al., 2005). 
These theoretical perspectives tend to dwell on the individual-level of analysis, often 
ignoring broader contextual factors that may further our understanding of organizational 
outcomes.  
By contrast, ecological theories focus primarily on the effects of environmental 
conditions on the formation, growth, and mortality of populations of firms (e.g., Agarwal 
& Bayus, 2004; Carroll et al., 2002; Dobrev et al., 2001; Singh, 2006). These theories 
generally account for adaptive change to organizations by focusing on the distribution of 
environmental resources and the various terms on which those resources are made 
available within populations. Accordingly, theoretical perspectives grounded in 
organizational ecology often are not concerned with the possibility of heterogeneity in 
resource endowments between firms within a population. 
While institutional theory stresses the influence of exogenous systems 
surrounding a firm influencing its behavior and performance prospects (Scott, 1995; 
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Oliver, 1991), network theory adopts a relational approach (Gulati et al., 2000) stressing 
the examination of firm behavior and related outcomes among a dyad of relationships 
occurring within and across various levels of analysis, i.e., between individuals, groups 
of individuals, and organizations. While these two theoretical perspectives often provide 
more comprehensive predictions of new venture performance, to-date very few studies 
have been concerned with the influence of exogenous systems and networks of social 
and professional relationships on the formation and use of organizational capabilities by 
firms.  
Perhaps the most significant weakness in previous research surrounds the nature 
of the relationship between venture resources and new venture performance, which is the 
focus of this study. Considering the limitations of the various dominant theoretical 
perspectives, this dissertation argues that without an explicit incorporation of the 
contextual setting and the presence of more complex intervening factors in the 
examination of the value of resources to new ventures and established firms alike, our 
understanding of the source of performance heterogeneity among firms is likely to be 
inadequate. I set out to address this aspect in more detail in Chapter III by presenting the 
theoretical model and accompanying hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER III 
THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES 
Introduction 
Relying on the resource-based view of the firm and contingency theory 
perspectives, this chapter examines the direct and indirect effects of organizational 
resources and capabilities on the performance outcomes of new ventures. More 
specifically, this chapter accomplishes two objectives. First, it incorporates context-
specificity using resource-based and contingency theory logics to investigate 
contingencies affecting resource value among new ventures under different 
environmental conditions. In particular, this dissertation proposes that certain 
organizational and environmental contingencies predict allocations to different 
capability configurations among new ventures and also predict new venture performance 
outcomes. Second, this chapter theorizes and empirically tests the indirect relationship 
between venture resources at IPO and new venture performance through allocations to 
capability configurations formed and maintained by these firms.  
In this chapter, I review the main tenets of the resource-based view of the firm 
(RBV) and contingency theory, discuss the important role of resource allocations, 
describe market-managing and market-creating capabilities, and provide an overview of 
the IPO process and its relevance to the study of performance outcomes among new 
ventures. Next, I introduce this dissertation’s theoretical model. In particular, I examine 
the relationships between venture resources, capability configurations, the environment, 
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and new venture growth and performance. Finally, I describe how organizational 
capabilities partially mediate the relationship between venture resources and the 
performance of new ventures. Hypotheses are presented for each relationship examined 
in the study. 
Figure 2 presents a theoretical model describing the proposed relationships 
among the constructs of interest to this study. This dissertation predicts that venture 
resources at IPO directly and indirectly affect the performance of new ventures. In doing 
so, I predict that venture resources at IPO influence new venture success directly and 
through the intensity of post-IPO allocations to configuration and use of market-
managing and market-creating capabilities. Specifically, the model illustrates how the 
hypothesized relationships between available financial capital at IPO, defined as 
proceeds from the IPO plus the net current assets at IPO (Katila & Shane, 2005; 
Schoonhoven et al., 1990), human capital at IPO, defined as managerial knowledge and 
experience that resides within and is utilized by a firm (Hitt, Bierman, Uhlenbruck, & 
Shimizu, 2006; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005; Youndt et 
al., 2004), and environmental uncertainty at IPO affect (1) post-IPO allocations to the 
formation and use of organizational capabilities, and (2) performance outcomes among 
new ventures. This dissertation elaborates this overview into hypotheses coming from 
resource, environmental, capability, and performance constructs. For parsimony, 
hypotheses are specified only for the links considered most central to the resource-based 
and contingency-based rationales asserted by this work. 
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FIGURE 2 
Theoretical Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Market-managing 
Capability 
Formation/Use
Market-creating
Capability 
Formation/Use
Resources Capability Configurations New Venture Performance
Market 
Performance
Human 
Capital
Environmental 
Dynamism
Industry 
Membership
• TMT elite education
• TMT education attainment
• TMT industry experience
• Shareholder returns 
(three-years following
completion of the IPO)
Financial
Capital
• Working Capital Available at 
IPO – Working Capital 
Required at IPO
 64 
 
 
 
The Resource-based View of the Firm 
The RBV is one of the most prominent theoretical perspectives in strategic 
management (Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991). Central to this 
perspective is the idea that firms’ resources determine heterogeneity, and that such 
differences drive value creation via development of competitive advantage (Ireland et 
al., 2003). Tracing the origins of their work to Penrose (1959) and Barney’s (1991) more 
recent articulation, resource-based scholars argue that a firm’s unique resource portfolio 
not only influences performance but also affects the rate and direction of its growth. In 
other words, the RBV assumes that the sources of superior performance are internal to 
the firm. In particular, it links firm performance to the resources and capabilities 
possessed by a firm (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Teece, 1980). According to this 
perspective, performance is sustainable when resources are inimitable and lack viable 
substitutes (Priem & Butler, 2001a). Relative performance advantages result when firms 
combine resources to form capabilities and then effectively leverage those capabilities to 
exploit specific market opportunities (Grant, 1991). Research also suggests that 
performance depends on the context in which firms develop and deploy resources and 
capabilities along their value chain (e.g., Aragon-Correa & Sharma, 2003; Brush & Artz, 
1999; Zajac et al., 2000).7 Stated differently, some conditions make the same 
                                                 
7
 A value chain, as defined in this dissertation, consists of the structured set of value-enabling production 
activities that may be undertaken for a product to be made or a service to be rendered (Holcomb & Hitt, 
2007). The concept of the value chain was originally used to describe the set of productive activities that 
occur within the boundaries of any given firm, such as research and development, engineering design, 
inbound/outbound logistics, marketing, etc. (see Porter, 1985). My definition of the term is consistent with 
the general use (e.g., Porter, 1985) to mean the structured set of activities associated with a firm’s 
productive output, regardless of whether they take place within the boundaries of a single integrated firm. 
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configuration of capabilities valuable in one context and not in others, which is explored 
further in this chapter.  
At its most basic level, the RBV is built on four arguments. First, the RBV 
asserts that resource endowments vary between firms (Penrose, 1959; Peteraf, 1993). 
Second, resources convey the potential for competitive advantage and superior 
performance to the extent they are valuable and difficult-to-imitate (Wernerfelt, 1984; 
Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Barney, 1991). Third, competitive advantage and superior 
performance is realized when resources are combined and used to create value (Lippman 
& Rumelt, 2003; Miller, 2003). Fourth, competitive advantage is sustained over time by 
firms that better utilize their resources to create value for customers and to protect 
unique combinations from imitation (Black & Boal, 1994). It is argued therefore that 
firms achieve superior performance not simply because of the resources they posses, but 
because of their innovative and effective management of those resources (Morrow et al., 
2007; Sirmon et al., 2007). 
In contrast to neoclassical economic theory explaining persistent firm differences 
on the basis of collusion or monopolistic behavior (Nelson & Winter, 1982), the RBV 
holds that variance in competitive outcomes stems from differences in the characteristics 
of rivals’ resources (Barney, 1991) and capabilities (Miller, 2003). According to this 
perspective, organizational resources are tangible and intangible assets owned, 
controlled, or accessed on a semi-permanent basis by firms that allow them to formulate 
and implement strategies in valuable and difficult-to-imitate ways (Morrow et al., 2007). 
                                                                                                                                                
Focusing on activities—the physically and technologically distinct activities a firm performs—provides an 
efficient way of examining how firm boundaries change and how capabilities are leveraged to 
accommodate some or all of the activities within a value chain. 
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Resources are valuable when they allow firms to implement strategies that increase net 
rents or decrease net costs and/or when they allow firms to sustain competitive 
advantages over time. Using routines and related procedures to deploy and use 
resources, capabilities allow firms to manage productive activity that exploits existing 
product-market positions and to develop new and/or substantially alter existing product-
market positions. In other words, firms endowed with superior capabilities are better 
able to compete in the marketplace by producing more efficiently and/or better satisfying 
customer wants (Peteraf, 1993; Priem, 2007). 
Although a dominant perspective in management research, the RBV has been 
criticized. Three of the more common criticisms of the RBV are as follows: (1) the RBV 
largely ignores how resources are managed to create competitive advantage, (2) it 
presents a static view of an evolving and dynamic process, and (3) it fails to consider 
external contingencies such as environmental uncertainty and the competitive context 
(Barney & Arikan, 2001; Priem & Butler, 2001a). Specific to the focus of this 
dissertation, there is minimal research investigating the context-sensitivity of 
relationships between resources, capabilities, and outcomes such as growth and 
performance (Priem & Butler, 2001a), especially studies involving new ventures that 
observe these relationships across different environmental contexts. Therefore, this 
dissertation follows calls for additional research to examine the context of resource use 
(e.g., Sirmon et al., 2007). 
In addition, scholars have largely overlooked the effect that resources implicitly 
exhibit on performance through their allocation and use by firms. RBV logic holds that 
resource value is contingent on its use. Thus, the resource-performance relationship 
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likely relies on the different capabilities that firms maintain, because capabilities govern 
the transformation of resource endowments to achieve productive outcomes (Collis, 
1994; Dutta et al., 2005). This is especially important for new ventures because these 
firms often lack sufficient financial resources to fund growth (Katila & Shane, 2005; 
Schoonhoven et al., 1990). Moreover, new ventures often possess or control limited 
human capital (knowledge) (Busenitz & Barney, 1997; Florin et al., 2003), and possess 
fewer socially endowed resources such as legitimacy that otherwise can provide them 
with access to resources controlled by other firms (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Certo, 2003; 
Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002). This research addresses these two theoretical gaps in the 
literature. 
Furthermore, despite its appeal as a theoretical framework for explaining firm 
heterogeneity, some scholars criticize the resource-based theory for lack of an empirical 
base, and argue previous conceptualizations and measurement of resources are 
tautological (e.g., Porter, 1991; Williamson, 1999). In particular, researchers often 
identify critical resources and capabilities by comparing successful firms with 
unsuccessful ones, and then test the criticality of those resources/capabilities for better 
performing firms. However, resources alone do not necessarily convey competitive 
advantage. Resources are valuable only within the context of some activity (Porter, 
1991), making performance outcomes contingent on their use (Priem & Butler, 2001a). 
This research attempts to overcome measurement limitations highlighted in previous 
studies by establishing measures of capability configurations that are observable and 
quantifiable. Specifically, I develop measures of resource allocation intensity that 
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provide an assessment of value derived from the resource transformation process and 
therefore offer an objective assessment of capability formation and use. 
This dissertation examines the allocation of resources in the formation and use of 
different capability configurations. In particular, I conceptualize the process by which 
capabilities are formed through the relative allocation of venture resources to different 
capability configurations and the effect of these allocations on new venture success. This 
approach entails modeling a venture’s distinctive capability configurations as allocation 
functions relating each configuration to the venture resources necessary for their 
formation and use. Thus, I attempt to link variations in venture outcomes with the 
choices ventures make when allocating their resources. In doing so, this dissertation 
explores how the configuration of capabilities potentially mediates the relationship 
between venture resource endowments at IPO and the performance outcomes of new 
ventures.  
Resource Allocations 
Resources are at the heart of the RBV. They are those specific physical (e.g., 
facilities, equipment, geographic location), human (e.g., knowledge, expertise, 
education, experience), and structural (e.g., organizational form, relational ties, network 
centrality) assets that can be used to implement value-creating strategies (Barney, 1986; 
Wernerfelt, 1984). They include the local abilities or ‘competencies’ that are 
fundamental to a firm’s success such as industry-specific skills and experience or the 
ability to effectively advertise and brand a firm (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). However, 
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ownership or control of firm resources alone does not ensure success. Firms must put 
resources to productive use. 
One important decision made within virtually all firms is the allocation of 
resources (Bower & Gilbert, 2006; Chandler, 1962; Daft, 1978; Hofer & Schendel, 
1978; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1974; Porter, 1980). Resource allocation within firms is 
important in understanding how firms make productive use of their resources through 
choices characterized by uncertainty, complexity, and conflict. As a result, competition 
is driven not simply by similarities or dissimilarities in resource endowments, but by 
how resources are used, such that different performance outcomes occur when separate 
firms employ similar resources in different ways (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Peteraf & 
Bergen, 2003). Accordingly, following Pfeffer and Salancik (1974), this dissertation 
argues that resource allocation provides a compelling basis for examining the 
performance effects of different capability configurations and the resources they use.  
In particular, this research employs a method of measuring firm-level resource 
deployments that has close analogues in research examining conditions at the firm-level 
(e.g., Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997; Zhang & 
Rajagopalan, 2003) and at the industry-level (e.g., Miles, Snow, & Sharfman, 1993; 
Dooley, Fowler, & Miller, 1996). Used as both a dependent variable and later as the 
mediating variable in the relationship between venture resource endowments and 
performance outcomes, actual resource allocations represent an observed pattern of 
deployment activity in an array of resource-related actions and thus have some attractive 
pragmatic and theoretical features that make them useful for this study.  
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There are several reasons that examining resource allocations can further our 
understanding of the relationship between venture resources, capability formation and 
use, and new venture performance. First, allocations provide an observable measure of 
firms’ use of key resources in productive activity across different capabilities, such as 
manufacturing, research and development (R&D), marketing, and finance. More 
specifically, actual resource allocations associated with operating expenditures (e.g., 
labor, material and other intermediate goods or services, and selling, general and 
administrative expenditures), working capital management (e.g., inventory management, 
accounts receivable, accounts payable), and strategic growth (e.g., R&D expenditures, 
capital expenditures, advertising expenditures) at firms are highly visible. Thus, resource 
allocations offer reliable indicators of resource uses (Harrigan, 1985; Mintzberg, 1978; 
Schendel & Patton, 1978), especially for firms operating in the public markets because 
these firms are required to complete independent audits of financial operating results.  
Second, how resources are actually allocated and used shapes a firm’s strategic 
intent and determines its performance outcomes (Bower & Gilbert, 2006). Thus, it is 
through the deployment of venture resources across these capabilities that firms manifest 
their competitive approaches (Chandler, 1962; Hofer & Schendel, 1978; Porter, 1980). 
Third, financial results are generally available for firms across different industries and 
environmental settings; therefore, they provide opportunities for extending and 
replicating research results. Finally, allocations are theoretically important because they 
represent actions that are not only critical and contested within most firms (e.g., Pfeffer 
& Salancik, 1974), but also may affect the competitive resource allocation decisions of 
rivals (McGrath, Chen, & MacMillan, 1998).  
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Resource allocation is especially important for new ventures because most of 
these firms face severe resource constraints (Baker & Nelson, 2005; Choi & Shepherd, 
2005) and tend to be undercapitalized (Holtz-Eakin et al., 1994a, 1994b). As a result, 
different organizational priorities compete for a share of these resources, with the total 
amount fixed in the short-run. By contrast, some new ventures pursue and even embrace 
challenging growth strategies by making efficient use of their resources (Mosakowski, 
2002), despite their inability or refusal to attract the resources these actions often 
demand (MacMillan & McGrath, 1997; Mahoney & Michael, 2005). For instance, Baker 
and Nelson (2005) found that resource-poor firms often “make do” by applying different 
combinations of the resources at hand to pursue new opportunities more effectively than 
rivals do. In making do with whatever is at hand, these scholars attribute performance 
heterogeneity to differences in discretionary choices about the exploitation of physical, 
human, and structural resource inputs. Similarly, in a study of privately held firms, 
George (2005) found that when resource demands exceed availability within these firms, 
performance is likely to be higher, because when demand substantially exceeds 
availability, these firms bootstrap and find more efficient and effective uses for limited 
resources. Accordingly, new ventures survive and often flourish experiencing growth 
and better performance despite facing potentially daunting resource constraints. 
Contingency Theory: A Subject of Fit 
To propose a general theory of how environmental conditions influence the 
formation of different capability configurations and their resulting impact on new 
venture performance, this research also draws upon contingency theory, which posits 
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that organizational outcomes are a result of the alignment of organizational elements 
with the environmental context (Donaldson, 2001; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1968; 
Thompson, 1967). According to Scott (1992: 98), the concept of fit suggests “there is no 
best way to organize but several, and their suitability is determined by the extent of the 
match between the form of the organization and the demands of the environment.” In 
other words, firms with organizational and strategic elements that more closely match 
the requirements of their environmental context are likely to be more effective than those 
firms that do not. In the organizational theory literature, the notion of fit has focused 
primarily on environment-structure relationships, focusing on contextual elements 
presumed to affect structural choices. Three of the more prominent contingency-based 
arguments have been made for size (e.g., Blau, 1970; Gooding & Wagner, 1986), 
technology (e.g., Rousseau, 1979; Thompson, 1967; Woodward, 1977), and the 
environment (e.g., Burns & Stalker, 1961; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978).  
According to organization theory’s interpretation of contingency theory, firms’ 
strategic actions take the form of ‘adaptation’ in which the environment contingencies 
suggest the adoption of structures that ‘fit’ prevailing conditions. Lawrence and Lorsch 
(1968), for example, suggest that the heterogeneity in a firm’s environment is directly 
related to the level of differentiation among the firm’s component parts because each 
component of the firm is responsible for dealing with certain areas of the environment. 
According to this perspective, firms in highly dynamic, complex, and uncertain 
environments adopt a differentiated structure that is unique from those in more stable, 
less complex, and more certain environments. Similarly, Pennings (1992) contends that 
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firms that adopt structures matching the demands of the environment are more efficient 
and effective than those that do not. Thus, by adopting ‘organic’ structures, firms in 
highly dynamic and uncertain environments utilizing low levels of work standardization 
and highly decentralized decision-making are able to process large amounts of relatively 
complex information more efficiently than firms that use more formalized and 
centralized structures.  
Strategic management scholars adopt a broader multidimensional view of ‘context’ 
in which different levels of environmental variation require different degrees of strategic 
formality as a means to match organizational resources and capabilities with 
opportunities and threats in the general business environment. In doing so, strategy 
scholars find strong support for the influence of both firm-specific and environmental 
conditions on performance outcomes (e.g., Hofer & Schendel, 1978; Porter, 1980; 
Youndt, Snell, Dean, & Lepak, 1996). For instance, Hofer and Schendel argued that 
firms must align their strategy with exogenous conditions such as environmental 
uncertainty, competitive entry barriers, and industry life-cycle factors to achieve superior 
performance. Drawing on contingency and resource-based arguments, Zajac et al. (2000) 
developed and tested a model of strategic fit, using industry- and firm-level conditions 
to predict changes in a firm’s strategy and the performance implications of such changes.  
Confirming the importance of contingency approaches to new ventures, empirical 
research in the field of entrepreneurship has found that contingency models 
incorporating the interactive effects of environmental conditions more useful than ‘direct 
effects’ models that do not consider context-sensitivity (e.g., McDougall et al., 1992; 
Sandberg, 1986; Tsai, MacMillan, & Low, 1991; Zahra, 1996). For example, Robinson 
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and McDougall (2001) demonstrated the importance of disentangling the effects of 
different environmental conditions on measures of new venture performance. Integrating 
arguments from industrial organization (IO) economics, strategic management theory, 
and entrepreneurship, they found that different market entry barriers (e.g., economies of 
scale and capital requirements) had divergent effects on both return-on-sales and 
shareholder return after accounting for the moderating effects of industry growth and 
venture strategy.  
In integrating resource-based and contingency theory perspectives within this 
research, I accept the view that environmental conditions affect the way in which new 
ventures may utilize their resources and therefore influences the value derived from the 
allocation of resources to different capability configurations. However, I do not argue 
that environmental conditions mechanistically determine resource value, thus avoiding 
the criticism of contingency theory by strategy scholars as being deterministic 
(Pennings, 1992; Schoonhoven, 1981). In particular, this research utilizes dynamism to 
the measure environmental uncertainty. This construct: (1) appears repeatedly in 
organizational theory and strategic management research with empirical support, and (2) 
fits the entrepreneurship context, having also appeared in a broad range of strategic 
management and entrepreneurship studies as a significant predictor of different 
organizational outcomes in new ventures. 
New Ventures: A Focus on Initial Public Offering (IPO) Firms 
The establishment of new ventures lies at the foundation of entrepreneurship 
(Hitt, Ireland, Camp, & Sexton, 2001), and the growth and performance of 
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entrepreneurial ventures is responsible for much of the wealth creation in developed and 
emerging economies (Birch, 1987; Kirchoff, 1991). Nevertheless, many obstacles 
confront young companies. New ventures often lack financial resources, knowledge of 
their competitive environment, and legitimacy with customers, suppliers, and partners 
(Stinchcombe, 1965). Similarly, young firms often have limited production experience, 
and therefore operate using routines that may be underdeveloped (Sorensen & Stuart, 
2000). Because new ventures can encounter numerous potential hazards, there is 
considerable uncertainty about the viability of these firms. Added to the hazards of 
inexperience, young firms often require substantial resources to fund early-stage and 
speculative strategic development programs (Stuart et al., 1999), while cash flows to 
fund growth are not expected until later development stages of a venture’s growth. Thus, 
the decision to ‘go public’ represents an important transitionary stage in the development 
of young firms (Aldrich, 1999), in part, because initial public offerings allow firms to 
access financial resources that can be used to seize and finance growth and/or repay debt 
(Nelson, 2003). 
An initial public offering (IPO) is the event that transforms a privately held 
venture into a publicly owned company. Over the past several years, IPOs have received 
a significant amount of attention in the finance (e.g., Jain & Kini, 1994), strategy (e.g., 
Certo, 2003; Certo et al., 2001; Certo et al., 2003), and organizational theory (e.g., 
Fischer & Pollock, 2004; Welbourne & Andrews, 1996) literatures. The primary focus of 
this research has been on discovering the factors that significantly affect survival rates 
(e.g., Fischer & Pollock, 2004; Jain & Kini, 1994; Welbourne & Andrews, 1996), IPO 
performance (e.g., Certo et al., 2003; Deeds, DeCarolis, & Coombs, 1997; DeCarolis & 
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Deeds, 1999; Gulati & Higgins, 2003; Sanders & Boivie, 2004; Stuart et al., 1999), and 
longer-term performance outcomes (e.g., Florin et al., 2003).  
Although an IPO offers a number of benefits to firms that successfully navigate 
the transition, it also represents a critical point in a new venture’s development bringing 
with it a number of costs and risks (see Husick & Arrington [1998] and 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers [2005] for discussions of potential benefits, costs, and risks). 
In particular, the change from the private to public market often necessitates a change in 
organizational goals (Aldrich, 1999), as top managers of IPO firms must consider the 
different goals and time horizons of new shareholders. Further, IPO firms often undergo 
a number of changes to their administrative systems and patterns of activity that 
necessitate refining existing operating routines and capabilities and developing new 
ones. For example, more formal governance procedures are often required and additional 
finance and administrative personnel are added to accommodate the reporting 
requirements of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and to facilitate 
communication with a firm’s new investors (Husick & Arrington, 1998). As a result, 
IPO firms must learn how to deal with reduced flexibility, increased oversight from the 
investment community and the firm’s own board of directors, greater demands for short-
term profitability and performance, and less tolerance for performance variability and 
uncertainty (Fischer & Pollock, 2004; PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2005).  
From a new venture’s perspective, however, selling equity to the public not only 
produces a positive signal of legitimacy to the market, but also generates much-needed 
capital. This observation is significant, especially from a shareholder’s perspective, 
because, similar to free cash flow from operations, cash proceeds from an IPO can be 
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reallocated to operations and to unfunded projects, albeit at the discretion of 
management. Accordingly, firms have decision options at the time of the IPO for 
deploying newly acquired financial resources. Available decision options include 
funding operational initiatives, expanding existing strategic initiatives, or devising new 
strategic programs. For example, firms can improve production capabilities to gain better 
cost efficiencies, engage in acquisitions that alter and/or expand firm boundaries, or 
enter new product or geographic markets to enhance scale and scope economies 
(Holcomb, Holmes, & Hitt, 2006; Husick & Arrington, 1998).  
In sum, although IPO firms vary in the intensity with which they experience 
specific changes and the resource allocation choices triggered by an IPO event, all face 
the task of adjusting goals, boundaries, and/or routines enough to incur performance and 
survival risks. In other words, the disruptive events associated with an IPO effectively 
‘reset the clock’ and reintroduce risks associated with the liability of newness as firms 
struggle to adapt strategies, internal operational routines and processes, and/or 
capabilities with the intent of continued growth and improved performance (Amburgey, 
Kelly, & Barnett, 1993; Fischer & Pollock, 2004).  
Furthermore, because IPO firms have not had the opportunity to establish a 
consistent performance record of accomplishment in the public market, they also lack 
the organizational legitimacy that other publicly traded counterparts often posses and 
thus suffer from a ‘liability of market newness’ (Certo, 2003). Taken together, previous 
research suggests that firms recently experiencing an IPO face significant performance 
challenges and failure risks that mirror the challenges faced by recently launched firms. 
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TABLE 2 
List of Definitions 
Term   Definition   Citation 
     
Resource  Resources, broadly defined, have often been used in the literature in a generic sense to also include 
capabilities (e.g., Barney, 1991). ‘Resources’ are defined as tangible or intangible assets that new 
ventures’ own, control, or are provided access to on a semi-permanent basis, and that allow them to 
implement their strategies. 
 Barney (1991); Grant 
(1991); Helfat & 
Peteraf (2003) 
     
Financial 
Capital 
 Financial capital is defined as proceeds from a new venture’s IPO plus tangible and intangible net current 
assets at IPO. It represents the cash ‘on-hand’ plus tangible and intangible ‘equity’ assets (e.g., facilities, 
patents, trademarks, etc.) that is available to allocate towards development and use of market-creating 
and/or market-managing capabilities.  
 Katila & Shane 
(2005); Schoonhoven 
et al. (1990) 
     
Human Capital  The sum of all knowledge, skills, and ‘life’ experiences residing in and utilized by its most senior 
executives. It represents knowledge owned by individuals that firms, in turn, borrow or rent from their 
managers and employees. Two important features of human capital are the level of formal education and 
level of work experience within a particular industry. 
 Hitt et al. (2006); 
Nahapiet & Ghoshal 
(1998); Schultz, 
(1961); Subramaniam 
& Youndt (2005); 
Youndt et al. (2004) 
     
Resource 
Allocation 
 Resource allocation is the process by which firms deploy and make productive use of their resources 
through choices that are characterized by uncertainty, complexity, and conflict. Resource allocations 
associated with operating expenditures (e.g., direct labor and material; selling, general and administrative 
expenditures), working capital management (e.g., inventory, receivables, payables), and strategic growth 
(e.g., R&D expenditures, capital expenditures, advertising expenditures) at firms are examined in this 
dissertation. 
 Bower (2006); 
Chandler (1962); Daft 
(1978); Hofer & 
Schendel (1978); 
Pfeffer & Salancik 
(1974); Porter (1980) 
     
Capability  Scholars claim that capabilities represent how firms manage resources or that capabilities represent a 
unique combination of resources that enable firms to pursue specific actions that create value.  
‘Capabilities’ are defined as organizational routines that allow firms to effectively integrate and use 
resources to implement their strategies. Capabilities serve as an intermediate transformation ability 
between the allocation of resources by new ventures and the organizational outcomes such resources 
achieve. 
 Dosi et al.(2000); 
Helfat & Peteraf 
(2003); 
Lavie (2006); 
Sirmon et al. (2007); 
Winter (2000, 2003) 
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TABLE 2 (cont.)  
Term   Definition   Citation 
     
Capability 
Configuration 
 Capability configurations represent a distinctive combination of organizational capabilities consisting of 
routines, the attributes of those routines, and interdependencies formed across different configurations that 
allow firms to establish, maintain, and extend a competitive advantage. 
 Lavie (2006); Winter 
(2003) 
     
Market- 
making 
Capability 
Formation/Use 
 Market-creating capabilities consist of dynamic routines that enable firms to extend or substantially 
augment existing product-market positions, to create new product-market positions, or to alter the 
process(es) by which future goods and services are produced. Accordingly, these capabilities are value-
enhancing, rather than value-enabling, because they permit ventures to achieve growth by altering current 
organizational scale and scope thereby converting existing and newly accessed resources into new 
product-market segments that enable competitive advantages to be sustained. Examples include research 
and development, engineering design, brand management and advertising, new product introduction, 
alliance formation and management, mergers and acquisitions, and divestitures.  
 -- 
     
Industry 
Membership 
 Industry membership is represented by the exogenous environmental/market conditions that are assumed 
to be idiosyncratic to each industry, which affect the formation of capabilities and the resulting 
organizational outcomes those capabilities are intended to achieve. Two specific conditions are examined 
in this dissertation: environmental munificence and environmental dynamism. 
 Aldrich (1979); Dess 
& Beard (1984); Keats 
& Hitt (1988) 
     
Environmental 
Dynamism 
 The level of instability or uncertainty associated with an environment and represents environmental 
change that is difficult to predict. Dynamism (uncertainty) is the variance in the rate of market and 
industry change and the level of uncertainty about the forces beyond the control of individual firms  
 Dess & Beard (1984); 
Keats & Hitt (1988) 
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Consequently, this research employs a sample of firms that have recently completed an 
IPO to test the hypotheses presented in this chapter. 
In the following sections of this dissertation, I develop the research hypotheses. 
These hypotheses explore the direct effects of venture resources on the performance of 
new ventures and on the allocation of resources to different capability configurations, the 
moderating effect of environmental conditions on these relationships, and the indirect 
effects of venture resources on new venture success via a venture’s capability 
configurations. Table 2 provides a brief summary of the descriptions of the main 
constructs represented in the theoretical model (see Figure 2). 
Venture Resource Endowments and New Venture Outcomes 
Underlying resource-based logic is based on the assumption that firms’ 
performance and the rate and direction of their growth are influenced by how firms 
conceptualize and use their resources. Given the popularity of resource-based arguments, 
several studies have explored relationships among similar resource types and outcomes 
such as firm growth and performance (e.g., Bamford et al., 2000; Cooper, Gimeno-
Gascon, & Woo, 1994; Covin, Slevin, & Heeley, 2000; Mishina et al., 2004). Although 
these studies offer many useful insights, there is still need for additional theorizing and 
empirical research. First, conceptualizations of organizational resource and capability 
constructs in prior studies vary widely and do not consistently capture the logic of 
growth and performance (Mishina et al., 2004), especially for new ventures. Second, the 
relationship between venture resources and different performance outcomes differ based 
on the contingent and indirect effects of these resources on performance. Thus, much 
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prior research overlooks the complexity in these relationships and a study incorporating 
them may better explain the influence of venture resources at IPO on new venture 
success. In this dissertation, I examine the direct, moderating, and indirect performance 
effects of two resource types: financial capital and human capital. 
Financial Capital 
Previous research suggests that the amount of initial financial capital invested by 
new ventures positively affects new venture survival and growth (e.g., Cooper et al., 
1994). In this research, I conceptualize a new venture’s financial resource endowment as 
the ‘liquid’ financial capital at IPO—proceeds from a new venture’s IPO plus tangible 
and intangible net current assets at IPO (Katila & Shane, 2005; Schoonhoven et al., 
1990)—that is available to allocate towards the development and use of different 
capabilities.8 Availability or slack in liquid financial resources is a general asset that is 
easily allocated to varied uses. Accordingly, the presence of positive amounts of 
financial capital implies that a firm has available financial resources that can be used for 
productive purposes, including the pursuit of capital-intensive strategies, which are more 
difficult to imitate (Cyert & March, 1963). 
                                                 
8
 The concept of available financial capital bears some resemblance to the concept of free cash flow, 
which refers to “undistributed cash flow in excess of that needed for positive net present value (NPV) 
projects” (Brush, Bromiley, & Hendrickx, 2000). However, this research considers the two concepts to be 
distinct from one another. In particular, by definition, the concept of free cash flow assumes that the only 
investment alternatives available for the allocation of free cash flow are unprofitable (i.e., negative NPV) 
alternatives. By contrast, the concept of available financial capital, or slack, refers to financial resources in 
excess of amounts needed to satisfy current operational demands and support current performance levels 
(Bourgeois, 1981; Cyert & March, 1963). The measure of available financial capital utilized by this 
research does not assume that excess resources exist because all profitable investment opportunities have 
been exhausted, as is posited by the free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1989, 1993). Rather, this research 
assumes that available financial capital exists because a firm has more resources than required to satisfy 
current demands. In addition, the focus on IPO firms highlights the significance of proceeds raised from 
this event and thus fails to qualify under the tenets of free cash flow logic. 
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Research suggests that available financial capital enhances experimentation and 
risk-taking, which influences the innovativeness and performance of large firms (e.g., 
Bromiley, 1991; Cho & Pucik, 2005; Greve, 2003) and privately held companies (e.g., 
George, 2005). In this case, the availability of such capital relaxes internal controls and 
creates funds that firms can redirect towards programs with uncertain outcomes, thereby 
fostering an environment for innovation (Nohria & Gulati, 1996; Singh, 1986). 
Therefore, this research assumes that financial capital at IPO will be positively 
associated with new venture performance. I offer two possible reasons for a positive 
effect. First, available financial capital eases financial resource constraints on the 
operation and growth of the business and expands the range of strategic alternatives 
available to management for investments with potentially positive returns (Tan & Peng, 
2003). Second, available financial capital allows experimentation and risk-taking 
(Nohria & Gulati, 1996), which may have positive performance consequences.  
The motivation to transform available financial resources into growth is fixed in 
what Penrose (1959) refers to as the ‘entrepreneurial ambition’ of new ventures, which 
she describes as management’s propensity for taking risks to ensure growth occurs. In 
other words, excess capacity provides an internal mechanism for growth that allows 
firms to more fully utilize available resources. According to this perspective, optimal 
performance requires a balance between the exploitation of existing resource 
endowments and the development (or acquisition) of new resource positions (Chatterjee 
& Wernerfelt, 1991; Ghemawat & Costa, 1993). In support of this view, Thompson 
(1967: 150) suggested that excess resources endow firms with the ability “to take 
advantage of opportunities afforded by the environment,” and various studies have found 
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that available financial resources have a positive effect on different measures of 
performance, including profitability and shareholder returns (e.g., Miller & Leiblein, 
1996; Mishina et al., 2004). For new ventures, financial capital provides the ability to 
adjust to prevailing environmental and competitive conditions and to establish new 
market positions vis-à-vis rivals (Bamford et al., 1999; Cooper et al., 1994). 
Accordingly, for entrepreneurial managers, available financial resources may be 
considered a ‘waste,’ and these managers are often willing to endure short-term resource 
deficits in order to promote future growth (Bhide, 1992).  
Results examining venture growth, however, are mixed. Evidence suggests that 
resources controlled by a firm often promote growth (e.g., Bamford et al., 2000; Cooper 
et al., 1994), while others observe that resource differences are unrelated to growth (e.g., 
Shrader & Simon, 1997). Other researchers have found that the combination of resources 
with business strategies influences growth (e.g., Chandler & Hanks, 1994) while other 
studies report that resource-strategy interactions do not have certain performance 
implications (e.g., Brush & Chaganti, 1999). The lack of clear findings between 
resources and performance, especially growth, in the literature may be attributed to the 
way in which the resource-performance relationship has been operationalized in the 
literature. Prior research has construed that greater levels of available financial capital 
will lead to better performance. However, countervailing claims to the resource-
performance relationship suggest that such relationships are contingent upon a firm’s 
allocation of resources. In other words, for available financial capital to spur better 
performance outcomes, it must be applied to productive uses.  
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By contrast, performance declines are likely at increasingly higher levels of 
available financial capital. Proponents of behavioral theory, for example, argue that 
higher levels of available financial capital provide opportunities for executives to 
appease different coalitions by allowing these parties to pursue their own agendas (Cyert 
& March, 1963), even when such allocations are unlikely to produce acceptable returns. 
In addition, some research suggests that ventures with large financial resource reserves 
can become overly optimistic in their assessment of risky projects. In turn, overly 
optimistic ventures often pursue strategic programs with higher failure rates yielding 
lower investment returns (Cooper, Woo, & Dunkelberg, 1988; de Meza & Southey, 
1996), which reduce profitability and shareholder returns when entrepreneurial 
opportunities are not properly exploited. Moreover, research on small entrepreneurial 
firms suggests that firms with fewer resources are likely to leverage them more 
effectively (Baker & Nelson, 2005; Starr & MacMillan, 1990). According to this 
perspective, resource ‘constraints’ alter the behavior by which resources are allocated 
and used, forcing these firms to improve allocative efficiency. 
In this dissertation, I first examine the direct effect of available financial capital 
at IPO on venture performance and address the potential indirect effects later in this 
chapter. Based on the arguments presented above, I argue that a non-linear relationship 
(inverted U-shape) exists between available financial capital at IPO and venture 
performance. More specifically, allocation activity intensifies at lower to moderate 
levels of available financial capital at IPO, enhancing experimentation and risk taking. 
As a result, performance improves as ventures capitalize on gains from investments in 
the most profitable entrepreneurial opportunities. However, as allocation activity 
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intensifies with higher levels of available financial capital at IPO, ventures often 
discover fewer profitable opportunities. Thus, higher levels of available financial capital 
at IPO are unlikely to produce performance gains necessary to offset added costs. 
Furthermore, as allocations intensify, organizational boundaries grow, increasing 
bureaucratic complexity and information asymmetries (Hitt, Hoskisson, Johnson, & 
Moesel, 1996). Information asymmetries produce information deficits. Information 
deficits add to the administrative demands of organizing transactions. In turn, excessive 
administrative demands associated with governance oversight reduce firm performance 
(D’Aveni & Ravenscraft, 1994; Rothaermel, Hitt, & Jobe, 2006). Thus, beyond a certain 
level of available financial capital at IPO, I expect the relationship to be negative. 
Specifically, I propose that: 
Hypothesis 1: Financial capital at IPO has a non-linear association (inverted 
U-shaped) with IPO-stage new venture performance. 
 
Human Capital 
Resources that are valuable, unique, and difficult to imitate can provide the basis 
for ventures’ competitive advantage (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Barney, 1991). In turn, 
these competitive advantages enhance venture success by producing higher levels of 
performance (Peteraf, 1993). Scholars argue that both tangible resources (such as 
financial resources and other physical assets) and intangible resources (such as human 
capital) form the basis of firm strategies (e.g., Barney, 1991; Hitt, Bierman, Shimizu, & 
Kochhar, 2001) and are critical to the execution of those strategies as well (e.g., 
Schoenecker & Cooper, 1998). In particular, intangible resources, such as human capital, 
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produce positive returns via competitive advantage because they are often rare and 
causally ambiguous, thereby making them more difficult and costly to imitate (Hitt et al., 
2001; Itami, 1987). Furthermore, human capital can enable firms to establish and sustain 
performance advantages over time because some capabilities generate private synergies 
when based on firm-specific knowledge (Barney, 1988).9 Others create scale economies 
when integrated with firm resources (i.e., complementary assets; Harrison, Hitt, 
Hoskisson, & Ireland, 2001). In both cases, such advantages may not be easily imitated 
by rivals and are likely to be immobile.  
This dissertation defines a firm’s human capital as the sum of all knowledge, 
skills, and ‘life’ experiences residing in and utilized by its most senior executives (Hitt et 
al., 2006; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Schultz, 1961; Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005; 
Youndt et al., 2004). Top managers gain knowledge through formal education and 
through learning on the job (Hitt et al., 2001; Hitt et al., 2006). Accordingly, executives’ 
higher education and work experiences form their skill sets and knowledge structures as 
well as their distinctive worldviews. Furthermore, although individual knowledge is held 
by people (i.e., know-how and know-what), it is embedded within the organizing 
principles, culture, etc. of the firm (Kogut & Zander, 1992). In turn, firm knowledge is 
nested in a higher order set of routines that form different capabilities (Winter, 2003). 
Different types of knowledge vary in their transferability. Previous research 
classifies these different knowledge types as either explicit or tacit knowledge (e.g., 
Polanyi, 1967). Explicit knowledge is codifiable and can be transferred at little or no 
                                                 
9
 Private synergy is created when information about the combination of firm-specific resources is observed 
from rivals and when no other combination of resources can produce the same value (Barney, 1988; 
Harrison et al., 1991). 
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cost (Eden, Levitas, & Martinez, 1997; Liebeskind, 1996). Whereas explicit knowledge 
is considered easy to transfer, making it susceptible to unintended transfer to or 
expropriation by competitors, tacit knowledge is embedded within individual skills and 
the collaborative working relationships within firms and therefore is unique to each firm. 
As a result, tacit knowledge is often embedded in uncodified organizational routines (see 
also Nelson & Winter, 1982; Winter, 2003), making it difficult to transfer (Teece et al., 
1997). As such, tacit knowledge is rare and inimitable making it a likely source of 
profitability and advantage (Barney, 1991; Berman, Down, & Hill, 2002; Mowery, 
Oxley, & Silverman, 1996; Spender, 1996).  
In contrast to organizational capital, which represents institutionalized 
knowledge and codified experiences stored in firms’ databases, patents, manuals, and 
other formalized structures (Hall, 1992; Itami, 1987), human capital represents 
knowledge owned by individuals that firms, in turn, borrow or rent from their managers 
and employees. Youndt et al. (2004: 338) describe organizational capital as “the 
knowledge, skills, and information that stays behind when an organization’s people go 
home at night.” Daft and Weick (1984: 285) note the distinction between human capital 
and organizational capital by observing, “[i]ndividuals come and go, but organizations 
preserve knowledge … over time.” In other words, individual expertise and knowledge 
may or may not remain with a firm and can evolve depending on the hiring, 
development, and turnover of its people. By contrast, organizational capital is 
institutionalized and therefore it does not change very easily (Walsh & Ungson, 1991).  
The upper echelons perspective is firmly grounded in the belief that top 
managers account for what happens in and to an organization (Cannella & Holcomb, 
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2005; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). According to this perspective, the knowledge, 
education, experiences, perceptions, and personalities of top managers manifest 
themselves at several stages of the decision process, from opportunity identification to 
alternative generation and exploitation. Thus, both strategic choices and organizational 
decision outcomes reflect the characteristics of the top managers in a firm. Drawing 
from the Carnegie School approach to decision theory (Cyert & March, 1963; March & 
Simon, 1958), the upper-echelons model assumes that cognitive and behavioral factors, 
rather than rational calculation, shape strategic decision-making. In this way, the 
knowledge and experiences of organizational decision makers strongly influence the 
ease with which firms make complex choices.  
An important feature of the upper echelons perspective adopted by this 
dissertation is a primary focus on the top management team (TMT) rather than strictly 
the chief executive officer (CEO). Except in extreme cases, management is a shared 
effort in which a dominant coalition (Cyert & March, 1963) collectively shapes 
organizational outcomes. Recent research in strategic management suggests that human 
capital attributes (including education, experience, and skills), and, in particular, top 
managers’ attributes affect firm outcomes (e.g., Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Huselid, 
1995; Pennings, Lee, & van Witteloostuijn, 1998). For example, Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven (1990) found that new ventures with TMTs having greater work 
experience experienced higher growth. Furthermore, examining a sample of the largest 
professional law firms in the U.S., Hitt and his colleagues (2001) found that partners’ 
human capital (knowledge) had a positive effect on firm performance. In particular, the 
authors’ empirical findings supported theoretical arguments suggesting the effects of top 
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managers’ human capital on firm performance are both direct and indirect. Carpenter, 
Sanders, and Gregersen (2001) concluded that a CEO’s work experience, specifically his 
or her international experience, was positively related to firm performance. In addition, 
they found that TMTs' work experience positively moderated the relationship between 
CEO experience and firm performance. Thus, a higher level of knowledge among top 
managers is expected to have a positive influence over new venture performance. 
Beyond knowledge gained through formal education and through experience on 
the job, managers, especially the senior-most executives managing firms in the public 
arena, are often required to have extensive education and training prior to assuming 
leadership roles. This education and prior work experience usually provide a high level 
of articulable knowledge in specific functional disciplines (i.e., finance, engineering, 
law; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992), broader managerial know-how (Kogut & Zander, 
1992), and awareness of different industry recipes (Reger & Huff, 1993). Often there is 
some variation in the degree and quality of this education and experience. For example, 
higher levels of education are associated with higher capacities for information 
processing and the ability to discriminate among a variety of decision options (Wiersema 
& Bantel, 1992). As such, high levels of education have consistently been associated 
with receptivity to and pursuit of innovation (Bantel & Jackson, 1989). Top managers 
who attended the best universities are perceived to have higher levels of codified 
knowledge and to have higher intellectual potential to accumulate and apply tacit 
knowledge (Hitt et al., 2001). Furthermore, individuals graduating from top institutions 
often develop and maintain social networks that can be a valuable organizational 
resource because such networks can provide access to valuable external resources 
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(Finkelstein, 1992; Useem & Karabel, 1986). The more information-rich a TMT’s 
external social network, the more opportunities it will have available. Information-rich 
networks also enhance a venture’s ability to withstand random environmental shocks by 
providing access to additional external resources (Brüderl, Preisendorfer, & Ziegler, 
1992; Cooper et al., 1994).  
After completing their formal education, managers continue to acquire 
knowledge through different work experiences, and thus, they gain tacit knowledge 
through ‘learning by doing’ (Pisano, 1994). Their experience builds valuable industry-
specific knowledge, which is often tacit. Industry-specific knowledge reflects specialized 
knowledge of the products and technologies, customer markets, and/or suppliers of 
similar businesses within an industry that cannot be completely transferred to other 
industries and that can be developed either through direct experience (Pennings et al., 
1998). Interpretive maps of competition within industries are often developed and shared 
among top managers (Reger & Huff, 1993). These maps reflect perceived ‘industry 
recipes’ (i.e., best practices) that represent “shared or interlocking metaphors [and the] 
taken-for-granted assumptions [that] most describe a cohesive industry’s character” 
(Huff, 1982: 125). As a result of industry-specific experience, top managers at new 
ventures apply knowledge about highly valued practices or recipes (cf. Kogut & Zander, 
1992). In turn, these industry practices and recipes influence firm behavior and the 
formation of individual ventures’ strategies, which aid these firms in competing 
effectively with rivals (Reger & Huff, 1993). 
Different aspects of human capital and their interrelationships have been linked 
with innovation and new product development (e.g., Ahuja, 2000; Powell et al., 1996; 
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Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005), internationalization (e.g., Carpenter & Fredrickson, 
2001; Carpenter et al., 2001; Hitt et al., 2006), and competitive firm behavior (e.g., 
Ferrier, 2001; Hambrick, Cho, & Chen, 1996; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992), and with 
different performance outcomes such as profitability, sales growth, and shareholder 
returns (e.g., Carpenter et al., 2001; Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997; Hitt et al., 2001; 
Miller & Shamsie, 1999; Peng & Luo, 2000). Accordingly, a venture’s human capital is 
not only essential to its ability to survive and sustain performance, but also to achieve 
growth, especially with IPO firms.  
During the post-IPO period, when market uncertainties are high and external 
demands add complexities, ventures that are endowed with greater levels of human 
capital are better able to plan, troubleshoot, and manage venture activities more 
effectively (Snell & Dean, 1992). They also are better able to adapt to environmental 
conditions (Youndt et al., 1996). Accordingly, superior human capital at IPO enhances a 
new venture’s ability to establish, sustain, and extend its competitive advantage during 
the post-IPO period, and therefore, to enhance its performance prospects. Specifically, I 
propose that: 
Hypothesis 2: Human capital at IPO is positively associated with IPO-stage 
new venture performance. 
 
Venture Resources and the Formation/Use of Capability Configurations 
The RBV attributes performance differences across firms to the variance in 
firms’ resources and capabilities. According to this perspective, resources having VRIN 
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characteristics provide a basis for firms’ competitive advantages (Amit & Schoemaker, 
1993). These competitive advantages often produce positive performance returns 
(Peteraf, 1993). In turn, resources form the basis of organizational capabilities (Sirmon 
et al., 2007), and therefore are critical to the formation and use of those capabilities as 
well. This is particularly important for young firms who face early resource and 
legitimacy concerns (Certo, 2003; Holtz et al., 1994a, 1994b). While different initiatives 
that such firms pursue may be associated with variations in new venture outcomes, I 
contend that more research examining how new ventures allocate and use resources to 
manage growth and performance is required.  
Evolutionary theory (Nelson & Winter, 1982) and the dynamic capabilities 
literature (Teece et al. 1997) provide useful perspectives for understanding how firms 
build capabilities, especially how capabilities allow resources to be managed for greater 
value across different industry contexts. Scholars studying capabilities have advanced 
different ways of thinking about them. Capabilities embody a duality of structure and 
agency—one part is grounded in normative views of the capability (structure) and the 
other in actual execution by different actors (agency) (Feldman & Pentland, 2003). 
Understanding these two aspects helps explain organizational performance and change.  
Capabilities are programs of action that reflect a firm’s experience with different 
tasks (Winter, 2000). As firms accumulate experience, they increase proficiency. 
Capabilities, then, can become a source of competitive advantage and play an influential 
role in the formulation of strategic choices by supplementing, or even substituting for, 
calculative, formal decision-making rules (March, 1999). Their configuration also helps 
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explain performance differences in firms. Thus, we need to better understand how firms 
build and use them. 
Routines appear prominently in descriptions of organizational capabilities (e.g., 
Levitt & March, 1988; March & Simon, 1958; Nelson & Winter, 1982), serving as their 
nervous system (Winter, 2000) or building blocks (Dosi et al., 2000). By definition, 
routines constitute more atomistic units of behavior than capabilities. They represent 
persistent patterns of learned behavior (Cohen & Bacdayan, 1994) or distinctive 
organizational procedures (Nelson & Winter, 1982). In turn, routines store 
organizational experience in a form that allows firms to more effectively accomplish 
patterned and repetitious tasks and actions exhibiting continuity over time (Winter, 
2003).10 Strategy and organizational theory literature provide evidence that firm 
behavior is influenced by the level of experience organizational members have with a 
particular strategic action or direction (e.g., Amburgey et al., 1993; Amburgey & Miner, 
1992; Gulati, 1995; Miller & Friesen, 1980). As a venture accumulates experience in a 
certain routine, it gains proficiency in that routine. As new ventures gain proficiency in a 
routine, they increase the speed and reliability of decision-making, enhancing their 
ability to achieve desirable outcomes (Cohen & Bacdayan, 1994).  
Furthermore, routines provide a source of competitive advantage in the formation 
and use of organizational capabilities by supplementing, or even substituting for, 
rational, calculative strategic decision-making logic pertaining to the allocation (use) of 
                                                 
10
 Winter (2000: 983) describes organizational capabilities as “high-level routine[s] (or collection[s] of 
routines) that, together with its implementing input flows, confers upon an organization’s management a 
set of decision options for producing significant outputs of a particular type.” In this context, the ‘set of 
decision options’ language emphasizes a managerial control aspect and the fact that a capability is 
deployable in various directions. ‘Implementing input flows’ is a reminder that production output requires 
actual inputs before the coordinating information flows and information processing features of a capability 
(i.e., its ‘nervous system’) can be enacted. 
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scarce resources. In turn, capabilities enable firms to acquire, develop, and deploy 
resources, convert those resources into value-enhancing products, and ultimately 
transform resources as the basis for sustainable competitive advantage. Accordingly, 
capabilities emerge in situations where the recurring cost of careful deliberation among 
organizational members would otherwise make organizations an inefficient structure for 
collective action (Cohen & Bacdayan, 1994; March & Simon, 1958). 
Capability configurations are composed of routines, their attributes, and the 
interdependencies that exist between them (Lavie, 2006). They reflect the value-
maximizing behaviors of rational decision makers (Dutta et al., 2005). Accordingly, 
performance depends on the degree to which capabilities fit with value-maximizing sets 
relative to the degree of convergence among industry members. Over time, firms affect 
performance outcomes by adjusting their capability configurations and narrowing 
capability gaps (Lavie, 2006).  
In this research, I build on Lavie’s (2006: 153) conceptualization of a capability 
configuration as “the composition of constituting routines, the attributes of these 
routines, and the interdependencies across these routines.” According to this perspective, 
the formation, reconfiguration, and use of different capability configurations reflect the 
value-maximizing behavior of rational decision makers. This behavior involves attempts 
to select the ‘best’ alternative among various options (i.e., the value-maximizing 
configuration), in which a value-maximizing configuration represents the most valuable 
configuration of similar capabilities available among rivals within a competitive industry 
segment (Dutta et al., 2005; Lavie, 2006). Thus, new venture performance depends on 
the degree to which its capability configuration achieves a fit with the value-maximizing 
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capability relative to the degree of convergence achieved by its competitors. However, 
cognitive limitations and lack of information among top managers affect a firm’s 
capacity to conceive of and then implement value-maximizing configurations, which 
affects the extent to which ventures are able to narrow (widen) performance gaps with 
rivals (Winter, 2000). Furthermore, the degree to which financial resources limit the 
range of potential alternatives considered also affects the performance gap that emerges 
when a firm’s configuration differs from rivals’ value-maximizing configuration.  
Previous studies argue that certain organizational capabilities can be a source of 
sustainable competitive advantage (e.g., Collis, 1994; Dutta et al., 2005; Teece et al., 
1997). To begin with, scholars have shown that because organizational capabilities 
govern the transformation of resources to productive outputs (Dosi et al., 2002); they 
allow firms to create and maintain unique product-market positions and thus establish a 
competitive advantage. However, to the extent that product-market positions can be 
imitated by rivals, current positions alone do not explain the future sustainability of 
competitive advantage over time (Porter, 1991). Additional capabilities are required to 
augment a venture’s market-positions and/or its production and administrative processes 
in such a way as to extend its distinctive advantage in a market (Eisenhardt & Martin, 
2000). Accordingly, scholars often distinguish capabilities on the basis of two types of 
routines that underlie their formation and use: operating routines and dynamic routines.  
Operating routines involve the execution of ‘known procedures’ that are used by 
firms to satisfy ongoing productive activity, such as manufacturing, distribution, and 
finance, for the purpose of generating current revenue and profit (Winter, 2000; Zollo & 
Winter, 2002). These routines guide organizational action and establish the basis for 
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market-managing capabilities (cf. Winter, 2000). They enable firms to exploit resources 
when implementing strategy (Teece et al., 1997) and represent the capacity of the firm to 
deploy resources to satisfy existing production activity usually in combination with 
organizational resources and knowledge (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Dosi et al., 2002). 
Firms create these capabilities in part by making strategic investments in reusable 
capabilities that link together and potentially transcend traditional business units and 
functions (Stalk, Evans, & Shulman, 1992).  
By contrast, dynamic routines bring about desirable changes in the existing set of 
operating routines for the purpose of sustaining competitive advantage and enhancing 
profit in the future (Helfat & Peteraf, 2003; Leonard-Burton, 1992). These routines 
enable firms to adapt, extend, and substantially alter their organizational scale to exploit 
developing opportunities in the market. These routines are regarded as constitutive of 
‘dynamic capabilities’ (Teece et al., 1997; Zollo & Winter, 2003), which consist as a set 
of specific and identifiable routines that augment, extend, or establish new operating 
routines and capabilities (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). As Loasby (1998: 139) notes, 
“‘managing capabilities’ is itself a capability.” Stated differently, firms develop routines 
that when formed into capabilities often provide them with the ability to more effectively 
develop new capabilities or link newly acquired capabilities with existing capabilities 
across a value chain. As such, this research draws on dynamic capabilities’ perspectives 
(e.g., Helfat & Peteraf, 2003; Teece et al., 1997) to define the role such capabilities 
perform in furthering a firm’s ability to market new products or services in new or 
existing markets using newly formed resource combinations (Lavie, 2006; Sirmon et al., 
2007; Winter, 2003).  
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Prior research has characterized capabilities using different grouping attributes, 
such as ‘specialized’ versus ‘generalized’ and ‘core’ versus ‘complementary’ (e.g., 
Chatterjee & Wernerfelt, 1991; Helfat & Raubitschek, 2000; Teece, 1980; see also 
Helfat & Lieberman [2002] for a review of previous classifications).11 Other research 
has grouped individual capabilities into broader portfolios based on the function each 
capability performs (e.g., Oliver, 1997; Wan, 2005). For example, Oliver (1997: 709) 
conceives of firms as possessing both resource capital and institutional capital, where 
‘capital’ is used to denote a “durable but not necessarily tangible … capability that 
yields services over its lifetime that contribute to sustainable competitive advantage.”12 
More recently, in explaining the relationship between country resource environments, 
firm capabilities, and diversification strategies, Wan (2005) proposed that firms consist 
of two types of capabilities: market and non-market capabilities. According to Wan, 
‘market’ capabilities refer to those organizational capabilities that enable firms to 
compete in a particular product or geographic market. He further segmented market 
capabilities on the basis of their function. For example, production capabilities enable 
                                                 
11
 According to Teece (1982), specialized resources and capabilities are specific to particular settings, and 
therefore useful only in a limited range of environments. They include such functional activities as R&D, 
marketing, and production that tend to be tailored in important ways to the technologies, operations, and 
products of the markets in which a firm operates. By contrast, generalized resources and capabilities can 
be applied broadly across two or more different environmental or competitive settings. Examples include 
the capability to organize multiple business units or diversify into a new geographic market. Core 
resources and capabilities refer to knowledge that is required to create a new product or service, including 
core technical knowledge (Teece, 1986) and knowledge of customer needs (Helfat & Raubitschek, 2000). 
According to Helfat and Lieberman (2002), complementary resources and capabilities are those needed to 
profit from core resources and capabilities, including finance, marketing, sales, production, and 
distribution. 
12
 Oliver (1997: 709) defines resource capital as “value-enhancing assets and competencies of the firm” 
and institutional capital as “the firm’s capability to support value-enhancing assets and competencies.” 
Citing Amit and Schoemaker (1993), Oliver provides the following examples of resource capital: superior 
distribution channels, ‘lean’ cost structures, patented production processes, and customer loyalty. 
According to Oliver, examples of institutional capital include training programs that accelerate the 
adoption of new technology, information systems that accelerate the diffusion of information, and 
interfirm alliances that facilitate resource learning and knowledge sharing. 
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firms to produce goods more efficiently using existing resources. The second type, 
innovation capabilities, allows firms to either improve existing products or generate new 
products. ‘Non-market’ capabilities refer to those organizational capabilities that firms 
use to replace, compliment, or influence features of institutional environments within 
local country-markets. For example, firms use non-market capabilities to influence 
public policy (Hillman & Hitt, 1999) or to leverage and ‘skillfully’ manage internal 
labor, capital, and product markets (Khanna & Palepu, 1997). These capabilities are 
most valuable when used to compensate for deficiencies in existing market institutions. 
Previous classification schemes suffer from several conceptual limitations. First, 
previous attempts at describing different capability configurations offer only a partial 
view of the role that organizational capabilities perform in managing and/or growing the 
business. Furthermore, previous research has not linked the formation and use of 
different capability configurations with the constitutive elements underlying their 
formation (e.g., operating routines versus dynamic routines). Second, none of the 
previous attempts links the formation and use of different capability configurations with 
the resource allocation decisions that precede them. Examining allocation decisions 
reveals the discretionary choices firms make under different conditions and may also 
explain variation in the performance between firms. Finally, previous research has not 
fully accounted for the configuration of capabilities among new ventures, especially for 
those firms making the transition from privately held ventures to publicly traded firms. 
Accordingly, this work represents an early attempt to frame and provide a theoretical 
understanding of how new ventures configure organizational capabilities following an 
IPO and the performance implications of such actions.  
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This research attempts to capture the influence of different capability 
configurations on performance outcomes for new ventures by considering how different 
capability configurations figure in the productive activity of new ventures. I therefore 
examine the post-IPO allocation of resources to capability configurations organized 
using two distinct taxonomies: market-managing capabilities and market-creating 
capabilities. 
The above arguments have some corollary to the exploration-exploitation 
framework in organizational learning (March, 1991). According to this perspective, 
exploitation processes represent the continual refinement and extension of existing 
routines in pursuit of more proximal opportunities, whereas exploration represents the 
search for new, distant, and more uncertain opportunities. Both processes “compete for 
scarce resources” (March, 1991: 71). As a result, firms make explicit and implicit 
choices between them. This study complements research examining these two processes 
by suggesting how choices about resource use in the configuration of capabilities 
necessitate tradeoffs and how these tradeoffs affect performance under different 
contexts. Table 3 provides a brief summary of the two proposed taxonomies, which are 
explained in more detail below. 
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TABLE 3 
Two Dimensions of Capability Formation and Use 
    Market-Managing Capability Formation/Use   Market-Creating Capability Formation/Use 
     
Emphasis  Operational/administrative focus.  Development/growth focus. 
 
    
Underlying 
Routines 
 Operating routines that involve the execution of ‘known 
procedures’ that are used by firms to satisfy ongoing productive 
activity. 
 Dynamic routines that bring about desirable changes—i.e., 
introduction of new products, entry into new geographic markets, 
etc.— in the existing set of operating routines.  
 
    
Description  Market-managing capabilities bring stability to and thus leverage 
existing product-market positions. They permit new ventures and 
established firms to more efficiently and more effectively produce 
goods or services and to manage related productive and 
administrative activity using routines that exploit existing product-
market positions. 
 Market-creating capabilities are used by new ventures to extend or 
substantially augment existing product-market positions, to create 
new product-market positions, or to alter the process(es) by which 
future goods and services are produced. They also permit ventures 
to alter the process(es) by which future goods and services are 
produced. 
 
    
Value Creation 
Potential 
 Value-enabling because they exploit existing product-market 
positions and bring stability and greater efficiencies to existing 
business activity and therefore affect current performance. 
 Value-enhancing because they influence performance in the 
future, permitting ventures to achieve growth by altering 
organizational scale and scope thereby converting existing and 
newly accessed resources into new product-market segments that 
enable competitive advantages to be sustained. 
 
    
Examples of 
Venture 
Capabilities 
 Manufacturing, distribution and logistics management, 
procurement and inventory management, finance and financial 
reporting, labor relations and human resource management, and 
service management and customer support.  
 Research and development, engineering design, brand 
development and advertising, new product introduction, alliance 
formation and management, mergers and acquisitions, and 
divestitures. 
 
    
Approaches to 
Capability 
Development 
 Different ways to develop or enhance market-managing 
capabilities include: development of demand and supply planning 
capabilities leading to more reliable and predictable forecasting of 
production and inventory requirements; use of decentralized cross-
functional team-based structures that facilitate increased spans-of-
control by eliminating management layers and bureaucracy; 
improvements to manufacturing and facilities management 
capabilities that enable firms to reduce cycle times and increase 
thereby reducing per unit costs; and the integration of specialized 
capabilities from intermediate markets that allow firms to increase 
efficiencies through strategic outsourcing. 
 Approaches to developing or enhancing market-creating 
capabilities through allocations of available resources include: 
investments in capabilities aimed at improving the quality and 
effectiveness of basic and/or applied research abilities; cultivation 
of interfirm linkages and alliances in different industries and 
geographic markets to maximize the potential for accessing novel, 
specialized market information or to facilitate entry into uncertain 
markets; and development of specialized capabilities that support 
the evaluation of, negotiation with, and integration of acquisition 
targets and alliance partners enabling firms to further diversify and 
expand the scale of their revenue-producing activities. 
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Formation of Market-Managing Capabilities 
Market-managing capabilities are value-enabling because they permit firms to 
more effectively exploit existing product-market positions (March, 1991). They are 
formed using operating routines, which are characterized as stable and reproducible 
patterns of activity (Zollo & Winter, 2002). Although market-managing capabilities can 
enable some adjustments to processes that underlie existing positions, they are not used 
to make substantive changes. Firms develop and use market-managing capabilities to 
produce goods or services and to manage related productive and administrative activity 
with routines that exploit existing product-market positions. Amit and Schoemaker 
(1993: 35) describe these capabilities as “repeated process or product innovations, 
manufacturing flexibility, responsiveness to market trends, and short development 
cycles.”  
Market-managing capabilities concern the ability of firms to perform important 
functional activities “more effectively than competitors with otherwise similar resource 
endowments” (Collis, 1994: 145). Examples include manufacturing, distribution and 
logistics management, procurement and inventory management, finance and financial 
reporting, labor relations and human resource management, and service management and 
customer support. Different ways to develop or enhance market-managing capabilities 
include: improvements in consumer demand and supply planning capabilities leading to 
more reliable and predictable forecasting of production and inventory requirements; the 
use of decentralized cross-functional team-based structures to facilitate increased spans-
of-control, thereby reducing overhead costs structures by eliminating the need for 
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management layers and bureaucracy; improvements to manufacturing and facilities 
management capabilities that enable firms to reduce production cycle times and increase 
throughput in such a way as to increase direct margins by reducing per unit product 
costs; and the integration of specialized capabilities from intermediate markets that allow 
firms to increase production efficiencies through strategic outsourcing.  
Accordingly, market-managing capabilities are value-enabling because they 
bring stability and greater efficiencies by permitting firms to make more effective use of 
resources allocated to the production of goods or services. Market-managing capabilities 
are formed using operating routines, which characterize relatively stable and highly 
reproducible patterns of organizational activity (Zollo & Winter, 2002). For example, 
receipt of a customer order initiates a predictable and interrelated set of operating 
routines and procedures that involve the consumption of resources (e.g., material or 
intermediate goods inventory, production labor, facility and equipment utilization, and 
management time) and eventually conclude with the shipment of the ordered goods to 
the customer as well as the receipt of payment. Accordingly, effective performance 
necessitates effective market-managing capabilities, and superior capabilities found in 
this taxonomy may be a source of competitive advantage. 
There are several reasons to believe that new ventures with greater levels of 
available financial capital at IPO are likely to allocate more financial resources to 
market-managing capabilities. First, drawing on the behavioral theory of the firm, 
greater levels of available financial capital at IPO provide opportunities for top managers 
within young firms to appease internal political affiliations. In other words, available 
financial capital acts as an inducement, which represents “payments to members of the 
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coalition in excess of what is required to maintain the organization” (Cyert & March, 
1963: 36). Furthermore, available financial capital is used to insulate firms from 
exogenous shocks (e.g., Thompson, 1967), which suggests that at higher levels of 
availability, firms may be more likely to fund major infrastructure investments.  
Second, new ventures entering the public arena may have certain incentives to 
allocate resources to market-managing capabilities following an IPO. For example, 
investments aimed at production and administrative processes that are more efficient 
reduce costs, which, in turn, enhance operating margins and profitability. Thus, ventures 
are more likely to apply proceeds from a recently completed IPO to the formation and 
use market-managing capabilities when improvements to financial ratios used by 
investors not only enhance operating performance, but also enhance a firm’s market 
value. Research in finance supports this argument. For instance, Pagano, Panetta, and 
Zingales (1998) found that when considering whether to pursue an IPO, privately held 
firms are influenced by opportunities to reduce their debt and improve their operating 
efficiencies and overall profitability (e.g., retire debt, renegotiate loan repayment 
schedules, secure lower risk premiums, and so forth). In other words, the reduced cost of 
credit that results from improved public information provides these firms with stronger 
bargaining positions. In addition, the cost of capital literature also supports the argument 
that available financial capital is likely to be deployed to market-managing capabilities 
(e.g., Modigliani & Miller, 1963; Scott, 1976), suggesting that firms conduct IPOs when 
external equity will minimize their cost of capital (thereby maximizing the profit 
potential to a company).  
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Furthermore, management ownership has wealth creating effects that occur when 
a venture enters the public arena making ownership interests (equity) more marketable 
and is therefore likely to lead to the agency problem described by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976). Because managers prefer strategies that maximize their utility (Amihud & Lev, 
1981), entrenchment motives often cause top managers to behave opportunistically. This 
is especially important at higher levels of ownership among management, such as those 
conditions that occur when senior executives maintain significant ownership in a post-
IPO venture, because investments that increase debt leverage often inflate the voting 
power of their equity stakes. For instance, research suggests that managers often 
opportunistically consume proceeds from an IPO in non-value maximizing projects such 
as those involving the expansion of organizational structures (e.g., Jain & Kini, 1994).13 
As a result, ventures are more likely to allocate resource to market-managing capabilities 
by developing and expanding organizational structures and bureaucratic processes after 
completing an IPO because managers are often incentivized to increase perquisite 
consumption.  
Finally, new ventures, immediately following an IPO, are relatively unknown to 
investors and thus face a ‘liability of market newness’ (Certo, 2003), which creates 
valuation difficulties for investors and that adversely affect market performance. 
According to Certo, these difficulties are evidenced by wide fluctuations in the equity 
values of IPO firms in the initial days of public trading. Moreover, he contends that 
                                                 
13
 Additional research has documented the superior operating performance of firms that have completed 
the transition from public to private ownership through investor-, management- or employee-led leveraged 
buyouts (LBOs) (e.g., Kaplan, 1989; Smith, 1990; Muscarella & Vetsuypens, 1990). A common 
conclusion in these studies explaining the efficiency gains is related to the relaxation of conditions that 
increase the conflict of interest between management and owners in a closely held firm.  
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positive signals of organizational legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977), such as signals to investors of a new venture’s ability to meet the 
increased pressures of public markets, have a positive impact on the success of these 
firms. Accordingly, new ventures, after completing a transition to the public arena, are 
likely to allocate resources to strengthen certain administrative capabilities necessary to 
cope with the demands of public trading (e.g., financial and regulatory reporting, 
investor relations, and so forth). Based on the arguments presented above, I propose that: 
Hypothesis 3: Financial capital at IPO is positively associated with 
allocations to market-managing capability formation/use. 
 
Actions by firms involving the conduct of underlying routines are guided by the 
subjective interpretations and improvisations of different decision makers (Feldman & 
Pentland, 2003). Everyone cannot know everything. Agency is therefore apparent in 
management’s collective choices. Given the brief histories of IPO-stage new ventures, 
superior human capital can greatly influence firm behavior (Baum et al., 2001). Highly 
educated managers show a greater capacity for the ‘integrative complexity’ that occurs 
when structural complexity increases. Thus, superior human capital is essential to their 
ability to exploit performance benefits in that it allows them to add value to existing 
factors of production (Hitt et al., 2001; Hitt et al., 2006).  
Further, research suggests that intangible resources are more likely than tangible 
resources to produce a competitive advantage (Hitt et al., 2001). In particular, intangible 
resources such as human capital allow firms to add value to existing factors of 
production. Indeed, Spender (1996) argued that a firm’s knowledge and its ability to 
generate new knowledge are at the core of the theory of the firm. Much of a firm’s 
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knowledge resides in its human capital. Top managers best represent the firm’s human 
capital because implicit in this study is an assumption that top managers represent a 
firm’s ‘power-holding’ group (i.e., its’ dominant coalition; Cyert & March, 1963). Thus, 
a firm’s senior-most executives hold decision-making power to formulate and administer 
strategic decisions (Child, 1972), are provided incentives to achieve higher levels of firm 
performance (Devers, Holcomb, Holmes, & Cannella, 2006; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), 
and therefore often have the largest stake in using a firm’s resources to the greatest 
advantage. 
Dollinger (1984) linked TMT education levels with programs advancing the 
expansion of organizational boundaries, especially for small business organizations. In 
particular, evidence from his research suggests that more highly educated managers 
show a greater capacity for ‘integrative complexity’ that occurs when organizations face 
uncertain environments. Managers who can discriminate among a wide variety of stimuli 
possess a larger potential for information processing (Hambrick & Cannella, 2004). This 
enhances their capacity to conduct different search routines and to collect and 
discriminate between different information inputs. In turn, increased information 
processing capacity among top managers result in more effective decision-making and 
therefore in better performance (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
Examining a group of banks, Bantel and Jackson (1989) found that more 
innovative banks were led by management teams with higher levels of human capital 
(i.e., education). These authors found that higher levels of education enhanced top 
managers’ ability to generate creative solutions to complex problems. As importantly, 
these management teams possess a greater capacity for managing the complexities 
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(Dollinger, 1984) and therefore are expected to be more efficient at managing ongoing 
production and administrative routines (i.e., market-managing capabilities). Thus, facing 
resource-constrained decision options, I conjecture that firms with management team’s 
possessing higher levels of human capital are likely to pay greater attention to actions 
that extend existing or develop new product-market positions. 
This is not to say that managers with higher levels of human capital at IPO view 
market-managing capabilities as unimportant; rather, ventures with management teams 
possessing higher levels of human capital at IPO are likely to be better prepared for the 
demands of public trading than other similar ventures with lower levels of human capital 
and, importantly, have greater legitimacy with the investor community. Furthermore, 
TMTs with higher levels of education and work experience often have higher legitimacy 
among investors (Higgins & Gulati, 2006). Young firms going public are dependent on 
the decisions of investors for a successful IPO. Yet, new ventures at IPO have limited 
records of accomplishment and therefore often face a skeptical investing public (Certo, 
2003). In particular, investors face tremendous uncertainty associated with the quality of 
young firms undertaking an IPO. This uncertainty is reflected in research on equity 
values of IPOs, which has been marked by considerable debate regarding how to value 
IPO deals (e.g., Ritter, 1984).  
In his theoretical account, Certo (2003) offers that firms undertaking IPOs often 
strive to overcome a ‘liability of market newness’ by providing signals of organizational 
legitimacy. Young firms gain organizational legitimacy by offering symbols of quality 
that redress specific concerns regarding product viability, competitive efficacy, and 
marketing efficacy (e.g., Higgins & Gulati, 2003). One such signal of a venture’s 
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legitimacy is the quality of the human capital embodied in members of its TMT. 
Applying signaling theory and the upper echelons perspective, Higgins and Gulati 
(2006) found that the work experience of the TMT provides a signal of organizational 
legitimacy and affects investor perceptions of potential market returns. In turn, these 
signals affect investors’ decision to participate in new offerings. More specifically, 
ventures headed by TMTs with higher levels of human capital endow their ventures with 
greater legitimacy and are therefore less likely to require investments in administrative 
structures to establish their legitimacy in the market. Accordingly, new ventures with 
more seasoned and knowledgeable executives at IPO will allocate relatively lower levels 
of financial resources to market-managing capabilities following an IPO, choosing 
instead to pursue initiatives linked to innovation and growth. Specifically, I propose that: 
Hypothesis 4: Human capital at IPO is negatively associated with allocations 
to market-managing capability formation/use. 
 
Formation of Market-Creating Capabilities 
Whereas market-managing capabilities permit firms to make productive use of 
resources allocated to the production of existing goods and services, market-creating 
capabilities represent organizational capabilities used by firms to extend or substantially 
augment existing product-market positions, to establish new product-market positions, or 
to alter the process(es) by which future goods and services are produced. Examples 
include research and development, engineering design, brand management and 
advertising, new product introduction, alliance formation and management, mergers and 
acquisitions, and divestitures. Approaches to developing or enhancing market-creating 
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capabilities through allocations of available resources include: investments in 
capabilities aimed at improving the quality and effectiveness of a new venture’s basic 
and/or applied research abilities; cultivation of interfirm linkages and alliances in 
different industries and geographic markets to maximize the potential for accessing 
novel, specialized market information or to facilitate entry into uncertain markets; and 
development of specialized capabilities that support the evaluation of, negotiation with, 
and integration of acquisition targets enabling a new venture to diversify and expand the 
scale of its existing operations.  
Drawing on the ‘dynamic capabilities’ literature (e.g., Helfat & Peteraf, 2003; 
Teece et al., 1997), market-creating capabilities consist of ‘dynamic’ routines enabling 
firms to extend, modify, or create new operating routines. In turn, these capabilities alter 
a firm’s portfolio of market-managing capabilities consisting of operating routines used 
to exploit a venture’s product-market positions. Market-creating capabilities are used to 
create and substantially alter the composition of a firm’s resources (Eisenhardt & Martin, 
2000; Galunic & Eisenhardt, 2001; Morrow et al., 2007), its operating routines (Nelson 
& Winter, 1982; Winter 2000; Zollo & Winter, 2002), and related productive activities 
of the firm (Porter, 1985). They not only alter a firm’s product-market positions, but also 
the routines a firm uses to manage its productive activity, and therefore its performance 
(Zott, 2003). Accordingly, market-creating capabilities are value-enhancing, rather than 
value-enabling, because they permit new ventures to achieve growth and performance 
gains by altering organizational scale and scope thereby converting existing and newly 
accessed resources into new competitive positions.  
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Although the effect of market-creating capabilities is generally value-enhancing, 
these capabilities often require firms to operate in domains where they lack knowledge 
or experience. Returns, then, have less certainty and firms exert less control over 
outcomes (Chattopadhyay, Glick, & Huber, 2001). Furthermore, actions involved in the 
formation and use of market-creating capabilities involve the allocation of substantial 
resources without the guarantee of returns. In turn, increases in the allocation of 
resources often increase external dependencies, leading to agreements with other firms 
and institutional actors that constrain the range of future options (Dutton & Jackson, 
1987; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Because actions that form and use these capabilities are 
generally riskier, require greater resources, and may be more difficult to implement, they 
are likely to be more complex and require more time to pursue than actions that form 
and use market-managing capabilities.  
Nevertheless, ceteris paribus, a positive association exists between the 
availability of financial resources and human capital among new ventures at IPO and 
their propensity to allocate resources to market-creating capabilities following the IPO. 
In fact, this propensity may be greater for those ventures recently completing the 
transition into the public arena. Evidence from Brau and Fawcett’s (2006) survey of 336 
chief financial officers (CFOs) that had successfully completed an IPO supports this 
argument. These authors found that two of the primary motivations for going public 
were to facilitate broader strategic moves by their firms (i.e., fund product and 
geographic expansion initiatives) and to facilitate takeover activity. Similarly, Brau, 
Francis, and Kohers (2003) argued that IPOs create ‘public shares’ that may be used as 
currency in acquiring other firms in stock deals. Furthermore, proponents of financial 
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slack argue that available financial resources allow firms to innovate by permitting them 
to experiment with new strategies, diversification initiatives, and new R&D projects that 
might not be pursued in more resource-constrained conditions (Cyert & March, 1963; 
Levinthal & March, 1981).  
There are two additional reasons for the positive effect of available financial 
capital at IPO on the formation of market-creating capabilities. First, the availability of 
‘excess’ financial resources eases capital restrictions; it also frees management attention 
to experiment and evaluate opportunities to exploit emerging market conditions (Cyert & 
March, 1963). In firms with lower levels of available financial capital, managerial 
attention is likely focused on short-term performance issues rather than actions involving 
the development of new product-market positions. As a result, the range of decision 
options available to a firm with potentially positive performance returns is expanded. 
Second, excess financial resources allow experimentation and risk taking by providing a 
buffer against downside risk (Moses, 1992; Singh, 1986), which implies the need for a 
greater range of related capabilities that may also have positive consequences. In other 
words, available financial resources permit firms to more safely experiment with new 
strategies by, for example, introducing new products and entering new markets (Moses, 
1992).  
By contrast, opponents counter that increasing levels of available financial 
resources eventually diminishes firms’ incentives to innovate (Noria & Gulati, 1996) and 
often promotes undisciplined investments in programs with higher risk and lower 
potential economic benefits (Jensen, 1986, 1993; Leibenstein, 1978). Indeed, with 
increasing slack, Noria and Gulati (1996) uncovered a non-linear (inverted U-shaped) 
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relationship between financial slack and innovation. Accordingly, by combining these 
two countervailing treatments of financial resource slack, I propose that available 
financial capital at IPO will have a non-linear (inverted U-shaped) association with the 
intensity of post-IPO allocations to market-creating capabilities.  
There are several reasons to believe that the relationship between available 
financial capital and the formation and use of market-creating capabilities is non-linear. 
First, although diversification offers prospective market opportunities and thus affords 
the opportunity for greater firm performance (Hitt, Hoskisson, & Kim, 1997), the 
process of expanding augmenting existing and/or diversifying into new product-market 
positions is a highly complex task (Vermeulen & Barkema, 2002). Learning to operate in 
diverse product-market segments is subject to certain time compression diseconomies 
(Dierickx & Cool, 1989), whereby the amount of new experiences firms can absorb is 
constrained by time. Therefore, even if substantial performance benefits accrue early 
with allocations to the formation of market-creating capabilities, escalating growth 
requiring substantially altered or entirely new operating routines greatly enhance the 
complexity of coordination and therefore a venture’s costs.  
Second, as the allocation of available financial resources to the formation and use 
of market-creating capabilities increases, the number and diversity of a firm’s product-
market positions increase. As the number and diversity of product-market positions 
increase, information asymmetries emerge (Hitt et al., 1996). These asymmetries 
produce deficits. Information deficits add to the administrative demands of organizing 
newly developed routines. Higher administrative demands reduce the degrees of freedom 
available to a firm (D’Aveni & Ravenscraft, 1994; Rothaermel et al., 2006). In turn, 
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these demands distract managerial attention from important sources of innovation and 
growth because of the demands of managing increasingly complex governance 
structures (D’Aveni & Ravenscraft, 1994). As a result, management attention is drawn 
towards financial controls, which entail objective criteria such as return on investment 
(ROI) in the evaluation of opportunities for continued growth (Hoskisson & Hitt, 1988). 
In doing so, managers become less likely to propose risky investments or to champion 
product ideas of geographic expansion that place their future earnings at risk (Hitt et al., 
1996). As a result, firms with stronger financial controls achieve growth largely through 
acquisition, which tend to be more complex and require more time to integrate 
(Hayward, 2002). In turn, they reduce the level of direct internal investment in R&D in 
favor of externally directed sources of growth (i.e., acquisitions).  
Finally, profitable decision options diminish over time as available financial 
resources increase because of the diminishing availability of allocation options involving 
the formation and use of market-creating capabilities. In other words, as allocation 
intensity to the formation and use of market-creating capabilities intensifies, ventures 
discover fewer valuable opportunities. Thus, additional allocations to improve or 
develop market-creating capabilities will be difficult to recoup. Based on these 
arguments, at some point, the costs and decision complexities associated with additional 
allocations to market-creating capabilities will overwhelm a venture’s ability to discover, 
evaluate, and exploit ‘new’ opportunities, eventually reducing the intensity of allocations 
to market-creating capabilities. Specifically, I propose that: 
Hypothesis 5: Financial capital at IPO has a non-linear association (inverted 
U-shaped) with allocations to market-creating capability formation/use. 
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The hallmarks of human capital are knowledgeable, experienced managers, with 
expertise in the functional disciplines and the competitive environment. Top managers 
constitute the predominant source for new ideas and knowledge in a firm and therefore 
directly influence decisions involving the allocation and use of financial resources (Snell 
& Dean, 1992). Furthermore, individuals, and more generally firms, learn by doing, 
repeating actions with which they have experience. Experience with routines gained 
through education and work experience, such as the knowledge embodied in top 
managers’ human capital, reinforces the experiential lessons learned from using certain 
routines (e.g., acquisition experience, alliance experience, etc.), which increases the 
likelihood of further adoption of these routines over time (Levitt & March, 1988). This is 
especially important for strategic actions involving the decision whether to form and use 
market-creating capabilities by new ventures because such actions are generally more 
complex, often involving the allocation of resources without reasonable expectations of 
return. Whereas managers with valuable industry-specific experience gain valuable tacit 
knowledge and develop interpretive maps that are used to form judgments about riskier 
actions (Pisano, 1994; Pennings et al., 1998), management teams that lack sufficient 
experience may view these actions as riskier, and therefore are less likely to allocate 
resources to market-creating capabilities.  
Superior human capital can also enhance development and use of a venture’s 
dynamic routines (Florin et al., 2003). During the post-IPO stage, ventures that are 
endowed with better human capital should be more able to effectively plan, strategize, 
and problem-solve, especially when market uncertainties are high (Snell & Dean, 1992), 
and they should be better able to continuously adapt and respond to changing 
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environmental conditions (Youndt et al., 1996). In turn, higher levels of human capital 
increase the likelihood that entrepreneurial opportunities, which emerge from changing 
environmental factors, will be ‘discovered’ by these firms. Thus, ventures with higher 
levels of human capital should be able to find new ways to increase customer benefits by 
engineering more efficient production processes and/or by innovating (Lengnick-Hall, 
1992). 
As previously indicated, strategic management research has linked human capital 
with various types of market-creating capabilities, including new product development 
(e.g., Ahuja, 2000; Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005), acquisitions (e.g., Zollo & Singh, 
2004), and international diversification (e.g., Carpenter et al., 2001; Hitt et al., 2006). 
Examining a sample of entrepreneurial high technology ventures, Deeds, DeCarolis, and 
Coombs (2000) found that CEO experience directly affected a venture’s commercial 
R&D capabilities. Specifically, the prior experience of a CEO in managing a commercial 
research facility positively enhanced a venture’s ability to more effectively manage its 
new product development process. Following Dutton and Duncan’s (1987) logic, prior 
research suggests that the greater the level of a venture’s resource endowment, in 
particular the knowledge and experience represented in its human capital, the more the 
venture is likely to take actions that reflect an understanding of the available 
opportunities in the market (cf. Bourgeois, 1981; Sharfman & Dean, 1997), increasing 
the likelihood that entrepreneurial opportunities will be discovered. Accordingly, I argue 
that human capital at IPO has a non-linear influence on the formation and use of market-
creating capabilities among new ventures. Specifically, I propose that: 
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Hypothesis 6: Human capital at IPO is positively associated with allocations 
to market-creating capability formation/use. 
 
Influence of Industry Membership on the Formation/Use of Capability 
Configurations 
Industries impose demands that may enable or constrain the collective patterns of 
action that firms pursue. Firms adapt to industry conditions by reconfiguring their 
capabilities and by shifting resources into or away from different positions. Because the 
degree of fit between firms and their environments affects performance, it is important 
that capabilities be appropriate for the overarching industry context (Doty et al., 1993). 
This reasoning is consistent with contingency theory assertions that environmental 
properties, such as dynamism, impose structural constraints on the range of resource 
actions that a firm might pursue.  
In the previous section, this work highlighted the importance of financial capital 
at IPO and human capital at IPO for explaining new venture success and the influence of 
endowments of both resource types on capability formation and use. Nevertheless, 
examining only the direct effects of venture resources on different organizational 
outcomes largely ignore the context-sensitivity of their value to a firm. Specifically, 
firms operate in unique environments, and characteristics of these environments may 
directly, and in combination with other factors, influence the hypothesized relationships. 
In particular, I expect that environmental conditions at IPO will moderate the 
relationship between venture resources at IPO and the formation and use of 
organizational capabilities. This line of reasoning is consistent with Goll and Rasheed’s 
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(1997) assertion that environmental properties impose constraints on the range of 
strategies, structures, processes, and outcomes that firms may enjoy.  
Because of the demands imposed by industries on firm behavior and 
performance, the study of the environment-organization interface has been an important 
focus in the strategic management and organizational theory literatures. The underlying 
premise is that external environments affect firm behavior, and thus firms must account 
for environmental conditions when formulating strategies and structures before taking 
actions (Zajac et al., 2000).  
Entrepreneurship scholars also agree that environmental theories are relevant in 
the entrepreneurship context and that environmental concepts matter for new venture 
performance (e.g., Acs & Audretsch, 1987; Aldrich & Zimmer, 1986; Bygrave & Hofer, 
1991; Bull & Willard, 1993; Cooper, 1993; Covin & Slevin, 1997; Naman & Slevin, 
1993, Zahra, 1996). Research in this area highlights the importance of government 
regulation and financial support, community culture, academic support, regional 
incubators, industry conditions, life cycles, and global innovation as factors that affect 
young venture performance. Indeed, empirical studies in entrepreneurship have found 
significant direct, indirect, and moderated relationships between environmental 
conditions and a variety of new venture outcomes (e.g., Carroll, 1983; Harrigan, 1981; 
McDougal et al., 1992; Sandberg & Hofer, 1987; Tsai et al., 1991). 
Dess and Beard (1984), building on earlier work by Aldrich (1979), decomposed 
the organizational task environment into several distinct dimensions (i.e., munificence, 
dynamism, and complexity), which have dominated empirical studies in strategic 
management (e.g., Keats & Hitt, 1988) and closely resemble dimensions proposed by 
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other scholars (e.g., Mintzberg, 1979; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). These dimensions also 
fit the entrepreneurship context, having appeared in several studies as predictors of new 
venture success. Consistent with previous research examining the effects of industry 
membership on different organizational outcomes, this study proposes that certain 
environmental dynamism may account for variations in the relationship between venture 
resources at IPO and the formation and use of different capability configurations.  
Because certain environmental conditions create uncertainty, interpretations of 
the environment play an important role in decisions involving the allocation of a firm’s 
resource endowment. Specifically, executives’ perceptions influence their firm’s actions 
as top managers filter, interpret incoming information, and make decisions based on 
those interpretations (Cannella & Holcomb, 2005; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Starbuck 
& Milliken, 1988). These interpretations may influence managerial responses to 
environmental conditions and, therefore, are likely to affect organizational actions 
involving the allocation of resources.  
Dynamism refers to the instability of an environment and represents 
environmental change that is difficult to predict (Dess & Beard, 1984). Dynamism is 
related to Aldrich’s (1979: 69) notion of environmental turbulence, which reflects 
“externally induced changes … that are obscure to administrators and difficult to plan 
for.” Dynamism is manifested in the variance in the rate of market and industry change 
and the level of uncertainty about forces that are often beyond the control of individual 
firms. Although all environments undergo change, dynamism generally refers to change 
that is unpredictable (Goll & Rasheed, 2004). Accordingly, some industries reflect high 
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levels of dynamism not simply because of growth, but because of the level of the 
unpredictability or volatility of growth (Dess & Beard, 1984; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  
Highly dynamic markets are particularly taxing on management, due to large 
information-processing demands (Galbraith, 1973) and the potential need for 
consequential modifications in strategy (Hamel & Prahalad, 1994). Because uncertainty 
arising from dynamism is usually confounded by incomplete information about rivals’ 
abilities and resources (Zahra & Bogner, 2000), actions are often pursued without 
adequate consideration of potential competitive responses. As a result, “firms will often 
be forced to act and respond blindly, motivated by fear of losing ground” (Smith, 
Grimm, & Gannon, 1993: 126). When demand for example varies widely, strategic 
decision-making becomes difficult to program, and competitive positions among rivals 
can shift considerably. Such unpredictability can create large, non-routine information-
processing requirements and represents another instance of high external task demands 
for new ventures, in which managers must devote greater attention to evaluating and 
responding to environmental conditions, rather than to strategies that address internal 
priorities (Hambrick & Cannella, 2004). 
Dynamic industries often include industries that are high-growth and technology-
intensive. In these contexts, decision makers may conclude that the stakes associated 
with competitive conditions in the marketplace are so great that their efforts on those 
fronts must be maximized. When demand swings widely, decision-making becomes 
difficult to program, and market positions can shift considerably, which increases the 
likelihood that experienced managers will be more highly valued by firms operating in 
these environments. For example, Eisenhardt (1989) found that the behavior of effective 
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decision makers working in dynamic environments is characterized by speed and 
comprehensiveness. According to Eisenhardt, effective decision makers maintain 
sophisticated information search and processing routines developed through experience, 
whereas less effective decision makers resort to using less well-developed routines to 
cope with complexities brought on by uncertain and rapidly changing environments.  
Research suggests that the volatility and unpredictability associated with 
dynamic environments create uncertainty for organizational leaders (Eisenhardt & 
Bourgeois, 1988) and the need for frequent strategic adjustments (Hamel & Prahalad, 
1994; Porter, 1980). Highly turbulent environments represent highly dynamic 
conditions, and managers in these environments often must adapt quickly to cope with 
these constant changes. This is especially difficult for new ventures because these firms 
often face significant internal resource constraints (Cooper, 1993) and are less likely to 
have well developed external networks to rely on when environmental demands vary 
widely (Venkataraman & Van de Ven, 1998). Given the liabilities of newness and small 
size, hostile environments characterized by high dynamism threaten new venture 
performance and survival. 
Furthermore, Dess and Beard (1984) propose that dynamic environments 
increase the information that executives must process. In addition, Pearce (1997) 
suggests that dynamism reduces the time available for executives to make decisions. 
This limits firms’ ability to determine the impact of actions on current and future 
activities, and to determine viable alternatives, which, in turn, reduces the stability and 
predictability of relations among firms. Thus, as the degree of environmental dynamism 
varies across industries, it is reasonable to expect that there should be significant 
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differences in the adaptive capabilities required for survival, and that these differences 
should also have performance implications for new ventures.  
Concerns about uncertain environments intensify management concerns about 
efficiency and often manifest themselves in a restriction of external activities, especially 
when firms interpret perceptions of the prevailing conditions as a threat (Thomas, Clark, 
& Gioia, 1993). In a survey of top executives examining the effect of perceived threats 
and opportunities on organizational actions, Chattopadhyay et al. (2001) found that firms 
facing uncertain environmental conditions considered a threat were more likely to pursue 
internally directed organizational actions. Applying Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton’s 
(1981) threat-rigidity hypothesis, Chattopadhyay and his colleagues found that threats 
resulting from environmental uncertainty lead to be more conservative internally 
directed actions. Moreover, because firms’ existing routines influences organizational 
adaptation (Lant & Mezias, 1992), firms that encounter highly dynamic conditions are 
more likely to act in those domains in which their management is most familiar, which 
increases the likelihood these firms will attempt to further leverage returns from existing 
product-market positions. 
Owing to resource constraints and legitimacy concerns, these effects are expected 
to be more salient for new ventures. These firms are particularly vulnerable to dynamism 
in the environment, especially volatile conditions requiring frequent strategic 
adjustments, because of their relative inexperience in handling crisis situations (Singh et 
al., 1986). Cooper (1993) pointed to the dangers that new ventures face from unforeseen 
environmental shocks because they have fewer resources and concentrated risk. 
Venkataraman and Van de Ven (1998) found that high dynamism hurt new ventures 
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because young firms lack knowledge and financial capital necessary to cope with 
substantial environmental change. They explained that high dynamism is disruptive, and 
it leads to damaged relations with customers and suppliers. 
Ventures operating in environments with higher levels of dynamism face 
decision complexities that increase information-processing requirements and restrict the 
range of decision options (Eisenhardt, 1989; Pearce, 1997). As the environment becomes 
increasingly more dynamic, a venture relies more heavily on its ability to provide 
meaningful interpretations of increasingly ambiguous information (Dutton & Jackson, 
1987; Thomas et al., 1993). Such conditions increase the pressure to conserve resources 
(Goll & Rasheed, 1997) and to restrict investments in externally directed actions with 
uncertain outcomes (Chattopadhyay et al., 2001). In turn, ventures operating in highly 
dynamic environments are likely to pursue internally directed investments, which adapt 
the organization to the demands of changing environmental conditions, because these 
actions are generally less risky and easier to implement (Dutton & Jackson, 1987). 
Furthermore, these actions are expected because actions that align structures with 
institutionalized norms often confer legitimacy with publicly traded rivals in the same 
industry segment during the period following an IPO, making them less risky to the top 
managers of new ventures. Accordingly, higher levels of environmental dynamism at 
IPO impacts upon existing organizational structures and therefore often results in an 
increase in a firm’s allocations to market-managing capabilities.  
Thus, I expect that environmental dynamism will negatively moderate the 
relationship between available financial resources at IPO and the intensity of allocations 
to market-managing and market-creating capabilities. Because highly dynamic 
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environmental conditions are more likely to be considered a threat, such conditions will 
increase a firm’s propensity to preserve its financial resources for internally directed 
investments (Chattopadhyay et al., 2001). In other words, higher levels of environmental 
dynamism at IPO will decrease the intensity of allocations to market-creating 
capabilities following an IPO in favor of additional investments with more predictable 
returns that further improve the efficiency of market-managing capabilities. Thus, I 
hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 7a: Dynamism at IPO positively moderates the relationship 
between financial capital at IPO and allocations to market-managing 
capability formation/use. 
Hypothesis 7b: Non-linear association (inverted U-shaped) between financial 
capital at IPO and allocations to market-creating capability formation/use 
will be negatively moderated by dynamism at IPO. 
 
Strategic decisions regarding the formation and use of organizational capabilities 
are made in the context of an organization’s environment. In particular, environmental 
conditions at IPO influence the complexity of allocation decisions, and their outcomes, 
thereby increasing the value of human capital at IPO to new ventures. In particular, 
management teams with higher levels of education and work experience are more likely 
to favor growth opportunities within industry segments characterized by lower levels of 
environmental dynamism because they are more likely to view such conditions as an 
opportunity further invest in growth by substantially augmenting or establishing new 
product-market positions.  
By contrast, management teams that operate in environments with higher levels 
of dynamism face greater decision complexities (Eisenhardt, 1989). Such instability can 
create large, non-routine information-processing requirements. This restricts decision 
 124 
 
 
 
options and represents another instance of high external task demands in which 
managers devote attention to actions that respond to environmental changes rather than 
to value creation strategies (Hambrick & Cannella, 2004). As dynamism increases, they 
rely more heavily on their ability to meaningfully interpret increasingly ambiguous 
information (Dutton & Jackson, 1987; Thomas et al., 1993), which increases pressures to 
restrict investments in actions with uncertain outcomes (Chattopadhyay et al., 2001). As 
dynamism increases, managers satisfice and rely more heavily on efforts to interpret 
increasingly ambiguous information (Dutton & Jackson, 1987), which increases rigidity 
and restricts investments in actions with uncertain outcomes. In turn, managers operating 
under these conditions are more likely to pursue internally directed investments, because 
these actions are more familiar to them and are generally less risky to implement. 
Therefore, environmental dynamism at IPO will attenuate the negative association 
between human capital at IPO and allocations to market-managing capabilities following 
the IPO.  
As previously indicated, ceteris paribus, higher levels of human capital increase 
the likelihood that entrepreneurial opportunities will be ‘discovered’ by firms. 
Furthermore, higher levels of education and work experience are associated with higher 
capacities for information processing and the ability to discriminate among a variety of 
decision options (Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). However, higher levels of environmental 
dynamism often increase the complexity and decrease the range of decision options 
available to firms. Therefore, although firms with TMTs possessing higher levels of 
human capital have the capacity to pursue new opportunities (Youndt et al., 1996), at 
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higher levels of environmental dynamism, this relationship is also likely to weaken. 
Thus, I propose that: 
Hypothesis 8a: Dynamism at IPO positively moderates the relationship 
between human capital at IPO and allocations to market-managing 
capability formation/use. 
Hypothesis 8b: Dynamism at IPO negatively moderates the relationship 
between human capital at IPO and allocations to market-creating capability 
formation/use. 
 
Resources, Capability Formation/Use, and New Venture Outcomes:  
The Partial Mediation Effect 
Central to RBV logic is the implicit assumption of resource use (Dosi et al., 
2002); outcomes are a function not only of resource possession, but of the way in which 
those resources are managed to create value. Whereas resources represent tangible and 
intangible assets, capabilities reflect “a firm’s capacity to deploy Resources, usually in 
combination, using organizational processes, to effect a desired end. They are 
information-based, tangible or intangible processes that are firm-specific and are 
developed over time through complex interactions among the firm’s Resources.” (Amit 
& Schoemaker, 1993: 35). Itami (1987) refers to capabilities as ‘invisible assets.’ Unlike 
resources, capabilities are largely based on the persistence of routines and related 
procedures acquired through the formation and reinforcement of productive activity by a 
firm over time (i.e., learning; Loasby, 1998). Building on earlier work by Grant (1991) 
and Amit and Schoemaker (1993), Dutta et al. (2005) established a link between 
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organizational capabilities and their outputs, measuring capabilities based on the 
efficiency with which they employ a given set of resources: 
One can think of capabilities as the efficiency with which a firm uses the inputs 
available to it (i.e., its resources, such as R&D expenditure), and converts them 
into whatever output(s) it desires (i.e., its objectives, such as developing 
innovative technologies). … Since capabilities are an intermediate step between 
resources and outputs, one can hope to see the inputs that a firm uses and the 
outputs it achieves, but one can only infer its abilities in converting one to the 
other (Dutta et al., 2005: 278-279) 
In this section, I establish the theoretical linkage between the two capability 
configurations described earlier in this chapter with the performance outcomes they are 
intended to produce. According to the model posited in this dissertation, allocations to 
capability configurations by new ventures following an IPO importantly influence their 
success. The greater the functional capability a firm possesses, the more effectively it is 
able to deploy its resources (Dutta et al, 2005). More specifically, firms create value 
through more effective resource use by either (1) reducing cost structures to provide 
existing products and services to consumers at a lower cost, (2) enhancing the quality, 
performance, reliability, etc. of existing products and services, (3) improving legitimacy 
thereby expanding network relationships and lowering the cost of capital to the firm, 
and/or (4) expanding or substantially augmenting existing product-market positions or 
entering new ones.  
It is argued that for new ventures to enjoy superior growth and performance 
relative to their competition, they must not only possess superior capabilities, i.e., the 
ability to deploy resources more efficiently (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993), but also be 
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more effective at configuring and using organizational capabilities to establish and 
maintain their competitive advantage. Because a firm’s capability is defined by its ability 
to deploy resources to achieve its desired outcome(s), the higher the functional capability 
a firm possesses, the more efficiently it should therefore be able to deploy its resources. 
Specifically, the effectiveness of organizational routines at value creation is subject to 
the diversity in the information, knowledge, and goals of managers in each firm. As 
diversity increases, resource actions are more likely to vary. Therefore, extending extant 
literature on capabilities and the RBV, value that new ventures realize resource 
possession and control is indirectly a function of the formation and use of 
capabilities/routines that use them. In what follows, I show how these two capability 
configurations can confer certain performance advantages to new ventures.  
Linking Market-Managing Capabilities with New Venture Outcomes 
A strong market-managing capability entails the integration and coordination of a 
complex set of tasks—often combining different activities and productive inputs from 
various sources—that enable a firm to enjoy lower production and/or administrative 
overhead costs, higher operating margins, and better cash flows. In other words, strong 
market-managing capabilities enable firms to enjoy lower cost structures and consume 
fewer resources when exploiting existing product-market positions to produce goods or 
services. Further, market-managing capabilities also enable younger companies to ally 
legitimacy concerns owing to the demands of public trading after completing an IPO 
(Certo, 2003). When a venture’s market-managing capability is more effective and/or 
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produces a superior good or service, in terms of quality or performance, than its industry 
rivals, venture performance is expected to increase.  
Evidence from Youndt et al.’s (1996) study of the relationship between human 
capital, manufacturing, and firm performance provides some evidence supporting this 
argument. Results from a study of 97 manufacturing facilities found that the value of 
human capital was predominantly contingent on performance enhancements achieved 
when firms link ‘human-capital-enhancing HR systems’ (i.e., resource management 
‘capability’) with manufacturing. The authors found that investments to human resource 
capabilities designed to develop talented and team-oriented factory workers improved 
employee productivity, machine efficiency, and customer satisfaction. These outcomes, 
in turn, allow firms to make better use of more highly trained human resources and 
translate to higher relative financial performance when compared with industry rivals.  
Similarly, Lieberman and Demeester’s (1999) examination of the causal link 
between inventory management and manufacturing productivity found that inventory 
reductions stimulated gains in manufacturing productivity, resulting in higher operating 
margins (profitability). In particular, the authors found that, on average, each 10% 
reduction in inventory levels (or a 10% improvement in inventory turns) led to at least a 
1% gain in labor productivity. In other words, investments by firms to implement just-in-
time production techniques resulted in more effective inventory management capabilities 
and preceded productivity gains in manufacturing, serving as an important driver for 
subsequent reductions in production costs.  
Examining a sample of 221 U.S. manufacturing companies, Chen, Paulraj, and 
Lado (2004) found that development of superior strategic procurement capabilities 
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enables firms to more effectively manage beneficial buyer-supplier relationships.14 In 
particular, Chen et al.’s work provides empirical support to arguments linking superior 
procurement capabilities with a firm’s ability to: (1) foster close working relationships 
with a smaller number of suppliers, (2) reduce the information asymmetries by 
promoting open communication among supply-chain partners, and (3) establish and 
foster long-term relationships that foster greater commitment and trust, thereby reducing 
costs associated with managing these relationships. In firms with weaker procurement 
capabilities, the authors found that short-term oriented, adversarial buyer-supplier 
relationships existed that inhibited attainment of procurement efficiencies, created 
conditions for distrust, and heightened the need for more costly governance mechanisms, 
which ultimately reduced the performance benefits accruing from relational exchanges 
between the supply-chain partners. 
Although allocations to market-managing capabilities are expected to have a 
positive effect on direct and indirect costs of production, the theoretical linkage between 
the intensity of allocations to these capabilities and growth is less clear. On the one hand, 
assuming supply-side constraints to meet consumer demand, a reduction in the time and 
costs associated with the production of a particular good or service holds the potential 
for higher production rates and thus increases in the levels of finished goods firms can 
produce (Lieberman & Demeester, 1999), thereby enabling firms to potentially realize 
                                                 
14
 For example, Toyota is generally recognized among Japanese automobile manufacturers as having made 
substantial investments in supplier management capabilities that resulted in superior knowledge transfer 
that improve the level of communication and learning between Toyota and its OEMs and supplier 
networks who produce as much as 70% of the value of each vehicle (Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000). Because 
cost and quality is a function of the productivity of a network of OEMs and suppliers working in 
collaboration, labor productivity and per-unit costs for Toyota consistently outpace the performance of 
U.S. automobile rivals. As a result of continuous investments in its supplier management capabilities, 
Toyota enjoys a defensible competitive position that has enabled it to sustain its performance advantage.  
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increased revenues from higher consumer demands for existing products. These 
conditions are likely to be greatest for young firms at IPO because these firms are more 
likely to be resource-constrained than larger, more established industry rivals 
immediately preceding an IPO, especially where production occurs within capital-
intensive industries. Therefore, post-IPO allocations to market-managing capabilities 
may enable these firms to boost production to meet greater levels of anticipated 
consumer demand. 
Research also suggests that IPO firms experience a number of changes to their 
production and administrative systems that necessitate new learning (e.g., Fischer & 
Pollock, 2004). As described earlier in this chapter, changing from a privately held to a 
publicly traded company constitutes a significant event (Aldrich, 1999) that potentially 
introduces an IPO firm to the risks associated with the liability of newness. Certo (2003) 
refers to this condition as the ‘liability of market newness,’ which creates valuation 
difficulties for investors. He describes this condition as follows: 
[L]iability of newness refers to the discount that investors place on IPO firms 
because these firms have not demonstrated an ability to cope effectively with the 
demands of public trading (e.g., market fluctuations, meetings with analysts, and 
so forth) (Certo, 2003: 433). 
Thus, new ventures’ ability to succeed and even to survive a change as significant as the 
transition from private to public ownership likely depends on their ability to modify 
existing administrative and financial reporting systems, adopting organizational forms 
that are common with other firms within their industry. This homogenization process, 
referred to as isomorphism, compels firms in a given population to resemble other firms 
facing similar environmental and competitive conditions (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
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Accordingly, post-IPO allocations to market-managing capabilities to strengthen 
capabilities such as financial reporting and human resource management are often 
necessary to enhance a new venture’s growth and performance subsequent to its IPO. 
On the other hand, although increasing post-IPO allocations to market-managing 
capabilities can provide ventures with the ability to more efficiently deliver existing 
goods or services in the short-term, such allocations reduce their ability to make post-
IPO allocations of resources to market-creating capabilities aimed at expanding a firm’s 
product or geographic market reach, which eventually constrain a venture’s longer-term 
growth prospects. Indeed, beyond a certain investment threshold, routinization of 
market-managing capabilities might have negative consequences. Miller (1990), for 
example, described how core capabilities of an organization—the very capabilities that 
made the organization successful in the first place—can lead to rigidity and an inability 
to adapt the business to a changing environment. Thus, firms can become trapped within 
their own competencies (Levinthal & March, 1993). Because capabilities erode in value 
over time either because of shifts in environmental conditions or organizational 
complacence, or both, further allocations to market-managing capabilities can result in 
‘core rigidities’ (Leonard-Burton, 1992) for firms and lead to a competitive 
disadvantage.  
As such, there is a point of diminishing returns for post-IPO allocations to 
market-managing capabilities. Beyond a certain level, additional resource allocations to 
further develop and/or strengthen market-managing capabilities following the IPO will 
not be recouped by productivity gains and lower costs nor will they be offset by 
legitimacy gains in the market. Furthermore, path-dependent investments in capabilities 
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supporting existing product-market positions are likely to increase internal inertial 
pressures, reducing incentives to further optimize operating routines and/or directly 
reduce allocations to market-managing capabilities. In turn, these inertial pressures result 
in further declines in financial performance.  
As the allocation of resources to ‘production’ or ‘administrative’ capabilities 
(i.e., manufacturing, inventory management, financial reporting, etc.) exceed a firm’s 
ability to capture incremental value (i.e., lower product costs and/or higher direct 
margins), the additional benefits that allocations to these capabilities require to 
positively affect growth and performance will not be generated. Thus, as allocations to 
market-managing capabilities associated with the production, delivery, and reporting of 
existing goods or services exceeds a certain level, firm performance will suffer. In short, 
there exists a point of diminishing returns for allocations to market-managing 
capabilities beyond which performance outcomes will turn negative. At some point the 
intensity of post-IPO allocations of resources by new ventures to market-managing 
capabilities will overwhelm potential enhancements to the value (i.e., quality, 
performance, reliability) realized from the production of existing products or services.  
Extending extant literature on capabilities and the RBV, because capabilities 
represent a firm’s ability to use resources to achieve productive outputs (Amit & 
Schoemaker, 1993), any value that firms receive from resource ownership or control is 
indirectly a function of the effectiveness of capabilities that use them. According to this 
perspective, a strong market-managing capability (i.e., manufacturing, inventory 
management, financial reporting, etc.) entails the integration and coordination of 
complex tasks that enable firms to increase production throughput and to enjoy lower 
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overhead costs, higher operating margins, and better cash flows; superior market-
managing capabilities produce lower cost structures and consume fewer resources when 
producing goods/services. When a firm’s market-managing capabilities are more 
effective or produce a superior good than rivals, firm performance increases (Chen et al., 
2004; Lieberman & Demeester, 1999; Youndt et al., 1996). These capabilities also 
enable IPO-stage new ventures to diffuse legitimacy concerns arising from the demands 
of public trading, further enhancing their market performance (Certo, 2003). However, 
as allocations exceed the ability to capture incremental value, the returns that allocations 
to these capabilities require may not be generated. Accordingly, these arguments predict 
that: 
Hypothesis 9a: Allocations to market-managing capability formation/use 
partially mediate the influence of financial capital at IPO on IPO-stage new 
venture performance. 
Hypothesis 9b: Allocations to market-managing capability formation/use 
partially mediate the influence of human capital at IPO on IPO-stage new 
venture performance. 
 
Linking Market-Creating Capabilities with New Venture Outcomes 
Whereas superior market-managing capabilities are value-enabling because they 
permit new ventures to stabilize and more effectively manage production activity that 
exploits existing product-market positions, as previously indicated, such capabilities 
might also have a downside that inhibits long-term growth. Leonard-Barton (1992: 112) 
describes the resulting paradox that occurs when ‘established’ capabilities become inert: 
core capabilities simultaneously enable and potentially inhibit development of new 
operating routines that can be applied to sustain and/or further extend a venture’s 
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competitive advantage. Thus, researchers that take a dynamic capabilities perspective 
focus on the processes by which firms substantially alter and leverage their portfolio of 
market-managing capabilities and establish product-market positions that often create 
new and distinctive performance advantages (Winter, 2000; Zollo & Winter, 2002).  
As market-creating capabilities by definition enable new ventures to enact or 
seize opportunities or neutralize threats in different environmental contexts (cf. 
Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000), allocations to these capabilities can enhance ventures’ 
longer-term growth and performance prospects. Knott’s (2003) theory of persistent 
heterogeneity, which emphasizes the importance of market-creating capabilities to 
sustaining performance advantages over time, supports this perspective. Using a Monte 
Carlo simulation, Knott concluded that firms should avoid ‘resting on their laurels’ and 
actively pursue strategies that continuously exploit the inherent value of their resource 
advantages through innovation. Accordingly, whether through incremental change or a 
more advanced degree of ‘creative destruction’ (Schumpeter, 1942), I contend that post-
IPO allocations to market-creating capabilities can provide new ventures with an 
opportunity to enhance their long-term growth and performance prospects. 
Consistent with the definition provided earlier in this chapter, market-creating 
capabilities include the design, development, and introduction of new products; the 
identification, selection, and integration of acquisition targets; ‘greenfield’ entry into 
new geographic markets; and the formation and management of various alliance types 
(e.g., marketing alliances, technology alliances, and equity joint ventures), as well as 
other related capabilities that allow a firm to extend or substantially augment existing 
product-market positions or the process by which goods and services are produced. 
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Applying RBV logic, therefore, superior market-creating capabilities establish a 
competitive advantage in so far as they are difficult to trade in the strategic factor 
markets (Barney, 1991; Morrow et al., 2007), are historically based and path-dependent 
(Nelson & Winter, 1982), and require time to develop (Dierckx & Cool, 1989). 
Furthermore, when market-creating capabilities entail complex dependencies and/or 
complementarities with other resources (Harrison et al., 2001), private synergies emerge 
(Barney, 1988), which make imitation by rivals difficult and therefore enhances a 
venture’s ability to sustain its competitive advantage over time. 
Kale, Dyer, and Singh’s (2002) study of firms from a cross-section of industry 
segments provides support for this argument. The authors found that firms with a 
dedicated function to manage inter-organizational relationships (i.e., strategic alliances) 
generated substantially higher market returns. Stated differently, firms that 
systematically invest in developing the ability to manage inter-organizational 
relationships consistently performed better than other firms that choose not to make such 
investments. Furthermore, these researchers found the presence of a dedicated alliance 
function to be a better predictor of performance realized by firms from their alliances 
than alliance experience itself. Zollo and Singh (2004) argued that acquiring firms learn 
to manage the post-acquisition integration processes by tacitly accumulating acquisition 
experience and explicitly codifying it in manuals, systems, and other acquisition-specific 
tools. They found that a dedicated capability in which firms accumulate and explicitly 
codify acquisition experience in reusable routines significantly improved overall 
performance of subsequent acquisitions by counteracting the coordination problems that 
future contingencies create. Similarly, Holcomb and Hitt (2007) argued that firms 
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enhance their ability to leverage specialized capabilities accessed through strategic 
outsourcing relationships with suppliers in intermediate markets by developing and 
refining mechanisms that strengthen the synergies such capabilities provide. By 
developing relational capability-building mechanisms, these scholars argue that firms 
pursuing strategic outsourcing can enhance the potential value of specialized capabilities 
deployed along their value chain.  
Furthermore, Katila and Ahuja’s (2002) examination of European, Japanese, and 
North American industrial robotics companies supports the notion that a firm’s problem-
solving capabilities—specifically, the capability used in the development and 
introduction of new products—enable more efficient and valuable search routines 
(Winter, 1984) and are an important source of performance heterogeneity between firms. 
Henderson and Clark (1990) attest that ‘architectural competence’ in the pharmaceutical 
industry—that is, a firm’s capability to integrate and leverage knowledge from external 
sources—is positively associated with research productivity (i.e., patent counts). Iansiti 
and Clark (1994) explored ‘integration capability’ in the automotive and computer 
industries and found broad empirical support for their hypotheses that a firm’s 
knowledge integration capability in product development is positively associated with 
firm performance and with firm growth over time.  
Despite the progress made in the empirical investigation of firm performance 
heterogeneity, there are few theories on how organizational capabilities—in particular, 
those ‘dynamic’ capabilities that enable extension of and/or substantial augmentation to 
a firm’s market-creating capabilities—precisely affect firm performance (Zott, 2003). 
Based on the RBV and dynamic capabilities research, post-IPO allocations to market-
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creating capabilities enable firms to extend and/or substantially augment existing 
product-market positions or to establish new product-market positions and therefore 
enhance firms’ performance prospects. This chain of causality implies a direct link 
between market-creating capabilities and new venture success. Stated differently, the 
routines by which new ventures develop new product-market positions and accumulate 
strengths and capabilities, which Amit and Schoemaker (1993) characterize as 
‘intermediate goods’ generated by a firm to enhance the productivity of its current and 
future resource endowment, are a logical prerequisite to new ventures’ efforts at 
establishing sustainable performance advantages relative to industry rivals over time.  
However, again there is a point of diminishing returns beyond which further 
allocations to market-creating capabilities are unlikely to yield performance gains to 
offset the level of continued investment. In other words, a firm’s ability to invest in 
developing these capabilities may outstrip its ability to assimilate the knowledge and 
experience gained from the experiences. For example, Vermeulen and Barkema’s (2002) 
empirical study of Dutch multinationals found that firms’ capacity to absorb 
international expansion is subject to capacity constraints such that a diversification 
activity that exceeds a certain pace, rhythm, and/or pace negatively impact their 
profitability. This is especially a concern for new ventures because these firms often face 
constraints in their ability to assimilate newly acquired knowledge.  
In addition, as firms diversify into increasingly greater numbers of new product 
and geographic markets, the external demands on the CEO and his or her top 
management team also increases (Hambrick & Cannella, 2004). At a time when 
continued expansion heightens the need for strategic resource-sharing and also creates 
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the need for more intensive coordination, the external demands can become 
overwhelming outstripping management’s ability to manage increasingly complex 
organizational task demands. Thus, as post-IPO allocations into market-creating 
capabilities exceed a certain threshold, the performance of new ventures is expected to 
decline.  
As market-creating capabilities enable firms to enact or seize opportunities or 
neutralize threats, allocations to these capabilities naturally enhance performance 
prospects. Despite the progress made in the empirical investigation of firm performance 
heterogeneity, there are few theories on how capabilities precisely affect firm 
performance. This is especially true of the formation and use of ‘dynamic’ capabilities. 
Nonetheless, research has linked performance gains with development of different 
market-creating capabilities, including in alliance management (Kale et al, 2002), post-
acquisition integration (Zollo & Singh, 2004), and strategic outsourcing (Holcomb & 
Hitt, 2007). This chain of causality implies that such capabilities are a logical 
prerequisite to firms’ efforts at sustaining performance advantages. Thus, I propose that: 
Hypothesis 10a: Allocations to market-creating capability formation/use 
partially mediate the influence of financial capital at IPO on IPO-stage new 
venture performance. 
Hypothesis 10b: Allocations to market-creating capability formation/use 
partially mediate the influence of human capital at IPO on IPO-stage new 
venture performance. 
 
Summary 
This chapter reviewed the main tenets of the RBV and contingency theory, 
discussed the important role of resource allocations in the formation of capability 
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configurations, introduced two new constructs to explain how firms configure their 
capabilities (e.g., market-managing and market-creating capabilities), and developed the 
dissertation’s theoretical model. In particular, this chapter presented hypotheses that 
framed the relationships between venture resources, capability configurations, the 
environment, and new venture growth and performance. By framing the investigation of 
venture resources within the context of how these firms make productive use of limited 
endowments, new insights into the relationship between resources and capabilities and 
the performance effects of these relationships were developed. Table 4 provides a 
summary of the dissertation’s hypotheses. 
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TABLE 4 
Summary of Hypotheses 
Number Hypothesis 
  
H1 Financial capital at IPO has a non-linear association (inverted U-shaped) 
with IPO-stage new venture performance. 
H2 Human capital at IPO is positively associated with IPO-stage new 
venture performance. 
H3 Financial capital at IPO is positively associated with allocations to 
market-managing capability formation/use. 
H4 Human capital at IPO is negatively associated with allocations to 
market-managing capability formation/use. 
H5 Financial capital at IPO has a non-linear association (inverted U-shaped) 
with allocations to market-creating capability formation/use. 
H6 Human capital at IPO is positively associated with allocations to 
market-creating capability formation/use. 
H7a Dynamism at IPO positively moderates the relationship between 
financial capital at IPO and allocations to market-managing capability 
formation/use. 
H7b Non-linear association (inverted U-shaped) between financial capital at 
IPO and allocations to market-creating capability formation/use will be 
negatively moderated by dynamism at IPO. 
H8a Dynamism at IPO positively moderates the relationship between human 
capital at IPO and allocations to market-managing capability 
formation/use. 
H8b Dynamism at IPO negatively moderates the relationship between human 
capital at IPO and allocations to market-creating capability 
formation/use. 
H9a Allocations to market-managing capability formation/use partially 
mediate the influence of financial capital at IPO on IPO-stage new 
venture performance. 
H9b Allocations to market-managing capability formation/use partially 
mediate the influence of human capital at IPO on IPO-stage new venture 
performance. 
H10a Allocations to market-creating capability formation/use partially 
mediate the influence of financial capital at IPO on IPO-stage new 
venture performance. 
H10b Allocations to market-creating capability formation/use partially 
mediate the influence of human capital at IPO on IPO-stage new venture 
performance. 
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
As indicated previously, this dissertation outlines several research questions 
important to the study of new ventures. Building from resource-based theory and 
contingency theory, I examine relationships that occur within the ‘black box’ between 
resources and performance by identifying capabilities and measuring the underlying 
routines that allow resources to be managed for greater value. The role of human capital 
is considered, bringing agency into theory explaining capability formation and use 
(Emirbayer & Mische, 1998; Feldman & Pentland, 2003). Specifically, this study 
examines the indirect (through capability formation and use) effects of resources on firm 
performance for new ventures following an initial public offering (IPO). Further, 
following contingency theory logic, I also examine the potential moderating influence of 
industry membership—conditions that can make resources valuable in some contexts 
and not in others. More specifically, this study considers the contingent role of 
environmental dynamism in moderating relationships between the aforementioned 
venture resources, organizational capabilities, and new venture performance. 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the methodology used to test the 
hypothesized relationships developed in Chapter III (see Table 4). First, I describe the 
sample of firms included in this study and identify data sources used to construct the 
dataset. Second, I discuss operationalizations of the dependent, intervening, independent, 
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and moderating variables included in the theoretical model. I also discuss the control 
variables included in the study. Finally, I specify the statistical analyses and procedures 
used to test each of the hypothesized relationships. 
Sample and Data Sources 
The sample for this dissertation consists of a dataset of young, entrepreneurial 
firms that completed an IPO in the United States between 1996 and 2000.15 Firms 
undertaking an IPO during this period were identified from the Thomson Financial’s 
Securities Data Company (SDC) New Issues database, which provides a comprehensive 
listing of firms undertaking U.S.-based IPOs. This source reports that 2,544 firms 
undertook an IPO during this period. As with prior research involving IPO firms (e.g., 
Fischer & Pollock, 2004; Ritter, 1991; Welbourne & Andrews, 1996), several 
restrictions were applied. First, the sample was restricted to new ventures that were six 
years old or less at IPO (Brush, 1995; Robinson & McDougall, 2001; Zahra et al., 2000). 
Even though research suggests that disruptive events associated with an IPO often ‘reset’ 
the liability of newness clock (Amburgey et al., 1993; Fischer & Pollock, 2004), a six-
year cutoff reflects a conservative position in the research definition of new ventures 
applied by this dissertation. Previously, researchers have used different cutoff points, 
including twelve years (Covin, Slevin, & Covin, 1990), ten years (Park, Chen, & 
                                                 
15
 This dissertation does not distinguish between firm-commitment and best-efforts’ offerings. Virtually all 
firms going public use either best-efforts or firm-commitment methods to market their initial public 
offerings (IPOs) (Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2005). Once the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
approves the registration of a firm-commitment IPO offering, the investment bank purchases the shares 
from the issuer and then attempts to resell them to the public. In a best-efforts IPO offering, the bank only 
pledges to provide its “best efforts” to sell between some pre-specified minimum and maximum number of 
shares. 
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Gallagher, 2002), and eight years (McDougall & Robinson, 1990; Zahra, 1996). Bantel 
(1998) argued that by the fifth year, the majority of young firms that have been unable to 
establish defensible market positions have failed. Biggadike (1979) found that new 
ventures, on average, needed eight years to reach profitability and twelve years before 
their behavior resembled ‘established’ firms. Thus, I selected a six-year cutoff for this 
study. A total of 1,143 ventures that completed an IPO during this timeframe met the 
six-year firm age restriction. 
Second, I excluded the following types of IPO entities from the analysis: 
Regulation A offerings (small issues raising less than $1.5 million; Ritter, 1991), real 
estate investment trusts (REITS), spin-offs, savings banks and insurance companies 
experiencing a demutualization, closed-end mutual funds, and reverse leverage buyouts 
(LBOs). These restrictions further eliminated 244 firms from the dataset. Finally, to 
assess the influence of environmental conditions on the formation and use of different 
organizational capabilities and new venture success, only single-product firms were 
included. A firm was considered a single-product company if at least 90-percent of its 
sales came from one industry segment (Rumelt, 1974). Using single-product firms limits 
extraneous variance and increases the accuracy of measures and results (Morrow et al., 
2007). This final restriction reduced the dataset to 689 firms.  
Of the 689 IPO firms that remained following application of the restrictions, 57 
firms were excluded due to missing data. The final sample of firms consisted of 632 IPO 
firms, representing 68 industries, as captured by the three-digit SIC. Firm IPO 
prospectuses filed pursuant to the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) Rule 
424(b)(1) provided information about the structure of each firm’s board of directors and 
 144 
 
 
 
included descriptions of directors and members of the top management team. Financial 
and related operating information for firms in this sample were collected from Standard 
& Poor’s (S&P) COMPUSTAT database. I compiled additional data from the Investor 
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) Directors database, the Compact Disclosure 
database, the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) database, and Thomson 
Financial’s SDC Platinum Merger and Acquisitions database. These databases were 
selected for their comprehensiveness and extensive use in strategy research.  
Measures 
Dependent and Intervening Variables 
As illustrated in Figure 2 and described in Chapter III, this dissertation tests 
relationships involving two different dependent variables: new venture performance and 
two sets of measures representing different configurations of organizational capabilities, 
including (a) one set of indicators for the formation and use of market-managing 
capabilities and (b) one set for the formation and use of market-creating capabilities. In 
addition, both sets of capability configuration measures also serve as intervening 
variables in the analyses of indirect relationships between venture resources at IPO and 
new venture performance (see Figure 2). 
New Venture Performance (Three-year Shareholder Return) 
Prior research and reviews of firm performance constructs used in strategy and 
entrepreneurship studies suggest that one of the most commonly used measures of 
market-based performance is shareholder return (e.g., Anand & Singh, 1997; Hoskisson, 
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Johnson, Moesel, 1994; Robinson & McDougall, 2001). Thus, this dissertation utilizes 
shareholder returns as its measure of new venture performance; in this case, I adjusted 
for the return of the S&P 500 Composite Value-Weighted Index during the period. 
It is widely recognized that publicly held firms pursue strategies with the 
intention of increasing shareholder returns (e.g., Ibbotson & Ritter, 1995; Robinson & 
McDougall, 2001). Thus, I constructed a measure of shareholder return to represent the 
post-IPO growth (decline) in the economic value (i.e., market capitalization) of each 
venture over the three-year period following the IPO year. Three-year shareholder 
return is defined as a firm’s stock market performance, which I calculate as the three-
year index-weighted holding period return for a firm’s common stock. This calculation 
estimates stock price appreciation over a three-year period, including the monthly 
reinvestment of any dividends received. By definition, a firm’s shareholder return is 
driven by changes to expected cash flows and/or the discount rates that represent a 
firm’s risk premiums in capital markets (Vuolteenaho, 2002). I estimated shareholder 
return for each firm from the end of the first full fiscal year following a venture’s IPO to 
the end of the fourth full fiscal year (as adjusted for stock splits) plus average dividends 
over the three-year period. Accordingly, a three-year shareholder return measure is 
computed for each new venture as follows (Ritter, 1991): 
( )( )∏
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−+=−
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itjtj rrReturnrShareholdeyear  
where rjt is the return (share appreciation, adjusted for stock splits, plus dividends) on 
firm j in event month t; rit is the return for the S&P 500 Composite Value-Weighted 
Index in event month t. This computation of shareholder return measures the total returns 
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from a ‘buy-and-hold strategy’ where a stock is purchased at the closing market price on 
the last day of the current year of the IPO and held until the earlier of (1) the anniversary 
of its third full year of operation after completing the IPO, or (2) its delisting (Ritter, 
1991: 8).  
 
TABLE 5 
Operationalization of Dependent and Intervening Variables 
Variable   Measurement   Source 
     
Shareholder 
Return  
(3-year) 
 
 
 ( )( )∏
=
−+=−
36
1
13
t
itjtj rrReturnrShareholdeyear
 
 
where rjt is the return (share appreciation, adjusted for stock splits, 
plus dividends) on firm j in event month t; rit is the return for the 
S&P 500 Composite Value-Weighted Index in event month t. 
 Ibbotson & Ritter 
(1995); Ritter 
(1991); Robinson 
& McDougall 
(2001) 
     
Allocations 
to Market-
Managing 
Capability 
Formation/ 
Use 
 Five indicators were considered:  
(1) direct production costs (e.g., cost of goods sold),  
(2) non-production overhead and administrative costs (e.g., 
selling, general, and administrative costs),  
(3) inventory turnover,  
(4) receivables turnover, and  
(5) payables turnover.  
The ‘cost-of-goods-sold’ (#1) and ‘selling, general, and 
administrative costs’ (#2) measures represent a venture’s 
operating expense structure.  
The ‘inventory turnover’ (#3), ‘receivables turnover’ (#4), and 
‘payables turnover’ (#5) measures assess a venture’s production 
efficiency and working capital management.  
 -- 
     
Allocations 
to Market-
Creating 
Capability 
Formation/ 
Use 
 Five indicators were considered:  
(1) capital expenditures,  
(2) plant and equipment newness (e.g., ratio of new plant and 
equipment to gross plant and equipment),  
(3) research and development expenditures,  
(4) advertising expenditures, and 
(5) the total value of acquisitions completed during the period. 
 -- 
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Because the shareholder return measure is based on market performance, it is 
likely to be biased by the bullish expectations that characterized the IPO markets during 
the mid- to late-1990’s, which, if unadjusted, is likely to result in important differences 
between firms attributable to the time period over which the variable is measured. 
Therefore, I adjust the shareholder returns measure to reflect changes in the S&P 500 
Composite Value-Weighted Index for comparable time periods (see Table 5). Share 
appreciation and dividend reinvestment data for each firm were collected from the 
Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) database.  
Capability Formation/Use 
All firms face difficult decisions involving the allocation of scarce resources 
among different priorities (Daft, 1978). Previous research has found that performance 
heterogeneity occurs when separate firms employ the same or similar resources in 
different ways, even when those resources share similar attributes (the so-called VRIN 
characteristics; e.g., Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Peteraf & Bergen, 2003). Moreover, the 
pattern or positioning of resources of a venture relative to its environment also explains 
performance heterogeneity between these firms (Schendel & Patton, 1978). Thus, I 
contend that the allocation of resources to capability formation and use provides a 
compelling basis for examining the performance effects of different capability 
configurations and the resources they use.  
Specifically, I identified key indicators of strategic resource deployments from 
previous empirical research (e.g., Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; Geletkanycz & 
Hambrick, 1997; Schendel & Patton, 1978; Schoeffler, Buzzell, & Heany, 1974) (see 
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Table 5). Selected indicators include measures of ventures’ operating expenses, 
production efficiency and working capital management, capital intensity, and 
innovation. When combined to represent the configuration of organizational capabilities, 
these dimensions provide an overview of sample ventures’ resource allocation actions—
specifically, how they configure organizational capabilities to compete against rivals in 
their given industry segments.  
This approach is consistent with the view of strategy and the strategic behavior of 
firms as an observed pattern in an array of actions (Mintzberg, 1978), including those 
involving the allocation of resources. It is through the deployment of resources across 
discretionary priorities—in particular, those allocations involved in the configuration 
and use of organizational capabilities—that firms manifest and leverage their 
competitive advantage (Chandler, 1962; Hofer & Schendel, 1978; Porter, 1980).  
Allocations to market-managing capability formation/use. This construct 
measures the extent to which a venture allocates resources to the formation and use of 
market-managing capabilities. Conceiving market-managing capabilities as those 
capabilities used to produce goods and services and to manage administrative activity 
against existing product-market positions, I considered five indicators: (1) direct 
production costs (e.g., cost of goods sold), (2) non-production overhead and 
administrative costs (e.g., selling, general, and administrative costs), (3) inventory 
turnover, (4) receivables turnover, and (5) payables turnover. The ‘cost-of-goods-sold’ 
and ‘selling, general, and administrative costs’ measures represent a venture’s 
production efficiency and operating expense structure. The ‘inventory turnover,’ 
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‘receivables turnover,’ and ‘payables turnover’ measures assess a venture’s working 
capital management. The data were collected from S&P’s COMPUSTAT database. 
Allocations to market-creating capability formation/use. This latent construct 
measures the extent to which a venture allocates resources to the formation and use of 
market-creating capabilities. Whereas market-managing capabilities permit ventures to 
make productive use of existing product-market positions in the production of goods and 
services, market-creating capabilities reflect those capabilities used by ventures to 
establish new product-market positions or to substantially alter the process by which 
goods and services are produced.  
Five indicators of allocation intensity were considered for a composite measure 
to operationalize variable: (1) capital expenditures, (2) plant and equipment newness 
(e.g., ratio of new plant and equipment to gross plant and equipment), (3) research and 
development expenditures, (4) advertising expenditures, and (5) the total value of 
acquisitions during the period. Capital expenditures, gross and net plant and equipment 
figures, research and development expenditures, and advertising expenditures were 
collected from S&P’s COMPUSTAT database. I obtained acquisition volume histories 
from Thomson’s SDC Platinum Merger and Acquisitions database. Specifically, I 
included all acquisitions announced during the period that were subsequently executed to 
ensure the measure of total acquisition value includes only those transactions that were 
actually completed by a firm. 
In addition to the use of these indicators in previous empirical studies, this 
approach has several additional strengths. First, these indicators represent meaningful 
measures of discretionary expenditures that are controllable by a venture, each of which 
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reflect the important strategic choices and tradeoffs by a venture (Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1990; Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997). Furthermore, they reflect realized 
allocations, rather than intentions or perceptions. In keeping with the logic of the two 
constructs, market managing capability formation/use and market-creating capability 
formation/use represent strategic decision patterns in an array of possible resourcing 
actions that a venture might consider (Mintzberg, 1978). The most appropriate way to 
assess such decision patterns is to examine actions on multiple fronts. Second, 
collectively, these indicators allow a more parsimonious analysis of the allocation 
decisions that potentially play an important role in determining the configuration of 
market-managing and market-creating capabilities as well as new venture success. 
Finally, the component metrics are not only widely recognized measures, but also are 
generalizable across industries (Hofer & Schendel, 1978; Schendel & Patton, 1978), 
rendering them conducive to cross-industry study. A summary of the indicators that were 
considered for potential inclusion in the composite measures for the capability 
configurations are summarized in Table 5. 
Independent and Moderator Variables 
Financial capital at IPO. Mishina et al. (2004) suggest that possessing the 
appropriate level of working capital to meet a firm’s operational growth needs is the 
most useful indicator of available financial resources (see also Moses, 1992). This 
dissertation represents financial capital at IPO as the difference between working capital 
‘available’ at IPO and working capital ‘required’ (Brealey & Myers, 1996). Working 
capital available at IPO is defined as a firm’s cash and cash equivalents, accounts 
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receivable, inventory, marketable securities, and other current assets. For new ventures 
recently completing the transition to the public market, this figure includes the net 
proceeds raised by the firm from its IPO (i.e., amount raised after deducting 
underwriting discounts and offering expenses). Working capital required is defined as a 
firm’s current liabilities at IPO (e.g., accounts payable and accrued expenses). Thus, 
available financial capital at IPO is a measure of short-term resources that are available 
for productive purposes (e.g., Bromiley, 1991; Miller & Leiblein, 1996). Measures of 
current assets (e.g., cash and cash equivalents, accounts receivable, inventory, 
marketable securities, and other current assets) and current liabilities were collected 
from S&P’s COMPUSTAT database. Net IPO proceeds were collected from Thomson’s 
New Issues database and from firm IPO prospectuses pursuant to SEC Rule 424(b)(1). 
Importantly, several authors have argued that the influence of financial resource 
availability (e.g., slack) on firm behavior is a quantity relative to a target level of 
resources, using for example industry financial ratios as proxies for targets (Lev, 1969; 
Miller & Leiblein, 1996), not absolute measures of resources (e.g., Bromiley, 1991; 
March & Shapira, 1987; Miller & Leiblein, 1996). In other words, research suggests that 
managers use comparisons of certain financial operating ratios with expected levels 
when considering whether to pursue action. While this may be an appropriate approach 
for established firms, ventures recently completing an IPO experience a substantial 
influx of cash and cash equivalents from the net proceeds of the public offering that 
make the use of financial ratios for computing measures of resource availability 
inappropriate. Furthermore, financial ratios such as those commonly used as slack 
indicators differ across industries. Ratios that are the norm in one industry may be 
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exceptionally high or low in another. As such, slack measures based on financial ratios 
may not generalize across industries (Miller & Leiblein, 1996). Thus, while other studies 
have used financial ratios (e.g., Bromiley, 1991; Deephouse & Wiseman, 2000; George, 
2005) for computing measures of financial capital availability, this dissertation uses 
absolute measures of financial resources to calculate available financial capital at IPO.16  
There has been some debate in the strategic management literature about 
measuring changes in financial resources over time versus assessing the level of 
financial resources at a given point in time (e.g., Marino & Lange, 1983; Moses, 1992). 
In this study, I compute a measure of available financial capital at a specific moment—at 
the IPO—for two important reasons. First, measurements of financial capital that include 
changes in the availability of these resources over time are only appropriate when the 
longitudinal dynamics of financial resources is of interest (Mishina et al., 2004). In 
particular, this study focuses on resource allocations following an IPO, which are 
affected by the net proceeds secured by a venture from the IPO itself. Second, measures 
of financial resources at a specific point in time are more appropriate where the concern 
is with the deployment of these resources over a definitive period of time (Marino & 
Lange, 1983), such as those resource allocations that occur over subsequent to the 
completion of an IPO. Thus, I calculate available financial capital at IPO as the 
difference between working capital available at IPO, including net proceeds raised from 
the IPO itself, and the working capital required at IPO. 
Human capital at IPO. This dissertation contends that superior human capital 
residing in a firm’s top management team at IPO enhances a new venture’s ability to 
                                                 
16
 Of note, scholars have also used survey instruments to compute actual and perceived measures of 
financial slack (e.g., Nohria & Gulati, 1996; Tan & Peng, 2003). 
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attain, sustain, and enhances its performance during the period following its transition 
into the public markets. Conceptually, the TMT consists of the firm’s senior-most 
executives, including the CEO, who comprise the firm’s dominant coalition (Cyert & 
March, 1963; Siegel & Hambrick, 2005). Following previous studies, this dissertation 
defines the top management team as the five most senior executives across the top two 
tiers of a venture’s management team. Specifically, I attempt to include the CEO, 
chairman, chief operating officer (COO), chief financial officer (CFO), and the next 
highest management tier of a venture. This approach is intended to capture the highest-
ranking officers of the company (Wagner, Pfeffer, & O’Reilly, 1984), encompassing the 
key activities of the firm at the senior-most level. Such a definition has been applied in 
other research concerned with top management teams (e.g., Carpenter & Fredrickson, 
2001; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). Because the SEC 
requires firms to publish comprehensive information on the top executives of publicly-
traded firms, data for TMT characteristics were obtained from the executives’ career 
histories reported in firm IPO prospectuses pursuant to SEC Rule 424(b)(1). Further, 
Dun & Bradstreet’s Reference Book of Corporate Management and company web sites 
were used, as needed, to supplement these data.  
Following previous studies, the measure of human capital employed by this study has 
three dimensions: elite education, educational attainment, and industry experience. The 
degree a top management team’s membership in the educational elite is measured as the 
percent of the top team who graduated from elite educational institutions (D’Aveni, 
1990; Finkelstein, 1992). Attendance at certain schools carries with it a perception of 
prominence in the business elite (Finkelstein, 1992). In turn, research suggests that top 
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managers from elite universities rely on these relationships to acquire additional 
resources and to absorb uncertainty in the institutional environment (Useem & Karabel, 
1986). This study used the comprehensive list of elite educational institutions developed 
by Finkelstein (1992), which was guided by original work by Useem and Karabel 
(1986), and supplemented by U.S. News & World Report’s (2006) annual rankings of top 
universities to confirm the listing (see Table 6 for a listing of the elite institutions used 
by this study). In total, TMT data were collected for 983 IPO firms during this period. 
The top management team’s educational attainment was assessed as the average 
number of years of higher education obtained by a venture’s top five executives 
(Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). It is not possible to determine the exact number of years an 
executive spent pursuing each degree from the secondary data. Thus, I assigned four 
years to the first undergraduate degree, two years to the first master’s degree, three years 
to the first law degree, and four years to the first doctorate obtained by each executive. 
High educational attainment scores indicate that a TMT is composed of members with a 
greater number of degrees. Finally, industry experience was measured by computing the 
average number of years of work experience in a venture’s primary industry for the top 
five executives on the TMT.  
I combined these three dimensions of human capital using standardized scores to 
produce a composite measure. Scholars observe that when constructing composite 
variables, weights should be selected a priori, independent of the data based on theory 
(McDonald, 1996). When no theory exists to rank extant component elements in terms 
of importance, equal weighting is recommended (McDonald, 1996). I therefore summed 
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the three standardized scores to form an equally weighted composite measure of human 
capital at IPO. 
 
TABLE 6 
Listing of Elite Educational Institutions 
 
School Name 
 
Amherst College 
Brown University 
Carleton College 
Columbia University 
Cornell University 
Dartmouth College 
Grinnel College 
Harvard University 
Haverford College 
Johns Hopkins University 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
New York University 
Northwestern University 
Oberlin College 
Pomona College 
Princeton University 
Stanford University 
Swarthmore College 
United States Military Academy 
United States Naval Academy 
University of California, Berkeley 
University of California, Los Angeles 
University of Chicago 
University of Michigan 
University of Pennsylvania 
Wellesley College 
Wesleyan University 
Williams College 
Yale University 
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Environmental dynamism. Environmental dynamism refers to the volatility 
within a given industry segment (Dess & Beard, 1984); it is generally used to describe 
environmental change that constrain managerial decision options and firm behavior (e.g., 
Goll & Rasheed, 2004). As previously discussed in Chapter III, higher levels of 
environmental dynamism reduce firms’ opportunistic behavior by introducing additional 
uncertainty regarding the ultimate outcomes of targeted growth-oriented investments. 
Under such conditions, firms are posited to reduce allocations to market-creating 
capabilities in favor of increased funding of internally-directed investments in market-
managing capabilities with more predictable returns. 
Dess and Beard (1984) examined the concept of task environments empirically 
and used customers (e.g., industry sales) as the primary environmental constituent. Since 
that time, most scholars have adopted this approach and have constructed environmental 
measures based on industry sales (e.g., Keats & Hitt, 1988). More recently, some 
scholars have also used stock market measures to gauge industry conditions such as 
market uncertainty (Beckman, Haunschild, & Philips, 2004; Folta, 1998; Wu, Levitas, & 
Priem, 2005).  
I combined elements of these two approaches to create my dynamism measure. 
Specifically, maintaining the spirit of the Keats and Hitt (1988) approach, I used 
measures of market capital (equity and debt) to compute my measure of environmental 
dynamism. More specifically, I began by summing the market capitalizations and long-
term debt of all publicly traded firms in the given industry of sampled firms (classified 
with three-digit SIC codes) for each of the five years preceding the year each sample 
firm completed its IPO. Both data elements represent ex post industry-level measures 
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and were gathered using data obtained from COMPUSTAT. Using these data, five-year 
average growth measures that reflect increases (reductions) in capital flows within an 
industry were used to compute measure of environmental dynamism for each industry 
segment. I computed measures for each industry segment in the year of each new 
venture’s IPO. 
I summed the market capitalization for each firm operating in an industry 
represented by one or more new ventures in the sample (classified with 3-digit SIC 
codes); this value represents the capital flows for each industry. I took the natural 
logarithm of each market capitalization value to reduce skewness (Keats & Hitt, 1988). I 
then regressed the industry market capital measure (dependent variable) on time 
(independent variable) over the five years immediately preceding the year of a venture’s 
IPO (e.g., Keats & Hitt, 1988). I employed the following regression equation: 
( ) kjjk eyearCapitalMarketIndustry ++= 10 γγ  
where γ0j is the intercept coefficient of the regression modeling market capital flows for 
industry k, year is the discrete time period for each firm-year observation weighted by 
the slope coefficient for industry k and indexed by year = 1, 2, … 5, γ1j is the slope 
coefficient for year for industry k, and ek represents the error term for the regression 
equation. Specifically, dynamism is determined by dividing the antilog of the standard 
error of the slope coefficient by the mean value of the dependent variable (market 
capitalization) for industry segment k (McNamara, Vaaler, & Devers, 2003; Sutcliff, 
1994).  
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TABLE 7 
Operationalization of Independent and Moderator Variables 
Variable   Measurement   Source 
     
Financial 
Capital at IPO 
 Financial Capital at IPO =  
Working Capital Available at IPO - Working Capital 
Required at IPO 
where  
(1) working capital available at IPO is defined as cash and 
cash equivalents, accounts receivable, inventory, 
marketable securities, and other current assets, including 
the net proceeds raised by a firm from an IPO (i.e., amount 
raised after deducting underwriting discounts and offering 
expenses) and 
(2) working capital required is defined as a firm’s current 
liabilities at IPO (e.g., accounts payable and accrued 
expenses).   
 Brealey & Myers 
(1996); 
Mishina, Pollock, 
& Porac (2004) 
     
Human 
Capital at IPO 
 Composite variable using equally weighted measures of 
elite education, educational attainment, and industry 
experience. 
where,  
(1) elite education was measured as the percent of the top 
team who graduated from elite educational institutions. 
(2) educational attainment was assessed as the average 
number of years of higher education obtained by a 
venture’s top five executives and 
(3) industry experience was measured by computing the 
average number of years of work experience in a venture’s 
primary industry for its top five executives.  
 D’Aveni (1990); 
Finkelstein 
(1992); 
Wiersema & 
Bantel (1992) 
     
Environmental 
Dynamism 
 ( ) kjjk eyearCapitalMarketIndustry ++= 10 γγ  
where,  
(1) γ0j is the intercept coefficient of the regression modeling 
industry market capital, year is the discrete time period for 
each firm-year observation weighted by the slope 
coefficient for industry k and indexed by year = 1, 2, … 5, 
γ1j is the slope coefficient for year for industry k, and ek 
represents the error term for the regression equation.  
(2) The standard error of the residual divided by the mean 
value of the dependent variable (market capital) is used to 
measure dynamism.  
 Keats & Hitt 
(1988); 
McNamara, 
Vaaler, & Devers 
(2003) 
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Operationalizations of the independent and moderator variables used in this 
dissertation—including financial capital at IPO, human capital at IPO, and 
environmental dynamism—are provided in Table 7. 
Control Variables 
Age at IPO. I control for venture age at IPO, measured by the number of years a 
venture has been in existence. I obtained each firm’s founding date from Thomson’s 
SDC New Issues database and confirmed the inception year using data collected from 
firm IPO prospectuses. The age at IPO was computed as the firm’s IPO year minus its 
year of inception. 
Firm size. Firm size is thought to influence the diversification behavior of new 
and established firms, especially acquisition intensity (Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & 
Moesel, 1993; Hitt et al., 1997). Further, several studies of IPO firms found a negative 
association between firm size and market returns (e.g., Carter, Dark, & Singh, 1998; 
Ibbotson, Sindelar, & Ritter, 1988; 1994). Thus, using data from S&P’s COMPUSTAT, 
I control for firm size at IPO by taking the natural logarithm (a linear transformation) of 
a venture’s total sales dollars the year prior to the IPO (Certo et al., 2003; Florin et al., 
2003). 
CEO power. Research suggests that powerful CEOs may be able to 
opportunistically pursue actions that raise their compensation and reduce their 
employment risk by increasing firm size (Carpenter et al., 2001; Seth, Song, & Pettit, 
2002). Accordingly, I use CEO duality as a proxy for CEO power. Using data collected 
from executives’ career histories in firm IPO prospectuses, CEO duality was 
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operationalized as a dichotomous variable reflecting whether the CEO was board chair 
(coded 1) or not (coded 0) at IPO.  
Board structure. To account for board vigilance, I control for board structure, 
using the percentage of inside directors. This measure is obtained from the Compact 
Disclosure and Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) Directors databases, 
where available, computed in the year of each venture’s IPO. Additional board data were 
also collected directly from firm IPO prospectuses. These data sources provide detailed 
descriptions of directors. With these data, the calculations of board size and board 
composition are straightforward.  
Although inside directors generally have sufficient knowledge of venture 
operations to perform their monitoring duties adequately (Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 
1997), these directors depend on a firm and its leaders for their financial well-being. 
Thus, inside directors may be in an unfavorable position to monitor firm activities 
(Finkelstein, 1992). By contrast, outside (or independent) directors are argued to 
exercise the greatest oversight over their respective ventures (Peng, 2004). Thus, I 
control for the influence of board structure on resource use and market performance 
using the percentage of inside directors by dividing the total number of directors who 
were either current or former employees of the venture (inside directors) at the time of 
the IPO by the total number of directors on the board at IPO.  
TMT/director ownership. I also control for the percentage of shares owned by 
officers and directors at IPO. Top managers and board members have both the ability 
and the incentive to monitor the venture and to influence decisions affecting its 
formation and use of different capability configurations. Thus, I further control for the 
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overall influence of top managers and board members using the percentage of shares 
owned by officers and directors at IPO. The percentage of shares owned by officers and 
directors is computed by dividing the total number of shares held and/or controlled by 
this group by the new venture’s total number of shares outstanding following the IPO. 
Using share ownership data for executive officers and directors collected from firm IPO 
prospectuses and supplemented by S&P’s EXECUCOMP database, this measure is 
computed for each new venture in the year the venture completed its IPO. 
Environmental munificence. Environmental munificence represents the 
abundance of critical resources needed by firms operating within a particular industry 
(Castrogiovanni, 1991; Dess & Beard, 1984) and thus influences a firm’s propensity to 
act. The amount of resources available in the external environment can influence a new 
venture’s need to maintain available financial resources and is expected to stimulate 
resource allocation decisions affecting the formation and use of different capability 
configurations by these firms.  
I follow the approach described previously for computing environmental 
dynamism. Specifically, to operationalize munificence, I obtained measures of common 
equity (shares outstanding and share price on the final trading day of each calendar year) 
and long-term debt from S&P’s COMPUSTAT database. I then summed the market 
capitalizations (equity and debt) of all publicly traded firms in the given industry of 
sampled firms (classified with three-digit SIC codes) for each of the five years preceding 
the year each sample firm completed its IPO. Using these data, five-year average growth 
measures that reflect increases (reductions) in capital flows within an industry are used 
to compute the measure of environmental munificence for each industry segment in the 
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year of each new venture’s IPO. I log each value to reduce skewness and regress the 
industry market capital measure (dependent variable) on time (independent variable) 
over the five years immediately preceding the year of a venture’s IPO (e.g., Keats & 
Hitt, 1988). Munificence represents the slope of the regression line produced by the 
equation (see the regression equation summarized previously in the description of 
environmental dynamism). 
Year indicators (dummy variables). Finally, since the IPO firms included in this 
study were drawn from the period 1996 through 2000, I included four year indicators 
(dummy variables), one for each IPO year represented in the sample,17 to control for 
systematic differences across these years that could influence a firm’s three-year 
shareholder returns (Mishina et al., 2004). An indicator was coded ‘1’ during a given 
year that the firm’s IPO was completed and ‘0’ otherwise. 
Model Specification and Analytical Procedures 
I rely on random coefficient modeling (RCM) to test the hypothesized 
relationships described in Chapter III (e.g., Bliese & Ployhart, 2002; Singer & Willett, 
2003; Xiao, 2002). In this study, firms are nested in industries; environmental conditions 
vary between industries. Therefore, a multilevel approach is well-suited for this study. 
Further, the use of multilevel analysis to examine such hierarchically ordered systems 
avoids certain statistical concerns (Hofmann, Griffin, & Gavin, 2000; Hough, 2006), 
such as lack of independence and aggregation to higher levels. Lack of independence 
between observations occurs when multiple observations are included from the same 
                                                 
17
 I dropped one dummy variable for identification purposes. 
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higher-level unit, for example, using observations from multiple firms from the same 
industry in a study examining the relationship between resource use and firm 
performance across industries. Aggregation to higher levels of analysis can result in a 
loss of information.  
Specifically, I model relationships at two levels: level-1 or the between-firm 
level (within industry), which consists of firm-specific attributes, and level-2 or the 
between industries-level, which consists of industry-specific characteristics. Practically 
speaking, in this study, use of multilevel modeling allows for regression-like modeling 
of relationships at the firm-level of analysis alongside regression-like models that 
describe how relationships at the firm-level vary between industries. Specifically, RCM 
addresses three general purposes with respect to its use in this study: (1) improved 
estimation of effects within and between individual units (i.e., developing an improved 
estimate of a regression model for an individual firm); (2) better formulation and testing 
of random influences on the dependent variable of interest (e.g., 3-year shareholder 
return) across each level of the data hierarchy; and (3) the partitioning of variance and 
covariance components among levels (i.e., decomposing variance among the set of firm-
level variables into between-firms/within-industries and between industries 
components). I followed the approach described by Raudenbush and Bryk (2002) and 
advocated by Singer (1998) to fit multilevel models; in this study, the proposed data 
hierarchy is represented by firms that operate within specific industries and are thus 
exposed to different environmental conditions. This approach therefore allows me to 
account for the nested nature of the data and thus exploit its multilevel structure. 
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Consistent with this approach, I began each analysis by fitting an unconditional 
means model (e.g., the so-called “null” model; Kreft & de Leeuw, 1998) that contains 
no predictors at level-1 or level-2 to partition the variance into between-firm/within 
industries and between-industry components. Specifically, I modeled each IPO firm 
observation as a linear combination of the firm’s mean plus a random error: 
 
 Yij = β0j + rij (1) 
 
In Equation 1, Yij is the firm-level dependent variable (either shareholder return or one of 
the two dimensions of capability formation/use advocated in this study) of the firm 
observation for firm i and industry j; β0j represents the sum of the intercept for each firm 
i (at the firm-level or level-1) in industry j (level-2); rij represents a random error, which 
is associated with the ith firm jth industry and contains no level-1 predictors. In this study, 
the indices i and j denote i = 1, …, nj firms nested within j = 1, … , J industries.  
Consistent with Equation 1, at level-2 (the industry-level), industry-level 
intercepts are expressed as the sum of the overall grand mean, γ00, and the series of 
deviations varying randomly around that mean: 
 
 β0j = γ00 + u0j (2) 
 
In Equation 2, γ00 represents the grand mean, and u0j represents the random 
“industry effect”, which is the deviation of industry j’s mean from the grand mean. As 
previously indicated, the model represented by equations 1 and 2 include no independent 
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or control variables, which typifies the unconditional means model. Subsequent analyses 
contain control variables and/or independent, moderator, or intervening variables added 
to the unconditional means model as required to test the various hypotheses described in 
Chapter III. More specifically, the level-1 model with 1 to n level-1 predictors (including 
IVs and controls) for each subsequent analysis is represented by the following general 
approach: 
 
 Yij = β0j + β1j (Xij – X-barj…) + rij (3A) 
 β0j = γ00 + u0j (3B) 
 β1j = γ10+ u1j (3C) 
 
where shareholder returns or one of the two dimensions of capability the formation and 
use (e.g., market-managing capability formation/use or market-creating capability 
formation/use) for every ith firm in every jth industry-group, i.e., Yij, is the dependent 
variable, which is modeled as a function of the intercept and the individual slopes of 
each firm’s set of predictors on the dependent variable.18 Xij represents the level-1 
predictor (of which there can be 1 – n variables) and Xij – X-barj … denotes the 
requirement to center each level-1 predictor. γ00 is the average intercept across level-2 
units; γ10 is the average regression slope across level-2 units; u0j is the unique increment 
to the intercept associated with level-2 unit j; and u1j is the unique increment to the slope 
associated with level-2 unit j.  
                                                 
18
 Each predictor (e.g., Xij, X2j, … Xnj) is centered, which is noted by the notation, Xnj– X-barj, in equation 
(3) above. 
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Similarly, analysis of level-2 predictors is generally modeled with a modification 
to equations 3B and 3C as follows: 
 
 β0j = γ00 + γ01 (Wj) + u0j  (4A) 
 β1j = γ10 + γ11 (Wj) + u1j  (4B) 
 
where Wj represents a level-2 predictor. In the combined form, this yields the following 
model: 
 
 Yij = γ00 + γ10 (Xij) + γ01 (Wj) + γ11 (Xij) (Wj) + u0j + u1j (Xij) + rij (4C) 
 
Each subsequent model adds complexity, which is described further in the results 
summarized to explain the individual models (see Raudenbush & Bryk [2002] for 
additional detail). For each model, variance components and the deviance statistics were 
examined. Likelihood ratio tests gauge the statistical significance of the coefficients 
among the models. I used SAS PROC MIXED routine to accommodate testing of the 
multilevel relationships hypothesized in Chapter III.  
Testing for Mediation Effects  
Mediation hypotheses posit how, or by what means, an independent variable (X) 
affects a dependent variable (Y) through one or more potential intervening variables, or 
mediators (M). Traditionally, scholars have held that mediation is established and 
significant only when the predictor-outcome coefficient goes from ‘significant’ to ‘not 
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significant’ when the mediating variable is added to the model (e.g., James & Brett, 
1984; Baron & Kenny, 1986). However, more recently, scholars have shown that 
mediating effects identified by such an approach may be spurious (MacKinnon, 
Lockwood, Hoffman, West, & Sheets, 2002). In other words, it is possible to have the 
predictor-outcome relationship drop from significant to not significant when accounting 
for the mediator even though there is no significant mediation, or for a mediating effect 
to be present when the predictor-outcome relationship continues to be statistically 
significant even after adding the mediator into the model. 
Accordingly, I tested for mediation using the multivariate extension of the 
product of coefficients strategy available for models involving multiple mediators. This 
test uses the multivariate delta method (Bishop, Fienberg, & Holland, 1975; Oehlert, 
1992) to derive the standard error of the total indirect effect (c – c′). Using the formula 
derived by Sobel (1982) and extending the work by Alwin and Hauser (1975), Fox 
(1980, 1985), Greene (1977), and others, this approach enables testing of simultaneous 
mediation by multiple variables, or multiple mediation. A mediation hypothesis 
involving only one mediating variable is termed simple mediation. Figure 3 depicts the 
simple mediation model graphically. Panel A illustrates the total effect of X on Y, 
quantified with the unstandardized regression weight c. Panel B depicts both the indirect 
effect of X on Y through M as well as the direct effect of X on Y. The a path represents 
the effect of X on the proposed mediator, whereas the b path corresponds to the effect of 
M on Y partialling out the effect of X. Assuming a and b are unstandardized regression 
weights, the indirect effect of X on Y through M is quantified as ab, the product of the a 
and b paths. The coefficient c′ represents the direct effect of X on Y. The total effect of X 
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on Y can be expressed as the sum of the direct and indirect effects: c = c′ + ab. 
Equivalently, c′ is the difference between the total effect of X on Y and indirect effect of 
X on Y through M, i.e., c′ = c – ab. Studies involving simple mediation are common in 
organizational research (Preacher & Hayes, in press).  
However, as indicated previously, this dissertation follows a design that has 
received less attention in both the methodological and applied literature involving 
simultaneous mediation by multiple variables, or multiple mediation. A graphical 
depiction of a multiple mediation model is illustrated in Figure 4, a model with j 
mediators that also incorporates covariates.19 As in the simple mediation model, Panel A 
represents the total effect of X on Y (path c). Panel B represents both the direct effect of 
X on Y (path c′) and the indirect effects of X on Y via mediation; in this example, path c′ 
represents the indirect effects of X on Y via j mediators. The specific indirect effect of X 
on Y via mediator i (Brown, 1997; Fox, 1985) is defined as the product of the two 
unstandardized paths linking X to Y via that mediator. For example, the specific indirect 
effect of X on Y through M1 is quantified as the product of paths a1 and b1, or a1b1. 
Assuming the model is structurally saturated (just-identified), the total indirect effect of 
X on Y is the sum of the specific indirect effects, Σi(aibi), i = 1 to j, and the total effect of 
X on Y is the sum of the direct effect and all j of the specific indirect effects: c = c′ + 
Σi(aibi), i = 1 to j. 
 
                                                 
19
 Covariates are included in this figure to illustrate how the inclusion of controls is modeled with 
equations involving multiple mediators. 
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FIGURE 3 
Illustration of Simple Mediation 
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FIGURE 4 
Illustration of Multiple Mediation 
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Computations for estimating, comparing, and testing indirect effects in multiple 
mediation models are described further below. These mathematical computations were 
handled using a SAS macro developed by Professors Kristopher J. Preacher and 
Professor Andrew F. Hayes for estimating and comparing indirect effects in multiple 
mediator models (email exchange with Professor Preacher on March 23, 2006). 
Appendix A contains the macro for SAS that was used to provide a test of the indirect 
effect for multiple mediation using the Sobel test (used to compute the standard error for 
total indirect effects and specific indirect effects using the calculations described in 
Equation 5A and Equation 8, respectively). Electronic copies of the macros can be 
obtained at http://www.comm.ohio-state.edu/ahayes/SPSS%20programs/indirect.htm. 
Specifically, I use SAS’s %MACRO …%MEND and SAS PROC IML procedures to 
generate estimates for the indirect effects in a multiple mediator model, incorporating the 
macro to initiate the required routines. This particular macro allows for multiple 
mediators, statistical control of covariates, and all possible pairwise comparisons 
between indirect effects, and it also produces bias-corrected bootstrap confidence 
intervals in addition to percentile-based bootstrap confidence intervals. 
Specifically, I model the indirect effect of the two venture resource types 
(financial capital at IPO and human capital at IPO) on the dependent variable (three-year 
shareholder returns) through the two mediators (market-managing capability 
formation/use and market-creating capability formation/use). I test significance for each 
specific indirect effect of each of the two dimensions of capability formation/use as well 
as the total indirect effect for the two mediators using the critical ratio and the 
confidence interval described below in Equation 9 and Equation 10, respectively. 
 172 
 
 
 
Specifying and testing of indirect effects using multiple mediation offers several 
advantages to the testing of separate simple mediation models. First, omitted variables 
may lead to biased parameter estimates if multiple mediation hypotheses are tested with 
a set of simple mediator models (Judd & Kenny, 1981). When multiple hypothesized 
mediators are modeled together, the likelihood of parameter bias due to omitted 
variables is reduced. Second, multiple mediation allows determination of whether and to 
what extent specific M variables transmitting the X→Y effect are conditional on the 
presence of other mediators in the model. Finally, multiple mediation allows researchers 
to contrast and evaluation of the strength of individual mediators relative to each other. 
More specifically, the indirect effect through, for example, M2 (see Figure 4) represents 
the ability of M2 to mediate the effect of X on Y conditional on the inclusion of the other 
mediators in the model. Because of this, collinearity plays a role in multiple mediation 
models in much the same way as in ordinary multiple regression. To the degree that 
individual mediators are correlated, the effects of the mediators on Y (the b paths) can be 
attenuated, which can compromise the ability to find particular specific indirect effects 
significant. 
Accordingly, I simultaneously test for mediation involving the two dimensions of 
capability formation and use the product of coefficients in a path model (i.e., the indirect 
effect; Alwin & Hauser, 1975; Sobel, 1982, 1988) using the formula derived by Sobel 
(1982). I apply a multivariate extension of the product of coefficients strategy developed 
for models involving two or more mediators (Bishop et al., 1975; Oehlert, 1992), using 
matrix formulae for obtaining point estimates and first-order standard errors for each 
indirect effect “path” in an equation simultaneously modeling the paths created by two 
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or more mediators (Bollen, 1987, 1989); these standard errors permit significance testing 
using critical ratios for measuring specific indirect effects (i.e., the path coefficient of 
each individual mediation path) and total indirect effects (i.e., the path coefficients for 
all mediation paths included in the model). Using this approach, standard errors for 
indirect effects are obtained as the square roots of diagonal elements produced in an 
asymptotic covariance matrix (referred to as F) given by: 
 
Σ (F) = a21σ2b1 + b21σ2a1 + a22σ2b2 + b22σ2a2 + 2 (a1a2σb1.b2 + b1b2σa1.a2) (5A) 
 
where σ2a1 , σ2a2 , σ2b1 , and σ2b2 are the variances of the a1, a2, b1, and b2 coefficients, 
respectively. The square root of Σ (F) represents the first-order standard error of the total 
indirect effect in a two-mediator model given by the following equation:  
 
 SEa1.2b1.2 = Σ (F) (5B) 
 
The total indirect effect of X on Y given by Sobel (1986) is: 
 
 f = a1b1 + a2b2 (6) 
 
Employing equation 5, the critical ratio for the total indirect effect of X on Y is:   
 
 z = (a1b1 + a2b2 ) / Σ (F) (7) 
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The specific indirect effects for each individual mediation path are computed 
using the same formula offered by Sobel (1982) to test for simple mediation. 
Specifically, the point estimate for the specific indirect effect of X on Y through mediator 
Mn in the model depicted in Figure 4 is computed as the product of the coefficients for 
paths an and bn (i.e., anbn). Application of Sobel’s multivariate delta method represents 
the standard error of the specific indirect effect for each moderator as follows: 
 
 SEanbn =  a2nσ2bn + b2nσ2an (8) 
 
The critical ratio for the specific indirect effect of X on Y through Mn is:   
 
 z = (anbn ) /  a2nσ2bn + b2nσ2an (9) 
 
In addition to conducting a significance test using the critical ratio, I also use the 
standard error (SEanbn) to create confidence limits for the indirect effect associated with 
each mediation path hypothesized in Chapter III. Using the lower and upper bounds of a 
95% confidence interval (CI
.95), I compute the confidence interval as follows: 
 
 CI
.95 (anbn) = anbn ± zα/2 SEanσbn (10) 
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where zα/2 is the z-score cutting off the upper 100(α/2)% of the standard normal 
distribution (e.g., 1.96 for the 95% confidence interval). In such case, the null hypothesis 
of no indirect effect for Mn is rejected at α = .05 when the CI.95 for path anbn does not 
contain 0.   
Summary 
This chapter explained the methodology applied by this dissertation to test the 
hypothesized relationships. First, I described the sample of firms that was examined in 
this study and identified data sources that were used. Next, I described the 
operationalization of the dependent, intervening, independent, moderating variables, and 
control variables. Finally, I specified the statistical analyses and procedures that were 
used to test the relationships hypothesized in Chapter III.  
 
 176 
 
 
 
CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
Introduction 
This chapter provides the results of the analyses conducted to test the ten 
hypotheses proposed in Chapter III. The summary includes a restatement of each 
hypothesis, the analytical procedure(s) relied upon to independently test each hypothesis, 
and an overview of the results. As described in Chapter IV, RCM is employed to test the 
hypothesized relationships. Further, a modified version of the product of coefficients 
method that supports the simultaneous modeling and testing of multiple mediation paths 
is applied to test the mediation hypotheses for both configurations of organizational 
capabilities.  
The first section of this chapter describes tests of the validity of measures for the 
two dimensions of capability formation and use, including descriptive statistics for the 
items and examination of the rotated factor patterns. The second section of this chapter 
describes the sample and summarizes the descriptive statistics and correlation statistics 
associated with the variables of interest to this study. The third section of this chapter 
discusses the results of the statistical procedures used to test each hypothesis. 
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Validity of Objective Capability Configuration Measures 
Data were gathered for each potential indicator of market-managing capabilities 
and market-creating capabilities described previously in Chapter IV and considered for 
the composite measure from a random sample of 600 firms between 1996 and 2000 from 
COMPUSTAT. Table 8 reports descriptive statistics for each of the items that were 
considered for the two dimensions of capability formation and use. Data from all five 
years were pooled to simplify the reporting. Although the significance of the correlation 
coefficients may be somewhat overstated because of the pooling of the data, a year-by-
year analysis of the correlation matrices indicated a similar pattern of relationships over 
time.  
To evaluate the capability dimensions and their potential measures more closely, 
I considered two selection criteria. First, how well do the items designed to measure 
each construct load on a single factor? And second, how internally consistent are the 
items that made up each construct? The first selection criterion was assessed by 
conducting a principal components factor analysis of the ten items that comprised the 
two dimensions of capability formation and use. Following the Kaiser criterion and the 
scree plot, I extracted factors with eigenvalues greater than one, using an oblique 
rotation because I expected the specific dimensions of capability formation and use to be 
interrelated. As the results shown in Table 9 indicate, two factors were identified with 
absolute factor loading values that exceeded the conventional cutoff of 0.40 (Tabachnick 
& Fidell, 2001).  
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TABLE 8 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of Items Measuring Capability Formation and Usea 
 
  Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
  
         
1. Direct production costs  
(e.g., Cost of goods sold) 
1,261.375 6,364.930                   
2.  Non-production overhead/ 
administrative costs  
(e.g., Selling, general, and 
administrative costs) 
307.931 1,421.867 0.727                 
3. Total inventory costs 292.202 4,061.886 0.722 0.750               
4.  Accounts receivable (t/o) 1,518.859 16,653.582 0.663 0.310 0.538             
5.  Accounts payable (t/o) 1,090.514 14,102.432 0.795 0.564 0.434 0.747           
6.  Capital expenditures 149.983 869.278 0.185 0.190 0.142 0.251 0.190         
7.  Plant, property, and 
equipment  
1,608.255 8,031.542 0.198 0.492 0.135 0.160 0.165 0.822       
8.  Research and development 
expenditures 
78.126 442.416 0.376 0.370 0.498 0.519 0.485 0.668 0.535     
9.  Advertising expenditures 68.619 316.945 0.613 0.756 0.193 0.317 0.124 0.550 0.466 0.647   
10.  Total acquisitions ($ value) 0.413 2.070 0.061 0.066 0.023 0.050 0.032 0.403 0.523 0.332 0.032 
  
  
                  
a
 n = 600 for all variables. Correlations greater than 0.140 are significant at p < .05. 
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TABLE 9 
Rotated Factor Patternsa 
 
Variables 
Factor 1: 
Market-managing 
Capability 
Formation/Use 
Factor 2: 
Market-creating 
Capability 
Formation/Use 
   
Direct production costs  
(e.g., Cost of goods sold) 
0.857 0.064 
Non-production 
overhead/administrative costs  
(e.g., Selling, general, and 
administrative costs) 
0.640 0.239 
Total inventory costs 0.833 0.011 
Accounts receivable (t/o) 0.761 0.343 
Accounts payable (t/o) 0.810 0.223 
Capital expenditures 0.227 0.892 
Plant, property, and equipment  0.171 0.952 
Research and development 
expenditures 
0.102 0.323 
Advertising expenditures 0.902 0.226 
Total acquisitions ($ value) 0.191 0.563 
  
 
Variance explained:   
 Proportional 0.453 0.325 
 Cumulative  0.779 
Subscale reliability:   
 Factor 1: Market-managing 
Capability Formation/Use 
0.664  
 Factor 2: Market-creating 
Capability Formation/Use 
 0.863 
   
a
 n = 600. Bold print highlights the factor loadings with absolute values greater than 0.40. 
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Nine of the ten items loaded on two factors with minimal cross-loading. 
However, the pattern differed from the original expectations described in Chapter IV in 
two ways. First, research and development expenditures did not load on Factor 2-
Market-creating capability formation/use, neither did the absolute value of its factor 
loading exceed 0.40 for Factor 1-Market-managing capability formation/use. Therefore, 
the item was excluded from subsequent calculation of composite measures for both 
dimensions of capability formation and use. Second, advertising expenditures produced 
a reasonably high factor loading of 0.902 on Factor 1, rather than on Factor 2 as 
expected. This result suggests that advertising expenditures most likely account for costs 
incurred by firms to exploit existing product-market positions by promoting the sale of 
current goods and services rather than representing long-term efforts by a firm to extend 
brand equity and market “legitimacy” to any new positions that the firm chooses to 
pursue. 
Internal consistency was assessed by calculating Cronbach alphas to obtain 
reliability estimates for each dimension. I applied guidelines from prior research 
suggesting that an alpha greater than 0.60 is considered reasonable for organizational 
research (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001; Van de Ven & Ferry, 1980). Hence, both 
dimensions of capability formation and use were reasoned to demonstrate internal 
consistency given the items that loaded on each factor. Further, as noted in Table 9, the 
market-managing capability formation and use factor accounted for 45.3% of the total 
item variance (α = .664), and the market-creating capability formation and use factor 
accounted for 32.5% of the total item variance (α = .863). Similar results and 
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conclusions were obtained when performing principal axis factoring, and when 
employing an oblimin rotation. 
As a result, I constructed a scale for each capability dimension by summing the 
standardized value of the items that exceeded the 0.40 threshold on each dimension of 
capability formation and use after completion of the factor analysis. More specifically, 
the composite measure of each venture’s allocation to market-managing capability 
formation and use included standardized values of the following items: (1) direct 
production costs (e.g., cost of goods sold), (2) non-production overhead and 
administrative costs (e.g., selling, general, and administrative costs), (3) total inventory 
costs, (4) accounts receivable turnover, (5) accounts payable turnover, and (6) 
advertising expenditures. The composite measure of each venture’s allocation to market-
creating formation and use included standardized values of the following items: (1) 
capital expenditures, (2) plant and equipment newness (e.g., ratio of new plant and 
equipment to gross plant and equipment), and (3) the total value of acquisitions during 
the period. 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
As described in Chapter IV, the sample for this study consists of 632 U.S. firms 
that completed an IPO in the U.S. between 1996 and 2000 and met the requisite 
restrictions for inclusion in the sample. Table 10 summarizes the distribution of IPOs for 
firms included in the study, including the average proceeds generated by each IPO 
during the year and the average annual shareholder return for the three-year period 
following each firm’s IPO year. Notably, the average proceeds for IPOs increased 
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substantially during the five-year period, increasing almost three-fold during the period 
from $39.7 million per IPO in 1996 to more than $94 million per IPO in 2000.  
 
TABLE 10 
Description of Sample: Distribution of IPOs for Firms Used in Study 
 
Year IPOs 
Percent of 
Sample 
Average IPO 
Proceedsa 
Average Annual 
Returnb 
     
1996 147 23.3% $39,737 24.6% 
1997 129 20.4% $37,793 19.8% 
1998 83 13.1% $44,705 15.7% 
1999 141 22.3% $65,706 -12.1% 
2000 132 20.9% $94,080 17.7% 
     
a
 In thousands.  
b
 Average annual return for the three-year period following the IPO year. 
 
Table 11 provides additional details regarding the IPO firms included in the 
study. On average, each IPO involves the issuance of 4.63 million shares of stock 
(common shares) and generated $59.58 million in proceeds for each firm included 
during the five-year timeframe for firms included in this study. Further, the average sales 
and net income at IPO, 3-year return on sales, 3-year sales growth, board size, and CEO 
ownership among other factors for firms included in this study are comparable with the 
levels for firms included in similar studies examining IPO firms (e.g., Certo et al., 2001; 
Florin et al., 2003).  
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TABLE 11 
Description of Sample: IPO Firm Attributes for Firms Used in Study 
 
  Minimum Maximum Mean s.d. 
     
Firm age at IPO 0 6 3.47 1.55 
Sales at IPOa 0 1,102.0 23.48 85.21 
Net income at IPOa -88.7 25.4 -10.31 32.95 
Return on sales (3-year)   -2.06 7.29 
Sales growth (3-year)   24.55 122.81 
Number of employees at IPO 3 5,995 483.95 136.61 
Total assets at IPOa 3.1 3,870.0 149.29 270.70 
Board size 2 14 6.68 1.86 
Average TMT age 28.0 58.8 43.27 4.94 
Average TMT industry 
experience 
1.6 34.0 10.84 4.44 
Average TMT educational 
attainment 
2.4 6.4 4.05 0.85 
IPO proceedsa 4.0 781.2 59.58 64.42 
Number of shares offereda 0.6 4.6 4.63 3.78 
Number of underwriters  
(including international co-
managers) 
1.0 20.0 12.10 8.34 
CEO ownershipb 0.00 0.86 0.17 0.34 
TMT/director ownershipb 0.00 0.97 0.59 0.29 
Firms with CEO dualityb   0.58 0.49 
Firms with founder as CEOb   0.64 0.48 
Firms with founder(s) on TMTb   0.84 0.37 
          
a
 In millions.  
a
 Percentage.  
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Descriptive statistics and correlations for variables used in this study are reported 
in Table 12. Overall, these figures indicate that shareholder returns for the sample of 
new ventures averaged 12.8% over the three-year period. Further, the average age at IPO 
for firms included in the sample was 3.47, which reflects the six-year age restriction 
applied to the original listing of IPOs that occurred during the five-year timeframe 
considered by this study. The bivariate correlations report a negative relationship 
between financial capital at IPO (-.171, p < .001) suggesting somewhat paradoxically 
that shareholder returns decrease at increasingly higher levels of available financial 
resources. The two dimensions of capability formation and use correlate with 
shareholder returns as expected. Specifically, market-managing capability formation and 
use is negatively correlated with shareholder returns (-.105, p < .01), suggesting 
shareholder returns suffer with increasingly higher allocations to the formation and use 
of these organizational capabilities. In contrast, market-creating capability formation and 
use is positively correlated with shareholder returns (.091, p < .05). 
Further, Table 12 suggests that multicollinearity is likely not a concern for these 
data because none of the bivariate correlations are excessively. Nevertheless, I used 
SAS’s PROC REG procedure with the VIF option to examine the variance inflation 
factors (VIFs) for each equation to assess the potential for multicollinearity. In each 
case, none of the VIFs exceeded 2.0. This is further indication that multicollinearity is 
not a concern. 
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TABLE 12 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of Variables Used in Studya 
 
 Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
            
 
 
1. Shareholder return 0.128 1.771            
2. Financial capital at IPO 
(log financial capital) 
17.878 0.849 -0.171***           
3. Human capital at IPO -0.146 2.489 0.024 0.043          
4. Market-managing 
capability formation/use 
1.127 3.873 -0.105** -0.364*** -0.188***         
5. Market-creating capability 
formation/use 
-0.023 1.322 0.091* 0.214*** 0.101* -0.350***        
6. Age at IPO 3.473 1.549 0.050 0.008 -0.069† 0.086* -0.049       
7. Firm size (log sales) 2.031 1.374 0.038 0.210*** 0.105** -0.441*** 0.111** 0.077†      
8. CEO duality 0.581 0.494 -0.007 -0.106** 0.024 -0.046 0.015 -0.051 0.104*     
9. TMT/director ownership 0.752 2.228 -0.139*** 0.090* -0.011 -0.036 0.069† -0.014 0.020 -0.055    
10. % inside directors 0.300 0.148 -0.017 -0.239*** 0.001 0.063† -0.084* -0.161*** 0.147*** 0.201*** -0.059   
11. Industry munificence 0.341 0.166 -0.085* 0.190*** -0.136*** -0.012 0.028 0.000 0.023 -0.023 0.048 0.050  
12. Industry dynamism 0.049 0.038 -0.137*** -0.067† 0.080* -0.047 -0.035 -0.095** 0.054 -0.024 -0.025 0.065† 0.167*** 
                         
a
 n = 632 for all variables.  
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .10 
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Test of Hypotheses 
As described in Chapter IV, all hypotheses were tested using SAS’s (software 
package) PROC MIXED procedure. PROC MIXED is considered an efficient procedure 
(Singer, 1998) making it particularly useful for fitting a wide range of mixed linear 
models to data, including multilevel (hierarchical) models, and to make statistical 
inferences about the data. Separate analyses were conducted for models involving each 
dependent variable (e.g., three-year shareholder return for H1, H2, and H9a – H10b; 
market-managing capability formation/use for H3, H4, H7a, and H8a; and market-
creating capability formation/use for H5, H6, H7b, and H8b). Table 13 presents the 
results for analyses involving the regression of the two venture resource types (financial 
capital at IPO and human capital at IPO) on three-year shareholder return. Results of the 
RCM analyses involving the regression of market-managing formation/use and market-
creating formation/use on the two venture resource types and the hypothesized 
interactions are included in the tables on pages 192-193 and 196-197, respectively. For 
each analysis, the first two models of the equation are the same. Model 1 for each 
equation presents the results of the null model (i.e., the unconditional means model with 
no predictors). Model 2 presents the results with only the control variables included in 
the equation. 
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TABLE 13 
RCM Regression Analysis of the Effect of  
Financial Capital and Human Capital on Shareholder Returna 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
      
Intercept -0.058* -0.377* 4.331* -4.342* -4.161* 
 (0.106) (0.343) (2.001) (1.858) (1.863) 
Age at IPO  0.043 0.020 0.006 0.002 
  (0.049) (0.050) (0.049) (0.050) 
Firm size (log sales)  0.011 0.057 0.056 0.062 
  (0.054) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) 
CEO duality  -0.079 -0.109 -0.093 -0.086 
  (0.141) (0.141) (0.140) (0.140) 
TMT/director ownership  -0.091** -0.092** -0.091** -0.092** 
  (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
% inside directors  -0.200 -0.484 -0.395 -0.410 
  (0.503) (0.515) (0.514) (0.513) 
Industry munificence  0.025 0.028 0.024 0.026 
  (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Industry dynamism  -0.144† -0.200* -0.180* -0.200* 
  (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) 
Year 1 dummy  0.896** 0.672* 0.590† 0.599† 
  (0.324) (0.337) (0.338) (0.338) 
Year 2 dummy  0.794** 0.512† 0.485 0.480 
  (0.302) (0.324) (0.323) (0.322) 
Year 3 dummy  0.680* 0.469 0.388 0.367 
  (0.317) (0.328) (0.328) (0.328) 
Year 4 dummy  -0.463† -0.560* -0.624* -0.643* 
  (0.264) (0.266) (0.266) (0.266) 
      
a
 n = 632. The dependent variable is 3-year shareholder return.  
(standard error) 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .10 
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TABLE 13 (cont.)a 
 
 
Model 1 
(cont.) 
Model 2 
(cont.) 
Model 3 
(cont.) 
Model 4 
(cont.) 
Model 5 
(cont.) 
      
Financial capital at IPO   -0.251** 5.126** 4.916** 
   (0.105) (2.082) (2.088) 
Financial capital at IPO squared    -0.151** -0.145** 
    (0.058) (0.058) 
Human capital at IPO     0.033† 
     (0.018) 
      
Deviance (-2ResLogLik) 2501.9 2378.1 2272.6 2206.0 2154.6 
∆ Deviance  -123.8*** -105.5*** -66.6*** -48.6*** 
      
a
 n = 632. The dependent variable is 3-year shareholder return.  
(standard error) 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .10 
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Further, because these models are presented in a hierarchical model, the reader 
may be interested in comparing models to determine the extent to which the inclusion of 
additional predictors contributes significantly to the subsequent model. Specifically, I 
use the goodness-of-fit χ2 process to evaluate model fit (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001), 
whereby the log-likelihood of the full model is compared with the log-likelihood of the 
smaller model and the significance of the resulting χ2 statistic is determined for the given 
degrees of freedom. In such case, the degrees of freedom for comparing models are the 
difference between degrees of freedom for the bigger and smaller models. The -2 log-
likelihood is reported for each model together with the difference score and the 
significance of the change in χ2 between models within each equation. 
Venture Resources  New Venture Performance Hypotheses (H1 and H2) 
Table 13 presents the results of Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2. I began the 
analysis by estimating a null model (e.g., unconditional means model) that contained no 
predictors at level-1 and level-2 to partition the variance in firm performance (e.g., three-
year shareholder returns) into between-firm/within industry and between industry 
components (e.g., Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). Although this model contained no 
predictors, it allowed me to understand the effects across the two levels. Model 1 in 
Table 13 displays the results of this analysis. The analysis revealed two variance 
components (not reported in the tables), both of which were statistically significant: the 
variance between firms within industries (2.963), and the variance between industries 
(0.177). 94-percent of the variance in shareholder returns over the three-year period 
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following an IPO was between firms within industries and only 6-percent of the variance 
in three-year shareholder return was between industries. 
In Model 2, I entered the control variables. As shown in Model 2, the 
TMT/director ownership percentage variable (p < .01), industry dynamism (p < .10), and 
the year dummies were statistically significant. A chi-square test revealed that the 
inclusion of the control variables resulted in a better model. More specifically, I 
compared the deviance statistics (e.g., the goodness-of-fit χ2) from Model 1 and Model 2 
and found a statistically significant difference in the two models (∆ Deviance = -123.8; p 
< .001). 
In Model 3, I entered my financial capital at IPO independent variable to 
equation. I subsequently added the financial capital at IPO squared variable to the 
equation and reported the results in Model 4. Hypothesis 1 predicted that financial 
capital at IPO has a non-linear association with IPO-stage new venture performance. 
Lower to moderate levels of available financial capital following an IPO were expected 
to positively affect new venture performance as these firms capitalized on gains from 
investments in the most profitable opportunities. However, at increasingly higher levels 
of available financial capital following an IPO, the relationship between financial capital 
at IPO and firm performance would turn negative. In other words, the relationship was 
expected to form an inverted U-shaped curve. As demonstrated in Model 4, financial 
capital at IPO is found to be positively associated with three-year shareholder return (p < 
.01), while financial capital at IPO squared is negatively associated with three-year 
shareholder returns (p < .001). Moreover, the likelihood ratio test suggests that Model 3 
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provided a better fit than Model 2 (∆ Deviance = -66.6; p < .001). These results support 
Hypothesis 1. 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that human capital at IPO would have a direct and 
positive association with IPO-stage new venture. Specifically, during the period 
following an IPO, new ventures that are endowed with greater levels of human capital 
are expected to enhance a new venture’s ability to establish, sustain, and extend its 
competitive advantage, and therefore, to increase its market performance during this 
period. I added human capital at IPO to the equation to test Hypothesis 2 and reported 
the results of this test in Model 5 (Table 13). As shown in Model 5, human capital at IPO 
has a marginally significant affect on the three-year shareholder return of new ventures 
following an IPO (p < .10). These results support Hypothesis 2.  
Venture Resources  Capability Formation/Use Hypotheses (H3 – H6) 
Separate equations were constructed to test the influence of venture resource 
endowments on the two dimensions of capability formation and use: market-managing 
capabilities and market-creating capabilities. Table 14 reports the results of the tests of 
Hypotheses 3 and 4. The table on pages 196-197 reports the results of the tests of 
Hypotheses 5 and 6.  
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TABLE 14 
RCM Regression Analysis of the Effect of  
Financial Capital and Human Capital on Market-Managing Capability Formation/Use a 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
      
Intercept 1.023* 7.764*** -4.192 -5.683 -7.315 
 (0.547) (1.055) (2.649) (3.845) (4.818) 
Age at IPO  -0.010 -0.005 -0.020 0.012 
  (0.080) (0.080) (0.081) (0.080) 
Firm size (log sales)  -1.351*** -1.825*** -1.873*** -1.876*** 
  (0.131) (0.221) (0.229) (0.226) 
CEO duality  -0.242 -0.195 -0.234 -0.145 
  (0.242) (0.242) (0.245) (0.242) 
TMT/director ownership  -0.024 -0.021 -0.014 -0.024 
  (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.048) 
% inside directors  -1.050 -0.819 -0.898 -0.662 
  (0.889) (0.889) (0.894) (0.889) 
Industry munificence  -0.098* -0.098* -0.100* -0.101* 
  (0.047) (0.047) (0.048) (0.047) 
Industry dynamism  0.370* 0.370* 0.373* 0.420** 
  (0.150) (0.150) (0.151) 0.152) 
Year 1 dummy  -2.011** -1.725** -1.441** -1.962** 
  (0.638) (0.644) (0.503) (0.649) 
Year 2 dummy  -2.256*** -1.872** -1.922*** -2.027*** 
  (0.568) (0.584) (0.460) (0.584) 
Year 3 dummy  -1.144† -0.866 -0.926† -1.019† 
  (0.588) (0.595) (0.489) (0.590) 
Year 4 dummy  0.150 0.340 0.221 0.320 
  (0.478) (0.481) (0.397) (0.477) 
      
a
 n = 632. The dependent variable is Market-Managing Capability Formation/Use.  
(standard error) 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .10 
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TABLE 14 (cont.)a 
 
 
Model 1 
(cont.) 
Model 2 
(cont.) 
Model 3 
(cont.) 
Model 4 
(cont.) 
Model 5 
(cont.) 
      
Financial capital at IPO   0.772** 0.850** 0.959** 
   (0.292) (0.306) (0.303) 
Human capital at IPO    -0.120** -0.108* 
    (0.051) (0.050) 
Financial capital X Dynamism     -5.587** 
     (4.210) 
Human capital X Dynamism     5.133*** 
     (1.264) 
      
Deviance (-2ResLogLik) 3377.2 3219.3 3162.3 3102.9 3053.4 
∆ Deviance  -194.9*** -57.0*** -59.4*** -49.5*** 
      
a
 n = 632. The dependent variable is Market-Managing Capability Formation/Use.  
(standard error) 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .10 
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Venture Resources  Market-Managing Capability Formation/Use (H3 and H4) 
Hypothesis 3 predicted that financial capital at IPO has a positive association 
with allocations to market-managing capability formation and use. That is, at higher 
levels of available financial capital, firms are expected to increasingly fund investments 
that develop and further utilize these organizational capabilities. In Hypothesis 4, I 
posited that human capital at IPO would have a negative association with the formation 
and use of market-managing capabilities. I expected to find a negative relationship, in 
part, because new ventures headed by TMTs with higher levels of human capital can 
handle complex business activity more effectively (Hambrick & Cannella, 2004) and 
also because these TMTs endow their firms with greater legitimacy (Higgins & Gulati, 
2006). Therefore, I predicted that top managers with superior human capital will be less 
likely to pursue investments in production and administrative structures. 
Results for both hypotheses are presented in Table 14. Again, I began the 
analysis by estimating a null model (e.g., unconditional means model) that contained no 
predictors at level-1 and level-2 to partition the variance in market-managing capability 
formation and use into between-firm/within industry and between industry components. 
Both variance components for the null model were statistically significant (not reported 
in the tables): the portion of variance between firms within industries (8.905) and the 
portion of variance between industries (24.350). More specifically, 27-percent of the 
variance in market-managing capability formation and use over the three-year period 
following an IPO was between firms within industries and 73-percent of the variance 
was between industries, suggesting the strong influence that industry membership has on 
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the formation/use of different organizational capabilities for firms that enable them to 
exploit existing product-market positions following an IPO. 
I entered the control variables in Model 2. As shown in Model 2, firm size (p < 
.001) and industry munificence (p < .05) were negatively related to market-managing 
capability formation and use, while industry dynamism (p < .05) had a positive 
association with market-managing capability formation and use. The likelihood ratio test 
indicates that the inclusion of the control variables resulted in a better model (∆ 
Deviance = -194.9; p < .001). I subsequently added financial capital at IPO and human 
capital at IPO to the equation to test Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4, respectively. As 
reported in Model 4, financial capital at IPO is found to be positively associated with 
market-managing capability formation and use (p < .01). Further, as expected, human 
capital at IPO is found to be negatively associated with the formation and use of this 
configuration of organizational capabilities (see Model 4; p < .001). These results 
support Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4. Moreover, the likelihood ratio test suggests that 
Model 3 (∆ Deviance = -57.0; p < .001) and Model 4 (∆ Deviance = -59.4; p < .001) 
indicate a better fit when comparing both deviance statistics.  
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TABLE 15 
RCM Regression Analysis of the Effect of  
Financial Capital and Human Capital on Market-Creating Capability Formation/Use a 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
Intercept 0.921 -3.382*** 0.557 8.7335*** 9.418*** 8.786*** 
 (0.918) (0.462) (2.172) (1.499) (1.580) (1.767) 
Age at IPO  0.027 0.026 0.048 0.062† 0.047 
  (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.045) 
Firm size (log sales)  0.735*** 0.890*** 0.875*** 0.927*** -0.026 
  (0.061) (0.103) (0.101) (0.105) (0.053) 
CEO duality  0.102 0.086 0.058 0.052 0.068 
  (0.115) (0.115) (0.112) (0.113) (0.126) 
TMT/director ownership  0.039† 0.038† 0.038† 0.038† 0.047† 
  (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.025) 
% inside directors  -0.573 -0.650† -0.796* -0.842* -0.937* 
  (0.416) (0.416) (0.406) (0.412) (0.474) 
Industry munificence  0.0022 0.0020 0.0088 0.0067 0.0184 
  (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.024) 
Industry dynamism  -0.0253 -0.0272 -0.0416 -0.0344 -0.0489 
  (0.069) (0.069) (0.067) (0.068) (0.075) 
Year 1 dummy  0.286 0.188 0.363 0.323 0.729* 
  (0.294) (0.298) (0.292) (0.296) (0.324) 
Year 2 dummy  0.363 0.232 0.302 0.276 0.655* 
  (0.264) (0.273) (0.266) (0.269) (0.302) 
Year 3 dummy  0.377 0.277 0.444† 0.503† 0.939* 
  (0.274) (0.279) (0.273) (0.275) (0.304) 
Year 4 dummy  0.118 0.055 0.149 0.158 0.415† 
  (0.225) (0.227) (0.222) (0.223) (0.243) 
       
a
 n = 632. The dependent variable is Market-Creating Capability Formation/Use. 
(standard error) 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .10 
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TABLE 15 (cont.)a 
 
 
Model 1 
(cont.) 
Model 2 
(cont.) 
Model 3 
(cont.) 
Model 4 
(cont.) 
Model 5 
(cont.) 
Model 6 
(cont.) 
       
Financial capital at IPO   -0.254* -10.043** -10.749*** -10.677*** 
   (0.137) (1.680) (1.763) (1.975) 
Financial capital at IPO squared    0.275*** 0.292*** 0.320*** 
    (0.047) (0.049) (0.055) 
Human capital at IPO     0.048** 0.068** 
     (0.023) (0.026) 
Financial capital squared X 
Dynamism 
     0.009 
      (0.061) 
Human capital X Dynamism      -0.110 
      (0.146) 
       
Deviance (-2ResLogLik) 2402.0 2277.2 2223.8 2180.5 2140.8 2136.2 
∆ Deviance  -124.8*** -53.4*** -43.3*** -39.7*** -2.2 
       
a
 n = 632. The dependent variable is Market-Creating Capability Formation/Use. 
(standard error) 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .10 
 
 
 198 
 
 
 
Venture Resources  Market-Creating Capability Formation/Use (H5 and H6) 
Table 15 provides results for Hypothesis 5 and Hypothesis 6. In Hypothesis 5, I 
posited that financial capital at IPO has a non-linear association with the formation and 
use of market-creating capabilities. A positive association was expected between low to 
moderate levels of available financial capital and the propensity to invest in these 
capabilities, in part, because such resources ease capital restrictions and act as 
inducements to experiment, take risks, and make strategic choices (Singh, 1986); 
however, research has found that increasingly greater levels of financial capital 
diminishes incentives to innovate (Nohria & Gulati, 1996). More specifically, the 
relationship between financial capital at IPO and the formation and use of market-
creating capabilities was expected to form an inverted U-shaped curve. 
Hypothesis 6 predicted that human capital at IPO has a positive association with 
the formation and use of market-creating capabilities. New ventures endowed with 
higher levels of human capital following an IPO are expected to be more effective at 
strategizing to develop new product-market positions, increasing the likelihood that 
profitable entrepreneurial opportunities will be discovered and thus positively 
influencing investments in this configuration of capabilities.  
The null model (see Model 1) partitions the variance in market-creating 
capability formation and use into between-firm/within industry and between industry 
components. Both variance components were statistically significant: the portion of 
variance between firms within industries (2.100) and the portion of variance between 
industries (2.509). More specifically, 46-percent of the variance in market-creating 
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capability formation and use over the three-year period following an IPO was between 
firms within industries and 54-percent of the variance was between industries. 
Results with control variables added to the equation are presented in Model 2. As 
indicated, firm size (p < .001) and TMT/director ownership percentage (p < .10) are 
positively associated with market-creating capability formation and use. The likelihood 
ratio test indicates that Model 2 with the control variables is a better model (∆ Deviance 
= -124.8; p < .001). Financial capital at IPO and financial capital at IPO squared was 
subsequently added to the equation to test Hypothesis 5. As reported in Model 4, 
financial capital at IPO is found to be negatively associated with market-creating 
capability formation and use (p < .01) while financial capital at IPO squared is positively 
associated with the formation and use of these organizational capabilities (p < .001). The 
likelihood ratio test suggests that Model 3 and Model 4, respectively, indicate both 
models are a better fit (p < .001 when comparing both deviance statistics). However, the 
shape of the non-linear relationship is inverted from the curvilinear form that was 
posited in Hypothesis 5 (i.e., inverted U-shaped). Specifically, financial capital at IPO 
was found to have a U-shaped association with allocations to market-creating 
formation/use following the IPO. Thus, Hypothesis 5 is not supported.  
I subsequently added human capital at IPO to the equation to test Hypothesis 6. 
As reported in Model 5, the association between human capital at IPO and allocations to 
market-creating capability formation and use is positive and statistically significant (p < 
.01). Thus, Hypothesis 6 is supported. 
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Moderating Effects of Industry Membership on Venture Resources  Capability 
Formation/Use Hypotheses (H7a – H8b) 
In the previous section, I reported results for the direct effects of venture 
resources at IPO on the two dimensions of capability formation and use (e.g., market-
managing capabilities and market-creating capabilities). The results of the tests for direct 
effects with market-managing capability formation/use as the dependent variable were 
reported in Table 14. Table 15 reports the results for the direct effect of venture 
resources on the formation and use of market-creating capabilities.  
This section reports the results of the interactions hypothesized in Chapter III. 
Results for Hypotheses 7a and 8a testing the effect of the interaction of financial capital 
at IPO and human capital at IPO, respectively, with environmental dynamism on market-
managing capability formation/use are reported in Model 5 of Table 14. I report the 
results for tests of the interaction of financial capital at IPO squared with environmental 
dynamism and human capital at IPO with environmental dynamism on the formation and 
use market-creating capabilities in Table 15, Model 6.  
To test the hypothesized interaction effect, I used the multiplicative product of 
the direct effects (Baron & Kenny, 1986). Because higher order terms (i.e., interaction 
terms) tend to be highly correlated with their lower order direct effects, making 
regression coefficients unstable and difficult to interpret (Cohen & Cohen, 1983), I 
centered the lower order variables prior to calculating higher order interactions (Aiken & 
West, 1991). Following Aiken and West, I then examined separately the direct effects 
from their higher order terms in each of the analyses. 
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Interaction of Industry Membership with Financial Capital at IPO on Capability 
Formation/Use (H7a and H7b) 
Hypothesis 7a predicted that environmental dynamism at IPO strengthens (e.g., 
positively moderates) the relationship between financial capital at IPO and market-
managing capability formation and use. By contrast, I posited that environmental 
dynamism at IPO weakens (e.g., negatively moderates) the non-linear relationship 
between financial capital at IPO squared and market-creating capability formation and 
use in Hypothesis 7b. Specifically, I expect that higher levels of environmental 
dynamism at IPO increase the propensity of new ventures to preserve financial resources 
for more certain, internally-directed investments, decreasing investments to market-
creating capability formation and use in favor of investments in the formation and use of 
market-managing capabilities. 
Results for Hypothesis 7a and Hypothesis 7b are presented in Table 14 (Model 5) 
and Table 15 (Model 6), respectively. Table 14 reports a statistically significant 
interaction between environmental dynamism and financial capital at IPO on market-
managing capability formation/use; however, in contrast to the positive interaction 
originally expected, I find a negative interaction between environmental dynamism and 
financial capital at IPO. Thus, Hypothesis 7a is not supported. Results in Table 15 report 
a statistically insignificant interaction between environmental dynamism and financial 
capital at IPO squared. Therefore, Hypothesis 7b is not supported.  
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Interaction of Industry Membership with Human Capital at IPO on Capability 
Formation/Use (H8a and H8b) 
In Hypothesis 8a, I predicted that environmental dynamism at IPO weakens (e.g., 
positively moderates) the negative relationship between human capital at IPO and 
market-managing capability formation and use. Hypothesis 8b posited that 
environmental dynamism at IPO attenuates (e.g., negatively moderates) the relationship 
between human capital at IPO and market-creating capability formation and use. Results 
for Hypothesis 8a and Hypothesis 8b are reported in Table 14 (Model 5) and Table 15 
(Model 6), respectively. As reported in Table 14, I find a positive interaction between 
environmental dynamism and human capital, suggesting that dynamism weakens the 
negative relationship between human capital at IPO and the formation and use of 
market-managing capabilities. Hypothesis 8a is supported. Table 15, which considers 
market-creating capability formation and use as the dependent variable, reports a 
statistically insignificant interaction between environmental dynamism and human 
capital at IPO. Thus, Hypothesis 8b is not supported. 
Venture Resources Capability Formation/Use, and New Venture Performance: 
Mediation Hypotheses (H9a – H10b) 
In this section, I report the results of the mediation hypotheses described in 
Chapter III. Specifically, I hypothesized that the two dimensions of capability formation 
and use (e.g., market-managing capabilities and market-creating capabilities) partially 
mediate the relationship between the two venture resource types at IPO (e.g., financial 
capital at IPO and human capital at IPO). Hypothesis 9a and Hypothesis 9b predicted 
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that allocations to market-managing capability formation/use would partially mediate the 
influence of financial capital at IPO and human capital at IPO, respectively, on IPO-
stage new venture performance. I posited that the formation/use of market-creating 
capabilities would partially mediate the influence of financial capital at IPO and human 
capital at IPO on IPO-stage new venture performance (e.g., shareholder return) in 
Hypothesis 10a and Hypothesis 10b, respectively.  
As indicated previously, I used the formula derived from Sobel’s (1982), which 
is based on the product of coefficients in a path model, and extended to test for 
simultaneous mediation by multiple mediators in order to check for the indirect effects 
of capability formation and use. The coefficients used to test the underlying mediation 
are calculated based on the four steps recommended by Baron and Kenny (1986). Table 
16 reports the results of the analyses completed in each step. In step 1, I first regressed 
three-year shareholder returns (the DV) on the controls (see Model 1). Next, I regressed 
new venture performance on controls plus the direct effects, financial capital at IPO and 
human capital at IPO, in the absence of the two configurations of organizational 
capabilities. The results are reported in Model 2. Step 2 examines the relationship 
between financial capital at IPO and human capital at IPO and the two dimensions of 
capability formation and use. Model 3 and Model 4 report the results of the equations 
involving market-managing capability formation/use and market-creating capability 
formation/use, respectively, as the dependent variable.  
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TABLE 16 
RCM Regression Analysis of the Multiple Mediation Effects of Market-Managing and  
Market-Creating Capability Formation/Use on the Relationship between Financial Capital and Shareholder Returna 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Dependent Variable: Three-year 
shareholder 
return 
Three-year 
shareholder 
return 
Market-
managing 
formation/use 
Market- 
creating 
formation/use 
Three-year 
shareholder 
return 
Three-year 
shareholder 
return 
       
Intercept -0.377* 6.408* -5.683 1.075 1.126* 5.569* 
 (0.343) (2.644) (3.845) (0.783) (0.549) (2.617) 
Age at IPO 0.043 0.043 -0.020 0.038 0.038 0.038 
 (0.049) (0.045) (0.081) (0.038) (0.045) (0.045) 
Firm size (log sales) 0.011 0.147 -1.873*** 0.916*** -0.265*** -0.079 
 (0.054) (0.124) (0.229) (0.108) (0.080) (0.134) 
CEO duality -0.079 -0.091 -0.234 0.075 -0.095 -0.108 
 (0.141) (0.138) (0.245) (0.116) (0.136) (0.136) 
TMT/director ownership -0.091** -0.093** -0.014 0.038† -0.098*** -0.098*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.049) (0.024) (0.029) (0.028) 
% inside directors -0.200 -0.623 -0.898 -0.706† -0.571 -0.646 
 (0.503) (0.489) (0.894) (0.423) (0.481) (0.482) 
Industry munificence 0.025 0.030 -0.100* -0.002 0.026 0.025 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.048) (0.022) (0.024) (0.025) 
Industry dynamism -0.144† -0.200** 0.373* -0.016 -0.100† -0.100† 
 (0.082) (0.081) (0.151) (0.070) (0.080) (0.080) 
Year 1 dummy 0.896** 0.646* -1.441** 0.154 0.656 0.540† 
 (0.324) (0.331) (0.503) (0.303) (0.322) (0.328) 
Year 2 dummy 0.794** 0.558† -1.922*** 0.221 0.569† 0.427 
 (0.302) (0.311) (0.460) (0.276) (0.298) (0.309) 
Year 3 dummy 0.680* 0.394 -0.926† 0.334 0.378 0.273 
 (0.317) (0.321) (0.489) (0.281) (0.312) (0.318) 
Year 4 dummy -0.463† -0.654* 0.221 0.077 -0.594* -0.662** 
 (0.264) (0.265) (0.397) (0.229) (0.259) (0.261) 
       
a
 n = 632. The dependent variable in Models 1, 2, 5, and 6 is 3-Year Shareholder Returns. The dependent variable in Model 3  
is Market-Managing Capability Formation/Use. The dependent variable in Model 4 is Market-Creating Capability Formation/Use. (standard error) 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .10 
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TABLE 16 (cont.)a 
 
 
Model 1 
(cont.) 
Model 2 
(cont.) 
Model 3 
(cont.) 
Model 4 
(cont.) 
Model 5 
(cont.) 
Model 6 
(cont.) 
Dependent Variable: Three-year 
shareholder 
return 
Three-year 
shareholder 
return 
Market-
managing 
formation/use 
Market- 
creating 
formation/use 
Three-year 
shareholder 
return 
Three-year 
shareholder 
return 
       
Market-managing capability 
formation/use 
    -0.071*** -0.067** 
     (0.022) (0.022) 
Market-creating capability 
formation/use 
    0.170** 0.107* 
     (0.055) (0.054) 
Financial capital at IPO  -0.400** 0.850** -0.291*  -0.289† 
  (0.167) (0.306) (0.144)  (0.167) 
Human capital at IPO  -0.041† -0.120** 0.057**  -0.044† 
  (0.028) (0.051) (0.024)  (0.028) 
       
a
 n = 632. The dependent variable in Models 1, 2, 5, and 6 is 3-Year Shareholder Returns. The dependent variable in Model 3 is Market-Managing Capability 
Formation/Use. The dependent variable in Model 4 is Market-Creating Capability Formation/Use. (standard error) 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .10 
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Step 3 establishes the relationship between the two configurations of 
organizational capabilities and new venture performance, in the absence of the two 
venture resource types (financial capital and human capital), and the results are reported 
in Model 5. Finally, market-managing capability formation/use and market-creating 
capability formation/use are added to the equation in step 4 to test for the indirect 
effects.  
As shown in Model 6 of Table 16, with the two dimensions of organizational 
capabilities added to the equation, a reduction in the effect size of financial capital at 
IPO (b = -.400, p < .01 to b = -.289, p < .10) was observed. This result suggests that the 
influence of financial capital at IPO on new venture performance may be partially 
mediated by one or both of the two dimensions of capability formation and use. 
However, when the two indirect effects were added to the model, the coefficient for 
human capital at IPO only did not change substantially (b = -.041, p < .10 to b = -.044, p 
< .10), which suggests the indirect effects may not be as salient for the influence of 
human capital at IPO on performance.   
Tests of the indirect effects using the product of coefficients formula testing the 
indirect effect of financial capital at IPO on three-year shareholder returns is reported in 
Table 17. Table 18 reports the results of the formula testing the indirect effect of human 
capital at IPO on three-year shareholder returns. Figure 5 illustrates the results of the 
tests of multiple mediation that were hypothesized in this study. For financial capital at 
IPO, the specific indirect effects are a1b1 = .080 (z = 2.162; p < .05; CI.95 : {.017, .165}) 
through market-managing capability formation/use and a2b2 = .029 (z = 1.320; p = .187; 
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TABLE 17 
Product of Coefficients Test for Indirect Effects of  
Financial Capital on Shareholder Return  
 
 Product of Coefficients Percentile 95% CI 
 Estimate SE Z Lower Upper 
      
Specific indirect effects      
      
Market-managing capability 
formation/use 
0.080 0.037 2.162 0.017 0.165 
      
Market-creating capability 
formation/use 
0.029 0.0220 1.320 -0.088 0.010 
      
Total indirect effecta 0.108 0.045 2.400 0.035 0.212 
      
a
 Measure of the significance of the total (combined) indirect effect of financial capital at IPO on three-year shareholder 
return through both dimensions of capability formation and use. 
 
 
 
TABLE 18 
Product of Coefficients Test for Indirect Effects of  
Human Capital on Shareholder Return  
 
 Product of Coefficients Percentile 95% CI 
 Estimate SE Z Lower Upper 
      
Specific indirect effects      
      
Market-managing capability 
formation/use 
0.096 0.049 1.960 0.014 0.021 
      
Market-creating capability 
formation/use 
0.025 0.023 1.090 -0.010 0.881 
      
Total indirect effecta 0.120 0.054 2.222 0.028 0.240 
      
a
 Measure of the significance of the total (combined) indirect effect of human capital at IPO on three-year shareholder 
return through both dimensions of capability formation and use. 
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FIGURE 5 
Summary of Multiple Mediation Results20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20
 Coefficients in bold for the direct paths between X1  Y and X2  Y represent path c’ and are taken from Model 6 from Table 16 that includes the two 
mediators. 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; † p < .10 
Human Capital
at IPO
X2
3-year Shareholder 
Return
Y
-.120**
-.067**
-.041† /-.044†
Market-managing
Capability 
Formation/Use
M1
Market-creating
Capability 
Formation/Use
M2
.057**
Financial Capital 
at IPO
X1
-.400***/-.289†
.850**
-.291*
.107*
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CI
.95 : {-.088, .010}) through market-creating capability. For human capital at IPO, the 
specific indirect effects are a1b1 = .096 (z = 1.960; p < .05; CI.95 : {.014, .021}) through 
market-managing capability formation/use and a2b2 = .025 (z = 1.090; p = .276; CI.95 : {-
.010, .881}) through market-creating capability. Tests of specific indirect effects indicate 
that market-managing capability formation and use accounts for variance in the 
relationship between venture resources at IPO and the post-IPO performance of new 
ventures. Thus, Hypothesis 9a and Hypothesis 9b are supported. By contrast, the indirect 
effects of formation and use of market-creating capabilities were not statistically 
significant; therefore, Hypothesis 10a and Hypothesis 10b are not supported.  
Summary 
This chapter provided the results of the analyses conducted to test the ten 
hypotheses proposed in Chapter III. First, I reported the tests of the validity of measures 
for the two dimensions of capability formation and use, including descriptive statistics 
for the items and examination of the rotated factor patterns. Second, I described the 
sample, summarizing the descriptive statistics and correlation statistics associated with 
the variables of interest to this study. Finally, I reported the results of the statistical 
procedures used to test each hypothesis. Table 19 summarizes the results of the 
hypothesis tests. These results are described further in the Chapter VI. 
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TABLE 19 
Summary of Results 
 Hypothesis 
Table  
Cross-ref 
Supported 
(Y/N) Comments 
     
H1 Financial capital at IPO has a non-linear association (inverted U-shaped) 
with IPO-stage new venture performance. 
Table 13-
Model 5 
Supported  
H2 Human capital at IPO is positively associated with IPO-stage new 
venture performance. 
Table 13-
Model 5 
Supported  
H3 Financial capital at IPO is positively associated with allocations to 
market-managing capability formation/use. 
Table 14-
Model 4 
Supported  
H4 Human capital at IPO is negatively associated with allocations to 
market-managing capability formation/use. 
Table 14-
Model 4 
Supported  
H5 Financial capital at IPO has a non-linear association (inverted U-shaped) 
with allocations to market-creating capability formation/use. 
Table 15-
Model 5 
Not 
supported 
Relationship is U-shaped and 
statistically significant. 
H6 Human capital at IPO is positively associated with allocations to market-
creating capability formation/use. 
Table 15-
Model 5 
Supported  
H7a Dynamism at IPO positively moderates the relationship between 
financial capital at IPO and allocations to market-managing capability 
formation/use. 
Table 14-
Model 5 
Not 
supported 
Relationship is negative and 
statistically significant. 
H7b Non-linear association (inverted U-shaped) between financial capital at 
IPO and allocations to market-creating capability formation/use will be 
negatively moderated by dynamism at IPO. 
Table 15-
Model 6 
Not 
supported 
 
H8a Dynamism at IPO positively moderates the relationship between human 
capital at IPO and allocations to market-managing capability 
formation/use. 
Table 14-
Model 5 
Supported  
H8b Dynamism at IPO negatively moderates the relationship between human 
capital at IPO and allocations to market-creating capability 
formation/use. 
Table 15-
Model 6 
Not 
supported 
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TABLE 19 (cont.) 
 Hypothesis 
Table  
Cross-ref 
Supported 
(Y/N) Comments 
     
H9a Allocations to market-managing capability formation/use partially 
mediate the influence of financial capital at IPO on IPO-stage new 
venture performance. 
Table 16 and 
Table 17 
Supported  
H9b Allocations to market-managing capability formation/use partially 
mediate the influence of human capital at IPO on IPO-stage new venture 
performance. 
Table 16 and 
Table 18 
Supported  
H10a Allocations to market-creating capability formation/use partially 
mediate the influence of financial capital at IPO on IPO-stage new 
venture performance. 
Table 16 and 
Table 17 
Not 
supported 
z = 1.320; p = .187; however, the 
total indirect effect of venture 
resources on performance 
through the two dimensions of 
capability formation/use is 
statistically significant (p < .01). 
H10b Allocations to market-creating capability formation/use partially 
mediate the influence of human capital at IPO on IPO-stage new venture 
performance. 
Table 16 and 
Table 18 
Not 
Supported 
z = 1.090; p = .276; however, the 
total indirect effect of venture 
resources on performance 
through the two dimensions of 
capability formation/use is 
statistically significant (p < .01). 
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CHAPTER VI 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter presents the dissertation’s conclusion. It begins with a brief 
overview of the study’s theory and methodology, which is followed by an analysis of its 
results and a discussion of the study’s overall contributions to the literature. The chapter 
closes with discussions of the study’s implications, limitations and future research, and 
conclusions.  
Overview 
This dissertation brings capabilities to the foreground in the examination of value 
creation and new venture performance. The purpose of this study is to introduce the 
formation and use of capability configurations by ventures following an initial public 
offering (IPO) and the environmental context to predict performance outcomes 
associated with venture resources at IPO. Specifically, this study examines indirect 
(through capability formation/use) effects that occur within the ‘black box’ between 
resources and performance following an IPO. The role of human capital is considered, 
bringing agency into theory explaining capability formation and use. While previous 
work has attempted to operationalize and measure firm-specific capabilities (e.g., Dutta 
et al., 2005) and examine the performance effects of strategies that acquire and use 
different resource stocks (e.g., Morrow et al., 2007), this study is one of the first to link 
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firm resources, organizational capabilities, and routines with performance outcomes and 
empirically test the indirect effect of resources on performance through the formation 
and use of different configurations organizational capabilities. Further, I extend theory in 
an entrepreneurial context to explain how underlying routines allow resources to be 
managed for greater value across different industries—environmental conditions that 
make resources valuable in some contexts and not in others. 
In the study reported, I proposed and tested a multiple mediation model in which 
venture resource endowments and environmental conditions at IPO are first used to 
predict the formation and use of different configurations of organizational capabilities by 
young, entrepreneurial firms following an IPO. In particular, I offered new theory to 
explain the formation and use of two configuration types: market-managing capabilities 
and market-creating capabilities. Subsequently, I incorporated the configuration of these 
different organizational capabilities into a theoretical model testing the indirect effects of 
resources on new venture performance through capability formation and use. Relying on 
a sample of U.S. ventures undertaking an IPO in the U.S. between 1996 and 2000, I used 
random coefficients modeling to test the relationships hypothesized in the model.  
The results presented in Chapter V provide general support for the conceptual 
model (Figure 1) first presented in Chapter I and further developed in Chapter III (see 
Figure 2). In most respects, the results show that the performance outcomes of different 
resource endowments vary with respect to how those resources are allocated in the 
formation and use of different organizational capabilities. The results lend support to the 
central proposition of the dissertation that the formation and use of different capability 
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configurations is a central component in explaining performance outcomes derived from 
different resource endowments and must be more explicitly incorporated into our theory. 
Analysis of Results 
Although various theories have been offered to account for differences in 
performance outcomes for entrepreneurial firms (e.g., Agarwal et al., 2002; Baum et al., 
2001; Boone et al., 2002; Katz & Shepherd, 2003; Stuart et al., 1999), strategic 
management and entrepreneurship research has lacked a theory to explain the 
performance implications of resource use. Recently, some scholars have applied 
resource-based perspectives to sharpen the focus on new ventures’ relative advantages 
(e.g., Baker & Nelson, 2005; Katila & Shane, 2005). In this study, I built on the 
resource-based view of the firm and drew insights from evolutionary theory (e.g., Nelson 
& Winter, 1982) and dynamic capabilities literature (e.g. Teece et al., 1997) to propose 
such a theory. Overall, the results of the empirical analyses lend support for most of the 
study’s hypotheses. In particular, the combination of these results and the underlying 
theoretical logic lends partial support for the indirect effect of capability formation and 
use account on the relationship between venture resources at IPO and the market 
performance of new ventures following an IPO. Results of the hypothesis tests 
summarized in Table 19 are described further in the pages that follow. 
Review of Venture Resources  New Venture Performance Results 
The first two hypotheses addressed the performance effects of resources 
controlled by new ventures at IPO and these hypotheses helped address the study’s first 
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research question: To what extent do resource endowments (e.g., financial capital and 
human capital) controlled by a new venture explain its performance following an IPO?  
Overall, I find that venture resource endowments at IPO have a direct and 
meaningful effect on new venture performance. First, findings indicate that financial 
capital at IPO has a non-linear (inverted U-shaped) relationship with shareholder returns 
over the three years following a new venture’s entry into the public arena (supporting 
Hypothesis 1). Specifically, lower to moderate levels of available financial capital have a 
positive influence over the shareholder returns of these firms following an IPO. 
However, with increasingly higher levels of available financial resources, the 
relationship turns negative. This suggests that there may be an optimum level of 
financing that a new venture should consider when evaluating the total financial 
proceeds to raise during its IPO. Second, I found that human capital at IPO is positively 
associated with IPO-stage new venture performance. During the post-IPO period, when 
market uncertainties and external demands add complexities, new ventures that are 
endowed with superior human capital appear to adapt more quickly to the rigors of the 
public arena and thus gain a sustainable performance advantage that translates to 
increased shareholder value over time.  
Review of Venture Resources  Capability Formation/Use Results 
The next six hypotheses (Hypothesis 3 – Hypothesis 8b) address the influence of 
different resource endowments and industry membership on the formation and use of 
different capability configurations by new ventures following an IPO. These hypotheses 
help answer the study’s second research question: To what extent do venture resources 
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and environmental conditions at IPO account for the formation and use of market-
managing and market-creating capabilities?  
The results show that venture resource endowments at IPO have a direct and 
meaningful influence on the formation and use of different organizational capabilities 
among new ventures following the IPO. As expected, I find that financial capital at IPO 
to be positively associated with the formation and use of market-creating capabilities 
(Hypothesis 3). This finding confirms previous research in the field of finance 
examining the allocation and use of financial proceeds following an IPO (e.g., Jain & 
Kini, 1994; Modigliani & Miller, 1963; Pagano et al., 1998). Further, these results are 
consistent with the view that new ventures are more likely to allocate financial resources 
to strengthen administrative capabilities following an IPO, in part, because new ventures 
face a ‘liability of market newness’ and also because these firms may require additional 
competencies (i.e., financial reporting, investor relations, etc.) in order to cope with the 
demands of public trading (Certo, 2003).  
However, in contrast to the inverted U-shaped relationship posited in Hypothesis 
5, I find that financial capital has a U-shaped association with the formation and use of 
market-creating capabilities. This result suggests that firms may initially focus attention 
on short-term returns and thus pursue investments that enable them to exploit existing 
product-market positions, rather than pursue early investments in new ones. This is 
consistent with the view that firms often tradeoff investments in exploitation and 
exploration to balance demands on the firm (Gupta, Smith, & Shalley, 2006). Further, 
the formation and use of market-creating capabilities entails exploration, firm behaviors 
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that are characterized by search, discovery, experimentation, risk-taking and innovation 
(March, 1991). These are highly complex tasks and are subject to time compression 
economies (Dierickx & Cool, 1989) that constrain learning and absorption rates and thus 
affect the pace with which new ventures can enter new and potentially diverse product-
market segments (Vermeulen & Barkema, 2002). Studies have shown that such 
capabilities require substantially different knowledge, organizational structures, 
strategies, and cultures to pursue (e.g., He & Wong, 2004).  
Increasingly, scholars have noted the tension between exploitation and 
exploration (e.g., Benner & Tushman, 2003; Burgelman, 2002; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 
2004). It is possible that new ventures recognize these complexities and opt to exploit 
existing positions before pursuing new ones. This study approaches the question of 
organizational decisions associated with the tradeoff between allocations to the 
formation and use of market-managing capabilities and those allocations to market-
creating capability formation and use as mutually exclusive decisions. However, it may 
be that the impact of the two decision outcomes on organizational capabilities and 
performance depend on whether the two concepts are viewed as mutually antithetical or 
complementary. When considering the interplay in organizational behavior between 
exploration and exploitation, Gupta and his colleagues observed:  
Theories about the ease or difficulty with which an organization can pursue both 
exploration and exploitation depend crucially on whether these two tasks are 
treated as competing or complementary aspects of organizational decisions and 
actions (Gupta et al., 2006: 693). 
 218 
 
 
 
I also find that human capital at IPO is associated with allocations to capability 
formation and use following an IPO. Specifically, results indicate that human capital at 
IPO is negatively associated with market-managing capability formation and use 
(Hypothesis 4) and positively associated with the formation and use of market-creating 
capabilities (Hypothesis 6). These results suggest that firms with superior human capital 
may be more effective at leveraging capabilities that exploit existing product-market 
positions to create value. Previous research, for example, has shown that highly educated 
managers show a greater capacity for integrative complexity that occurs when the 
structural complexity within organizations increases (e.g., Baum et al., 2001). The 
findings in this study support this view.  
Further, superior human capital has also been linked with development and use 
of “dynamic” capabilities (Florin et al., 2003). In other words, ventures with higher 
levels of human capital are not only more likely to discover profitable entrepreneurial 
opportunities, but also produce more innovative ways to realize the potential value from 
these new positions (Bantel & Jackson, 1989). These findings appear to support this 
view as well. It may also be that ventures with top managers possessing superior human 
capital have greater legitimacy with stakeholders (i.e., the investor community) (Certo, 
2003; Higgins & Gulati, 2003, 2006) and may therefore be less compelled to allocate 
scarce resources to the formation and use of the administrative capabilities described 
previously.  
Results also provide partial support for the view that industry membership affects 
the allocation choices made by new ventures following an IPO. Specifically, this study 
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finds that environmental dynamism weakens the influence of venture resources at IPO 
and the formation and use of different capability configurations. Although Hypothesis 7a 
is not supported, I find, in contrast to the positive association posited in Hypothesis 7a, 
that dynamism negatively moderates the relationship between available financial 
resources at IPO and market-managing capability formation/use. This contrasts with 
Chattopadhyay et al’s (2001) findings that firms facing uncertain competitive conditions 
tend to direct investments to internal activities. In contrast to the findings by these 
scholars, young, entrepreneurial firms facing uncertain conditions in the public market 
such as those found in highly dynamic environments appear more likely to conserve 
scarce resources rather than increase investments in this area.  
Consistent with Hypothesis 8a, I also find that dynamism weakens (positively 
moderates) the negative relationship between human capital at IPO and market-
managing capability formation and use. Whereas in stable conditions, firms with 
superior human capital are likely to reduce investments in capabilities aimed at 
exploiting existing positions, these same management teams are more likely to fortify 
investments in this area, possibly to buffer the firm against perceived threats from future 
uncertain conditions (Agarwal et al., 2002). However, I find no signification interaction 
between dynamism and either financial capital at IPO (Hypothesis 7b) or human capital 
at IPO (Hypothesis 8b) on market-creating capability formation and use.  
Previous research indicates that founding conditions play an important role in 
shaping the behavior and growth of young, entrepreneurial firms (Carroll & Delacroix, 
1982; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990). In particular, Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 
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found that ventures founded in growth markets with plentiful environmental resources 
were more likely to experience sales growth than firms founded in emergent or mature 
markets. One possible explanation for the mixed findings of this study is that the 
influence of environmental resource variability is more salient for investments affecting 
the formation and use of organizational capabilities to manage existing product-market 
positions.  
Another possible explanation is found in the way in which market-creating 
capability formation and use is operationalized. Specifically, the measurement of total 
acquisition investments that I include in the composite measure does not distinguish 
between the different forms of payment. More specifically, I include those transactions 
that use all stock, all cash, or a combination of stock and cash and that meet the 
conditions described previously in Chapter IV. As previously noted, IPOs create ‘public 
shares’ that may be used as currency in acquiring other firms in stock deals. It is possible 
that factors weighed in the discretionary choice about acquisitions involving stock or a 
combination of stock and cash differ substantially from those involving cash. Research 
in financing examining merger waves lends some support to this assertion. In particular, 
researchers examining merger waves have found a meaningful relationship between 
market and industry valuations and acquisition activity—specifically, firms within 
industries experiencing abnormally high market valuations are more likely to pursue 
acquisitions using equity rather than cash (e.g., Harford, 2005; Rhodes-Kropf & 
Viswanathan, 2004). 
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Review of the Indirect Effect of Venture Resources on New Venture Performance 
The final two hypotheses (Hypothesis 9a – Hypothesis 10b) address an important 
assertion of this study—indirect effects (through capability formation and use) account 
importantly for the value creation potential of venture resource endowments following 
an IPO. These hypotheses help answer the study’s third and final research question: To 
what extent is the configuration of organizational capabilities likely to influence 
performance among new ventures? And importantly, does capability formation and use 
partially mediate the relationship between venture resources at IPO and performance?  
These results provide partial support for the assertion that neither resources nor 
capabilities alone explain firm performance, but instead, how firms allocate scarce 
resources in the formation and use of different capability configurations account in part 
for the value created by firms following an IPO. More specifically, financial and human 
resources in combination with the formation of use of organizational capabilities can 
enhance firm performance. In this study, I modeled capability formation and use as a 
mediating variable. The results find the indirect effect of financial capital at IPO 
(Hypothesis 9a) and human capital at IPO (Hypothesis 9a) on firm performance (e.g., 
three-year shareholder return) through market-managing capability formation and use to 
be statistically significant, while the indirect effect of the two resource types (Hypothesis 
9b for financial capital at IPO; Hypothesis 10b for human capital) on performance 
through the formation and use of market-creating capabilities to be non-significant. 
While tests of the specific (individual) indirect effects (of each path) for the two resource 
types through the two dimensions of capability formation and use yield mixed results, 
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importantly, tests of the total (combined) indirect effects (e.g., c – c′) for financial capital 
at IPO and human capital at IPO, respectively, through the two dimensions of capability 
formation and use were statistically significant (see Table 17 and Table 18). These 
results support the assertion that capability formation and use partially mediate the 
relationship between venture resources at IPO and IPO-stage new venture performance. 
Because the direct effect of financial capital at IPO and human capital at IPO on 
three-year shareholder return exists as well as the indirect relationship that includes the 
capability formation and use, one can conclude that resource characteristics (the so-
called VRIN attributes; Barney, 1991) alone do not fully account for the value realized 
by new ventures from the resource endowments that they control. More specifically, I 
find that how those resources are used figure importantly in value creation for the firm. 
These findings are supportive of Penrose’s (1959) distinction between resources and 
services, in which she describes resources as cash, physical objects, and people and 
services as “the contributions those resources can make to the productive operations of 
the firm” (Penrose 1959: 86) or what organizational scholars more recently characterize 
in the literature as capabilities (Sirmon et al., 2007; Winter, 2003). In particular, 
Penrose’s distinction between resources and services implies that each firm is unique in 
its idiosyncratic relation to its resource environment: “Not only can the personnel of a 
firm render a heterogeneous variety of unique services, but also the material resources of 
the firm can be used in different ways” (Penrose, 1959: 75; also see Mishina et al., 
2004). In other words, two firms controlling the same comparable resource endowments 
and facing similar competitive conditions can attain different performance outcomes 
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driven by human agency associated with the decisions that firms make about the 
allocation and use of their resource endowments.  
In sum, the results of this study find that resource use does in fact matter. More 
specifically, different ventures can and do ‘discover’ and/or draw out different 
capabilities and configurations of capabilities from similar objective resource 
endowments. While one cannot reject the objective value creation potential of resources 
from the findings in this study, we should consider the value realized from the resource 
environment as idiosyncratic to the uses firms make of it. Whereas work from the 
resource-based view emphasizes attributes of resource endowments (Barney, 1991) and 
the centrality of unique resource combinations (Baker & Nelson, 2005; Garud & Karnoe, 
2003), this study is one of the first to substantiate the tradeoff in resource use that occurs 
during the formation and use of different configurations of organizational capabilities. 
This finding appears to support Sirmon and his colleagues who asserted that, “To realize 
value creation, resources must be accumulated, combined and exploited” (Sirmon et al., 
2007: 273). Further, this study finds that managerial discretion and choice (agency) 
accounts importantly for the potential value realized from different endowments of firm 
resources and resource combinations. Taken together, this extended view of the 
resource-based view provides a promising basis for understanding how firms might 
realize value by synchronizing the processes by which resources are managed by the 
firm. 
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Contributions to the Literature 
The focus of this study is on the particular dimensions of capability formation 
and use that account for the firm’s ability to pursue and extend its characteristic 
“productive” actions—specifically, the exploitation of existing product-market positions 
and the creation of new ones. I find that performance outcomes are a function not simply 
of the characteristics of resource themselves, but of the way those resources are 
intentionally put to productive use (Morrow et al., 2007; Sirmon et al., 2007). Because a 
firm’s capability is defined by its ability to deploy resources (Dutta et al., 2005; Winter, 
2000), results in this study suggest that the greater the functional capabilities a firm 
possesses, the more effectively it should be at leveraging its resources to create value. 
These results are supportive of previous work by Dosi and his colleagues, who noted:  
To be capable of some things is to have a generally reliable capacity to bring that 
thing about as a result of intended action. Capabilities fill the gap between 
intention and outcome, and fill it in such a way that the outcome bears a definite 
resemblance to what was intended (Dosi et al., 2002: 2). 
This study addressed three questions: 1) To what extent do resource endowments 
controlled by a new venture explain its performance following an IPO? 2) Do different 
resource endowments affect the formation and use of organizational capabilities by new 
ventures and to what extent are these effects contingent on industry membership? 3) 
Does capability formation and use partially mediate the relationship between venture 
resources at IPO and firm performance among these firms?  
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By addressing these questions, this study makes three important contributions. 
First, it proposes, validates, and operationalizes two new constructs representing how 
firms configure capabilities to create value. In doing so, the study builds new theory that 
extends the RBV to explain the indirect influence of resources on performance through 
capability formation and use. These constructs increase the theory’s predictive validity 
and enhance our understanding of the performance efficacy of resources.  
Second, in examining relationships across different industry contexts, this study 
provides a contingent view of the elusive link between resources controlled by a firm 
and its performance that to-date has been unexplored. Thus, it extends research 
examining the influence of industry membership on the value of resources (e.g., Agarwal 
et al., 2002; Bamford et al., 2000; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990), answering calls to 
further integrate contingency theory logic into our understanding of the RBV (Aragon-
Correa & Sharma, 2003; Sirmon et al., 2007). Further, by employing a multilevel 
framework to examine cross-level relationships, this study contributes to the growing 
literature examining the relative importance of firm- and industry-level factors on firm 
performance (e.g., Hawawani et al., 2003; Hough, 2006; Misangyi, Elms, Greckhamer, 
& Lepine, 2006).  
Finally, this study advances our understanding of firms recently completing the 
transition to the public arena. Specifically, it contributes to a growing body of research 
on IPO-stage firms, especially theoretical and empirical research examining conditions 
that affect performance following an IPO. Because capabilities form the basis for the 
ability of firms to perform crucial activities, resource constraints facing young, 
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entrepreneurial firms following an IPO can limit the range of capabilities available to 
these firms.  
Implications 
Empirical tests of resource-based logic have proven challenging due to the 
methodological difficulties associated with developing measures for variables of interest, 
especially measures for resource value (Godfrey & Hill, 1995). Although the link 
between resources and performance has frustrated scholars for decades, the RBV 
continues to receive widespread attention and skepticism. The integrative, 
multidisciplinary theoretical framework developed in this dissertation establishes new 
theoretical views about the relationship between resources, capabilities, industry context, 
and performance (see Table 3) and thus has substantive implications for strategy and 
entrepreneurship and for management practice. First, this study suggests that allocation 
decisions figure importantly in the performance success or failure of new ventures 
following an IPO. Indeed, resource allocation within firms is important to understanding 
how firms make productive use of their resources through the choices they make (Bower 
& Gilbert, 2006; Porter, 1980). Further, environmental conditions prevalent in different 
industry settings not only influence the allocation decisions that determine the formation 
and use of different organizational capabilities, but also affect the value that may be 
realized from these combinations.  
Second, the results of this study suggest an interplay between capabilities aimed 
at exploiting firms’ existing product-market positions and those capabilities that enable 
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firms to build new ones. This interplay has important performance implications. Some 
researchers, for example, have argued that firms need to balance conflicting needs for 
exploration and exploitation (Levinthal & March, 1993; Gupta et al., 2006; Lavie & 
Rosenkopf, 2006). Several arguments can be made for the potential incompatibility of 
development and use of the two different configurations. First, the processes behind the 
configuration of these two organizational capability types compete for scarce resources. 
Thus, by definition, resources devoted to market-managing capabilities for the 
exploitation of existing positions imply fewer resources for development of new ones 
through market-creating capabilities, and vice-versa.  
Further, these results suggest the mindset and organizational knowledge needed 
for exploitation differ radically from those needed for exploration (March, 1991), 
potentially making the simultaneous pursuit of investments in capability configurations 
that enable both all but impossible. These findings are consistent with March’s (1991, 
1996, 2006) argument that, notwithstanding the adaptation benefits of exploitation and 
exploration, which mirror the two capability configuration types examined in this study, 
the interplay between the two occurs in the form of a zero-sum game where allocations 
to market-managing capabilities compete with allocations to market-creating capabilities 
compete for resources and management attention. Accordingly, logic dictates and these 
results suggest that decisions about resource use among the two should consider the 
needs of the firm.  
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Limitations and Future Research 
As with most studies, this study has several limitations worth noting. First, the 
primary indicators used to develop composite measures of market-managing capability 
formation/use and market-creating capability formation/use were based on secondary 
data which does not allow for direct measurement of the efficiency of allocations to each 
capability configuration type. Instead, these measure represent the outcomes of specific 
actions believed to proxy the formation/use of the different capability configurations. 
Further, although the indicators selected were meant to capture allocations to the 
formation and use of the two configuration types, it is likely that measures of other 
indicators should also be considered. For example, Brau and his colleagues (Brau et al., 
2003) argued that IPOs create ‘public shares’ that can be used as currency in transactions 
with other firms (i.e., acquisitions, equity alliances, joint ventures, etc.). While the 
measure of market-creating capability formation/use considered the total value of 
acquisition investments, it does not incorporate measures of equity used in the formation 
of different strategic alliances that might be used by a venture to enter a new product or 
geographic market. Further, the computation of available financial capital at IPO, in 
effect, only considered cash, cash equivalents, and other current assets and did not 
include measures of shareholder equity (e.g., common shares) approved but not issued 
by the firm, which might have otherwise captured the currency-like attribute of equity as 
a financial resource in this study.  
Future research could address these shortcomings by examining the individual 
effects of different components of market-managing and market-creating capabilities 
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instead of aggregating measures into a single “configuration.” Although some previous 
research has examined the performance expectations of investors given different 
resource strategies (e.g., Morrow et al., 2007), research may be informed, for example, 
by examining the differential performance effects of capital expenditures related to the 
establishment of Greenfield operations in new geographic markets versus the 
acquisitions and/or equity-based alliances for different given resource endowments and 
environmental conditions at IPO.  
Second, the construction of the sample did not allow for examining whether and 
how the hypothesized relationships evolved over time. Specifically, the sample was 
constructed as a pooled/cross-sectional dataset that lagged the measure of shareholder 
returns three years to capture the performance effects of venture resource at IPO and the 
intermediate allocation decisions that represented the formation and use of the market-
managing and market-creating capability configurations. Future research might employ 
growth modeling techniques to examine the indirect effect (or not) of changes to 
different organizational capabilities on the relationship between different venture 
resource endowments and firm performance over time. For example, emphasis on the 
exploitation of existing positions and thus continued investments in market-managing 
capabilities often derive from inertia, which is evident “when the speed of reorganization 
is lower than the rate at which environmental conditions change” (Hannan & Freeman, 
1984: 151). In other words, path dependence intensifies as established routines become 
further embedded in the decision-making processes and organizational structures and are 
applied almost automatically (Nelson & Winter, 1982), whereby “a firm’s previous 
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investments and its repertoire of routines (its ‘history’) constrain its future behavior” 
(Teece, Rumelt, Dosi, & Winter, 1994: 17).  
Future research might consider the effects of path dependency (e.g., Nelson & 
Winter, 1982) and momentum (e.g., Amburgey & Miner, 1992; Miller & Freisen, 1980) 
in the development of different capability configurations on relationships between 
resource endowments and the performance of young entrepreneurial firms following an 
IPO. Although research suggests that momentum represents a pervasive force with 
respect to the persistence of firm behavior over time (e.g., Amburgey & Miner, 1992), 
little research has examined how time-varying changes in the ordering of prior activity 
may affect firm behavior much less how these changes might explain the relationship 
between venture resources and firm performance.  
Third, this study examined the indirect effects of two configuration types and did 
not attempt to contrast the relative value creation potential of the two configurations 
given different resource endowments and industry contexts. Future research should 
consider whether an optimal balance exists between the formation and use of different 
capability sets and whether that balance is idiosyncratic to different resource 
endowments and industry setting. For example, scholars studying exploration and 
exploitation in organizational learning have assumed a strategic posture by recognizing 
the essential trade-offs firms make in undertaking these activities (e.g., Levinthal, 1997; 
Levinthal & March, 1993; March, 1991; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003), yet little is known 
about the organizational mechanisms that drive firms’ tendencies to engage in different 
capability configuration activities described in this study or about whether and how 
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firms balance the two activities. Subsequent research should attempt to fill this gap in 
organizational research by offering theory and evidence that demonstrate why and how 
firms balance these tendencies over time and across different domains.  
Fourth, I restricted my focus to the five senior-most executives to construct the 
measure of human capital at IPO when, in fact, lower level managers and employees 
likely influence allocation decisions affecting capability formation and use. However, 
the top managers and the CEO retain considerable symbolic, if not direct, influence that 
can convey their preferences for lower-level initiatives (Finkelstein, 1992; Pfeffer, 
1981). Additionally, agenda-setting at the top serves as an important guide for lower-
level managers to follow (Kotter, 1982). While influence may emanate from numerous 
parts of the firm, I have at least expanded the scope beyond the predominant focus on the 
CEO alone. Nevertheless, future research should consider the role and influence of 
human capital from origins in the firm beyond the upper echelon.  
Fifth, my sample was restricted to young, entrepreneurial firms that had recently 
completed an IPO, and my findings therefore may not be generalizable to all firms 
across different industries. For instance, managerial effects may be less intense in larger 
firms because they are more constrained by organizational inertia (Miller, Kets de Vries, 
& Toulouse, 1982). By contrast, in smaller, privately-held firms, the allocation and 
utilization of resources are likely dominated by managerial decisions (George, 2005). 
Thus, future research should consider these relationships across different organizational 
contexts (i.e., S&P 500 firms, privately-held firms, etc.). 
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Lastly, this study used conventional measures of industry membership (i.e., use 
of the 3-digit Standard Industrial Classification codes). It is conceivable that firms 
grouped by 3-digit SIC codes compete in different product and market domains. As a 
consequence, firms that would otherwise be considered competing within the same 
“industry” and thus facing similar environmental conditions may in fact face different 
contexts. Thus, future research could address the effects of competitive and 
environmental contexts on decisions to configure and use different organizational 
capabilities using different groupings.  
Conclusion 
Understanding how resource use facilitates achieving organizational goals is 
fundamental to theories of how firms act, evolve, and perform. In this study, I find that 
evolutionary theory and dynamic capabilities literature provide useful perspectives for 
examining these factors in combination, especially how underlying routines infuse 
resources with sustainable value, allowing them to be managed for greater advantage 
across different industry settings. I find that adjustments to the configuration of 
organizational capabilities affect performance prospects for new ventures in the period 
following an IPO. I also find that industry conditions moderate this relationship. Finally, 
I find that capability formation/use partially mediates the relationship between resources 
at IPO and performance. These results confirm that different capability configurations 
compete for firm resources, necessitating tradeoffs in allocation decisions between them 
and that such tradeoffs have compromising effects on firm performance over time. 
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APPENDIX A 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE USE OF SAS MACRO FOR ESTIMATING AND 
COMPARING INDIRECT EFFECTS IN MULTIPLE MEDIATION MODELS
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SAS MACRO OVERVIEW 
The macro described here is used to generate estimates for indirect effects associated 
with the multiple mediator model reported in Tables 17 and 18 and illustrated in Figure 
5, where c is the total effect of X  Y, c′ is the direct effect of X  Y, and the specific 
indirect effect of X on Y through mediator Mn is defined as anbn. This macro was 
developed by Professors Kristopher J. Preacher and Professor Andrew F. Hayes for 
estimating and comparing indirect effects in multiple mediator models. It was provided 
by Professor Preacher for use in this dissertation in an email exchange with Professor 
Preacher (March 23, 2006), and electronic copies of the macros can be obtained at 
http://www.comm.ohio-state.edu/ahayes/SPSS%20programs/indirect.htm. It allows for 
multiple mediators, statistical control of covariates, and all possible pairwise 
comparisons between indirect effects, and it also produces bias-corrected bootstrap 
confidence intervals in addition to percentile-based bootstrap confidence intervals. 
 
The SAS macro (%indirect) has the following syntax:  
 
%indirect (data=filename, y=dv, x=ivs, m=mlist covlist, c=cov, boot=z, 
conf=ci, normal=n, contrast=t, percent=p, bc=b, bca=d); 
 
where filename is the name of a SAS file name, dv is the name of the dependent variable, 
ivs are the name of the independent variables, and mlist is a list of mediator variables. 
These are the only arguments that are necessary for execution of the macro. If no other 
options are provided, the macro estimates the paths in the model assuming no control 
variables, the number of bootstraps is set to 1000, the confidence level defaults to 95, 
only bias corrected and adjusted confidence intervals for the indirect effects are printed, 
and no normal theory results or pairwise contrasts are conducted.  
 
Additional options include the following. covlist is a list of covariate variables, and cov 
is the number of covariate variables in the covlist list, z is the number of desired 
bootstrap resamples desired in increments of 1000 (e.g., boot = 2000 yields 2000 
bootstrap resamples; set it to 0 to disable bootstrapping), ci is the desired confidence 
level, p is set to 1 to print percentile-based confidence intervals, b is set to 1 to print 
bias-corrected confidence intervals, d is set to 0 to disable printing of bias corrected and 
adjusted confidence intervals, n is set to 1 to enable printing of normal theory test 
results, and t is set to 1 to do all possible pairwise contrasts between indirect effects. If 
any of these arguments are not provided, default values will be used (the defaults are c = 
0, z = 1000, ci = 95, p = 0, b =0, d = 1, n = 0, t = 0). If c is set to 0, it is assumed that 
there are no variables listed in covlist, and all variables listed after “m =” are treated as 
potential mediators. The macro accepts missing data as “.” and uses listwise deletion to 
exclude cases with missing data.  
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SAS MACRO COMMAND SET 
 
%macro 
indirect(data=,y=,x=,m=,c=0,boot=100,conf=95,percent=0,bc=0,bca=1, 
normal=0,contrast=0); 
proc iml; 
use &data; 
read all var{&y &x &m} into dd; 
nm={&y &x &m}; 
xx=(dd = .);xx=xx[,+]; 
j=1;do i = 1 to nrow(dd);if xx[i,1]=0 
then;do;dd[j,]=dd[i,];j=j+1;end;end; 
dd=dd[1:j-1,]; 
nm = nm`; 
n = nrow(dd); 
nv = ncol(dd); 
nc = &c; 
con=j(n,1,1); 
dt2 = dd; 
dt = dd; 
resid = j(n,(nv-nc),0); 
info = j((2*(nv-nc-2)+1),(2*(nv-nc-2)+1),0); 
imat = j(ncol(info),4,1); 
imat[1:(nv-nc-2),1]=(2:(nv-nc-1))`; 
imat[1:(nv-nc-2),3]=(2:(nv-nc-1))`; 
imat[(nv-nc-1):(ncol(info)-1),2]=(2:(nv-nc-1))`; 
imat[(nv-nc-1):(ncol(info)-1),4]=(2:(nv-nc-1))`; 
imat[(nv-nc-1):(ncol(info)-1),1]=j((nv-nc-2),1,(nv-nc)); 
imat[(nv-nc-1):(ncol(info)-1),3]=j((nv-nc-2),1,(nv-nc)); 
imat[ncol(info),1:4]={1 1 1 1}; 
imat[ncol(info),1]=nv-nc; 
imat[ncol(info),3]=nv-nc; 
bzx = j(nv-2-nc,1,0); 
bzxse = j(nv-2-nc,1,0); 
b=j((nv-1-nc),(nv-1-nc),0); 
cname={"C1", "C2", "C3", "C4", "C5", "C6", "C7", "C8", "C9", "C10", 
"C11", "C12", "C13", "C14", "C15", "C16"}; 
cname=cname//{"C17", "C18", "C19", "C20", "C21", "C22", "C23", "C24", 
"C25", "C26", "C27", "C28", "C29"}; 
cname=cname//{"C30", "C31", "C32", "C33", "C34", "C35", "C36", "C37", 
"C38", "C39", "C40", "C41", "C42"}; 
cname=cname//{"C43", "C44", "C45"}; 
p0 = -0.322232431088; 
p1 = -1; 
p2 = -0.342242088547; 
p3 = -0.0204231210245; 
p4 = -.0000453642210148; 
q0 = 0.0993484626060; 
q1 = 0.588581570495; 
q2 = 0.531103462366; 
q3 = 0.103537752850; 
q4 = 0.0038560700634; 
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conf=round(&conf); 
lowalp = 0.5*(1-(conf/100)); 
upalp = 0.5*(1+(conf/100)); 
zbca = lowalp//upalp; 
btn = 1; 
if (&boot > 999) then; 
  do; 
  btn = floor(&boot/1000)*1000; 
  end; 
blowp = floor(lowalp*btn); 
if (blowp < 1) then; 
  do; 
  blowp = 1; 
  end; 
bhighp = floor((upalp*btn)+1); 
if (bhighp > btn) then; 
  do; 
  bhighp = btn; 
  end; 
indeff = j((n+1+btn),(nv-1-nc),0); 
do d = 1 to (n+1+btn); 
  if (d = (n+2)) then; 
    do; 
 dt = dt2; 
 con = j(n,1,1); 
 end; 
  if (d > 1) then if (d < (n+2)) then; 
    do; 
    if (d = 2) then; 
   do; 
   con = j((n-1),1,1); 
   dt = dt2[2:n,]; 
   end; 
 if (d = (n+1)) then; 
   do; 
      dt = dt2[1:(n-1),]; 
   end; 
    if (d > 2) then if (d < (n+1)) then; 
   do; 
      dt = dt2[1:(d-2),]//dt2[(d:n),]; 
      end; 
 end; 
  if (d > (n+1)) then; 
    do; 
   do nn = 1 to n; 
      v = int(ranuni(0)*n)+1; 
   dt[nn,1:nv]=dt2[v,1:nv]; 
   end; 
 end; 
 
x = dt[,2]; 
m = dt[,3:(nv-nc)]; 
y = dt[,1]; 
xz = dt[,2:nv]; 
xo = con||x; 
if (nc > 0) then; 
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   do; 
   c = dt[,(nv-nc+1):nv]; 
   xo = xo||c; 
   end; 
do k = 3 to (nv-nc); 
  ytmp = dt[,k]; 
  bzxt = inv(xo`*xo)*xo`*ytmp; 
  bzx[(k-2),1]=bzxt[2,1]; 
  if (d = 1) then; 
    do; 
 resid[,(k-1)]=ytmp-(xo*bzxt); 
 mse = sum((ytmp-(xo*bzxt))##2)/(n-2-nc); 
 olscm = (mse*inv(xo`*xo)); 
 bzxse[(k-2),1]=sqrt(olscm[2,2]); 
 end; 
end; 
if (d = 1) then; 
  do; 
  if (nc > 0) then; 
    do; 
    cnt = dd[,(nv-(nc-1)):nv]; 
    xo = con||x||cnt; 
  end; 
  if (nc = 0) then; 
    do; 
    xo = con||x; 
  end; 
  byx = inv(xo`*xo)*xo`*y; 
  mse = sum((y-(xo*byx))##2)/(n-2-nc); 
  olscm = (mse*inv(xo`*xo)); 
  byxse = sqrt(olscm[2,2]); 
  byx = byx[2,1]; 
  end; 
xzo = con||xz; 
byzx = inv(xzo`*xzo)*xzo`*y; 
byzx2 = byzx[3:(nv-nc),1]; 
if (d = 1) then; 
  do; 
  resid[,ncol(resid)]=y-(xzo*byzx); 
  mse = sum((y-(xzo*byzx))##2)/(n-nv); 
  covmat = mse*inv(xzo`*xzo); 
  olscm = vecdiag(covmat); 
  sse = mse*(n-nv); 
  sst = sum((y-(sum(y)/n))##2); 
  r2 = 1-(sse/sst); 
  ar2 = 1-(mse/(sst/(n-1))); 
  fr = ((n-nv)*r2)/((1-r2)*ncol(xz)); 
  pfr = 1-probf(fr,ncol(xz),(n-nv)); 
  if (nc > 0) then; 
    do; 
    bcon = byzx[(nv-nc+1):nv,1]; 
 bconse = sqrt(olscm[(nv-nc+1):nv,1]); 
    end; 
  byzx2se = sqrt(olscm[3:(nv-nc),1]); 
  cprime = byzx[2,1]; 
  cprimese=sqrt(olscm[2,1]); 
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end; 
indeff2 = (bzx#byzx2); 
zs = (bzx/bzxse)#(byzx2/byzx2se); 
temp = t(sum(indeff2)//indeff2); 
indeff[d,]=temp; 
if (d = 1) then; 
  do; 
  vs = nm[1:(nv-nc),1]; 
  rn = {"DV = " "IV = " "MEDS = "}; 
  print "Dependent, Independent, and Proposed Mediator Variables"; 
  print vs [rowname = rn]; 
  if (nc > 0) then; 
    do; 
 vs = nm[(nv-nc+1):nv,1]; 
 print "Statistical Controls"; 
 rn = {"CONTROLS="}; 
 print vs [rowname = rn]; 
 end; 
  print "Sample size"; 
  print n; 
  nms = nm[3:(nv-nc),1]; 
  te = bzx/bzxse; 
  df = n-2-nc; 
  p = 2*(1-probt(abs(te),df)); 
  bzxmat = bzx||bzxse||te||p; 
  b[2:(nv-1-nc),1]=bzx; 
  se2 = bzxse#bzxse; 
  cnm = {"Coeff" "se" "t" "p"}; 
  print "IV to Mediators (a paths)"; 
  print bzxmat [rowname = nms colname = cnm format = 9.4]; 
  te = byzx2/byzx2se; 
  df = n-nv; 
  p = 2*(1-probt(abs(te),df)); 
  byzx2mat=byzx2||byzx2se||te||p; 
  print "Direct Effects of Mediators on DV (b paths)"; 
  print byzx2mat [rowname = nms colname = cnm format = 9.4]; 
  te=byx/byxse; 
  df = n-2-nc; 
  p=2*(1-probt(abs(te),df)); 
  byxmat = byx||byxse||te||p; 
  xnm=nm[2,1]; 
  print "Total effect of IV on DV (c path)"; 
  print byxmat [rowname = xnm colname = cnm format = 9.4]; 
  te=cprime/cprimese; 
  df = n-nv; 
  p=2*(1-probt(abs(te),df)); 
  cprimmat = cprime||cprimese||te||p; 
  print "Direct Effect of IV on DV (c' path)"; 
  print cprimmat [rowname = xnm colname = cnm format = 9.4]; 
  if (nc > 0) then; 
    do; 
 df = n-nv; 
 nms = nm[(nv-nc+1):nv,1]; 
 te=bcon/bconse; 
 p=2*(1-probt(abs(te),df)); 
 bconmat = bcon||bconse||te||p; 
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 print "Partial Effect of Control Variables on DV"; 
 print bconmat [rowname = nms colname = cnm format = 9.4]; 
 end; 
  dvms=r2||ar2||fr||ncol(xz)||(n-nv)||pfr; 
  print "Fit Statistics for DV Model"; 
  cnm = {"R-sq" "adj R-sq" "F" "df1" "df2" "p"}; 
  print dvms [colname = cnm format = 9.4]; 
  if (&normal =^ 0) then;if(&c = 0) then;do; 
    do; 
      bmat=j((nv-nc),(nv-nc),0); 
      bmat[2:(nv-nc-1),1]=bzx; 
   bmat[(nv-nc),2:(nv-nc-1)]=byzx2`; 
      bmat[(nv-nc),1]=cprime; 
      imbinv = inv(i(ncol(bmat))-bmat); 
   imbtinv = inv(i(ncol(bmat))-bmat`); 
      resid[,1]=x-(x[+]/n); 
   psi = (resid`*resid)/(n-1); 
   invpsi = inv(psi); 
   ibpsiib = imbinv*psi*imbtinv; 
   do ic = 1 to ncol(info); 
     do ic2 = 1 to ncol(info); 
    info[ic,ic2]=(n-
1)*((imbinv[imat[ic2,4],imat[ic,1]]*imbinv[imat[ic,2],imat[ic2,3]])+(ib
psiib[imat[ic2,4],imat[ic,2]]*invpsi[imat[ic,1],imat[ic2,3]])); 
        end; 
   end; 
   varcov=inv(info); 
   varcov=varcov[1:(2*(nv-nc-2)),1:(2*(nv-nc-2))]; 
   ses = vecdiag(varcov); 
   avar = ses[1:nrow(bzxse),1]; 
   bvar = ses[(nrow(bzxse)+1):nrow(ses),1]; 
   if ((nv-nc-2) > 1) then;do;if(&contrast = 1) then;do; 
     prws=j(((nv-nc-2)*(nv-nc-3)/2),1,0); 
  prwse=prws; 
  kk=1; 
  do ic = 1 to (nv-nc-3); 
    do ic2 = (ic+1) to (nv-nc-2); 
      vf2=((byzx2[ic,1]##2)*varcov[ic,ic])-
(2*byzx2[ic,1]*byzx2[ic2,1]*(varcov[ic,ic2])); 
  
 vf2=vf2+((byzx2[ic2,1]##2)*varcov[ic2,ic2])+((bzx[ic,1]##2)*(bvar
[ic,1])); 
   vf2=vf2-
(2*bzx[ic,1]*bzx[ic2,1]*covmat[(2+ic),(2+ic2)])+((bzx[ic2,1]##2)*(bvar[
ic2,1])); 
   cnt=indeff2[ic,1]-indeff2[ic2,1]; 
   prws[kk,1]=cnt; 
   prwse[kk,1]=sqrt(vf2); 
   kk=kk+1; 
    end; 
     end; 
   cnam2=cname[1:(kk-1),1]; 
   end;end; 
   dermat=byzx2//bzx; 
   totse=sqrt((dermat)`*varcov*dermat); 
   specse = sqrt((byzx2#byzx2)#(avar)+(bzx#bzx)#(bvar)); 
 282 
 
 
 
   specse = totse//specse; 
   indsum=indeff2[+]; 
      specz = (indsum//indeff2)/specse; 
   ind22 = indsum//indeff2; 
   nms = {"TOTAL"}//nm[3:(nv-nc),1]; 
   if ((nv-nc-2) > 1) then;do;if(&contrast = 1) then;do; 
     ind22 = ind22//prws; 
  specse = specse//prwse; 
  specz2 = prws/prwse; 
  specz = specz//specz2; 
  nms = nms//cnam2; 
  end;end; 
      pspec = 2*(1-probnorm(abs(specz))); 
      spec = ind22||specse||specz||pspec; 
      cnm = {"Effect" "se" "Z" "p"}; 
      print "*****************************************************"; 
      print "NORMAL THEORY TESTS FOR INDIRECT EFFECTS"; 
      print "Indirect Effects of IV on DV through Mediators (ab 
paths)"; 
      print spec [rowname = nms colname = cnm format = 9.4]; 
    end;end; 
  end; 
end; 
if (btn > 1) then;do; 
  nms = {"TOTAL"}//nm[3:(nv-nc),1]; 
  if (nv-nc-2) > 1 then do;if (&contrast = 1) then do; 
     crst=j((n+1+btn),((nv-nc-2)*(nv-nc-3)/2),0); 
  kk=1; 
  do ic = 2 to (nv-nc-2); 
    do ic2 = (ic+1) to (nv-nc-1); 
      crst[,kk]=indeff[,ic]-indeff[,ic2]; 
   kk=kk+1; 
    end; 
  end; 
     indeff = indeff||crst; 
  cnam2=cname[1:(kk-1),1]; 
  nms = nms//cnam2; 
  end; 
  end; 
lvout = indeff[2:(n+1),]; 
tdotm = lvout[+,]/n; 
tm = j(n,ncol(lvout),1)*diag(tdotm); 
topa=(((n-1)/n)*(tm-lvout))##3; 
topa=topa[+,]; 
bota =((((n-1)/n)*(tm-lvout))##2); 
bota=bota[+,]; 
bota=6*sqrt(bota##3); 
ahat = topa/bota; 
indsam = indeff[1,]`; 
boot = indeff[(n+2):nrow(indeff),]; 
mnboot = (boot[+,]/btn)`; 
xt=boot-j(btn,1)*boot[:,]; 
cv=(xt`*xt)/btn; 
se=sqrt(vecdiag(cv)); 
 
  create bootstp from boot [colname='indirect']; 
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  append from boot; 
  nnn = j(1,ncol(indeff),-999); 
  boot = nnn//boot; 
  do e = 1 to (ncol(indeff)); 
  do i = 2 to (btn+1); 
    ix = boot[i,e]; 
 do k = i to 2 by -1; 
   k2 = k; 
   if (boot[(k-1),e] > ix) then; 
     do; 
  boot[k,e]=boot[(k-1),e]; 
  end; 
   else; 
   if (boot[(k-1),e] <= ix) then; 
     do; 
  goto stpit; 
  end; 
 end; 
 stpit: 
 boot[k2,e]=ix; 
    end; 
    end; 
  boot = boot[2:(btn+1),]; 
 
xp=j((nrow(mnboot)+2),1,0); 
do i = 1 to (nrow(mnboot)+2); 
  if (i <= nrow(mnboot)) then; 
    do; 
    pv = (boot[,i] < indsam[i,1]); 
 pv = pv[+,]/btn; 
    end; 
  else; 
    pv = zbca[(i-nrow(mnboot)),1]; 
  p=pv; 
  if (pv > 0.5) then; 
    do; 
 p = 1-pv; 
 end; 
  y5 = sqrt(-2*log(p)); 
  
xp[i,1]=y5+((((y5*p4+p3)*y5+p2)*y5+p1)*y5+p0)/((((y5*q4+q3)*y5+q2)*y5+q
1)*y5+q0); 
  if (pv <= 0.5) then; 
    do; 
 xp[i,1]=-xp[i,1]; 
 end; 
end; 
bbb = nrow(mnboot); 
zz = xp[1:bbb,1]; 
zlo = zz + ((zz+xp[(bbb+1),1])/(1-ahat`#(zz+xp[(bbb+1),1]))); 
zup = zz + ((zz+xp[(bbb+2),1])/(1-ahat`#(zz+xp[(bbb+2),1]))); 
ahat = 0; 
zlobc = zz + ((zz+xp[(bbb+1),1])/(1-ahat`#(zz+xp[(bbb+1),1]))); 
zupbc = zz + ((zz+xp[(bbb+2),1])/(1-ahat`#(zz+xp[(bbb+2),1]))); 
zlo = probnorm(zlo); 
zup = probnorm(zup); 
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zlobc = probnorm(zlobc); 
zupbc = probnorm(zupbc); 
blow = int(zlo*(btn+1)); 
bhigh = int(zup*(btn+1))+1; 
blowbc = int(zlobc*(btn+1)); 
bhighbc = int(zupbc*(btn+1))+1; 
lowbca = j(nrow(blow),1,0); 
upbca = lowbca; 
do i = 1 to nrow(blow); 
  if (blow[i,1] < 1) then; 
    do; 
 blow[i,1]=1; 
 end; 
  lowbca[i,1]=boot[blow[i,1],i]; 
  if (bhigh[i,1] > btn) then; 
    do; 
 bhigh[i,1]=btn; 
 end; 
  upbca[i,1]=boot[bhigh[i,1],i]; 
end; 
lowbc = j(nrow(blow),1,0); 
upbc = lowbca; 
do i = 1 to nrow(blowbc); 
  if (blowbc[i,1] < 1) then; 
    do; 
 blowbc[i,1]=1; 
 end; 
  lowbc[i,1]=boot[blowbc[i,1],i]; 
  if (bhighbc[i,1] > btn) then; 
    do; 
 bhighbc[i,1]=btn; 
 end; 
  upbc[i,1]=boot[bhighbc[i,1],i]; 
end; 
print "*****************************************************"; 
print "BOOTSTRAP RESULTS FOR INDIRECT EFFECTS"; 
res = indsam||mnboot||(mnboot-indsam)||se; 
cn = {"Data" "Boot" "Bias" "SE"}; 
print "Indirect Effects of IV on DV through Mediators (ab paths)"; 
print res [rowname = nms colname = cn format = 9.4]; 
lowperc = boot[blowp,]; 
upperc = boot[bhighp,]; 
ci = lowbca||upbca; 
cn = {"Lower" "Upper"}; 
if (&bca ^= 0) then; 
  do; 
  print "Bias Corrected and Accelerated Confidence Intervals"; 
  print ci [rowname = nms colname = cn format = 9.4]; 
  end; 
if (&bc ^= 0) then; 
  do; 
  ci = lowbc||upbc; 
  print "Bias Corrected Confidence Intervals"; 
  print ci [rowname = nms colname = cn format = 9.4]; 
  end; 
 if (&percent ^= 0) then; 
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  do; 
  ci = lowperc`||upperc`; 
  print "Percentile Confidence Intervals"; 
  print ci [rowname = nms colname = cn format = 9.4]; 
  end; 
print "*****************************************************"; 
print "Level of Confidence for Confidence Intervals"; 
print conf; 
print "Number of Bootstrap Resamples"; 
print btn; 
end; 
if (&normal = 1) then;do;if (&c = 0) then;do;prt =1;end;end; 
if (btn > 999) then;do;prt = 1;end; 
if ((nv-nc-2) > 1) then;do;if (&contrast = 1) then;do; 
if (prt = 1) then;do; 
print "*****************************************************"; 
print "Indirect Effect Contrast Definitions: IndEff_1 minus IndEff2"; 
kk=1; 
prwsv = j(((nv-nc-2)*(nv-nc-3)/2),2,"XXXXXXXX"); 
do ic = 1 to (nv-nc-3); 
  do ic2 = (ic+1) to (nv-nc-2); 
    prwsv[kk,1]=nm[ic+2,1]; 
 prwsv[kk,2]=nm[ic2+2,1]; 
 kk=kk+1; 
  end; 
end; 
prwsv = cnam2||prwsv; 
cn = {"Contrast" "IndEff_1" "IndEff_2"}; 
print prwsv [colname = cn]; 
end;end;end; 
quit; 
%mend; 
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